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Mahmoud Abbas
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Palestinian option not dead

Israel must move to strengthen moderate forces in the PA

The chorus of "I told you so" about Hamas' victory is superfluous, and not only because most of it only appeared after the fact.

 

From all sides of the political spectrum, we appear not only "shocked," but we also have no intention to learn anything from the episode.

 

Two main refrains have been heard since the revolution: That a Hamas-led Palestinian Authority cannot be considered a partner, and the second says that because of this, Israel must continue to make unilateral disengagements.

 

Really?

 

Make up your mind

 

Those making the first claim must ask themselves honestly: Did they consider the PA under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, Mahmoud Abbas and Ahmed Qurei was a credible partner?

 

If so, why have they stubbornly refused all efforts to renew negotiations with them over the last five years?

 

And if not, why should Israel get so excited that there is no negotiating partner? According to that approach, not much has changed, and the policy of unilateralism based on this logic should remain the preferred one.

 

Different reality

 

But this is not the reality of two central points – Hamas' ideology and long term strategy.

 

Arafat's and Abbas' PLO accepted UN Council Resolution 242 in 1988 and recognized Israel in 1993 from a position of weakness. The collapse of the Soviet Union, pressure from the Reagan administration, Israel's peace treaty with Egypt and Israel's resilience in the face of the first intifada brought the PLO to abandon the "armed struggle" in favor of diplomacy to obtain half its goal, a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders.

 

But Oslo, due to mistakes on both sides, "brought the Palestinians nothing politically," according to Mahmoud a-Zahar, and Fatah was banished to political exile.

 

Position of strength

 

Hamas takes power in 2006 from a position of strength. Most of the Palestinian public believes that only Hamas terrorism sent Israel fleeing from the Gaza Strip, and failed to see disengagement as a process – flawed as it may have been – by which Sharon intended to buy time to strengthen settlements in Judea and Samaria.

 

In addition, Hamas also promises a war on corruption and official anarchy, in order to present the Palestinian people, who feel they have nothing left to lose, a better alternative to ending the Israeli occupation and to make social advances.

 

In coming years Hamas will try to reach other types of agreements with Israel before considering tactical negotiations, because "in negotiations, the scales of power always lean towards the stronger side," as Ismail Hania explains.

 

Partner for what?

 

Israel has refused for years to answer the question: Partner for what kind of agreement? It is true that Hamas, like the PLO, will not be party to an agreement that leaves Israeli sovereignty over "united Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley and settlement blocs."

 

Hamas has said it would support the establishment of a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders, but as opposed to the PLO, it will not consider land swaps, dividing eastern Jerusalem, a demilitarized Palestinian state and the like.

 

Hamas is also unprepared, in contrast to the PLO, to recognize the principle of two states for two peoples, because "All of Palestine, from the river to the sea, is Islamic holy land."

 

No fantasies

 

Israel, on the other hand, must not fantasize about turning Hamas into a possible partner for a final status agreement because of its religious outlook.

 

In addition, it must reject any process by which the Palestinian leadership goes back to developing an illusion of power and refusal to compromise as a preferred method to establish a state and to solve the refugee issue.

 

Using Gaza-style withdrawals, the Sharon government did all it could to avoid renewing negotiations with Mahmoud Abbas. This mistake must not be repeated, because that will serve Hamas' long term strategy.

 

Back to the Palestinians

 

On the other hand, Israel must go back to the Palestinians to present diplomatic alternatives for a just settlement based on UN Security Council Resolution 242, not the cursed "Road Map for Middle East peace."

 

Such moves could strengthen moderate forces amongst the Palestinians as a secular opposition to the Hamas government. They could stick to the stance calling for historic compromise between two peoples, and learn a few lessons about corruption and anarchy for the day when they return to power.

 

The success of this policy requires Israel to cooperate with the United States and Europe, as well as with Egypt and Jordan, who have no joy in considering the implications of Hamas' victory on their own Moslem Brotherhood groups.

 

The loss of a Palestinian opposition, whether it is due to the mistaken decision to join Hamas or due to Israeli mistakes, will slam the compromise option shut and perpetuate the battle between extremists over this land.

 

Brig. Gen. (res.) Shaul Arieli is a member of the Council for Peace and Security and was one of the initiators of the Geneva Initiative

 


פרסום ראשון: 01.30.06, 11:21
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