Mahmoud Abbas assured the Israeli government that he would continue to manage the Israeli-Palestinian relationship in his capacity as head of the PLO. Such a move will allow him to retain his stature and relevancy, both internally and vis-a-vis the international community.
For all its rhetoric, Hamas is afraid of being cut-off from western financial resources, which are vital for its ability to deliver its election promise of "change and reform." Therefore, it has an interest in allowing Abbas to continue in his role as head of the PLO, which will constitute a "fig leaf," enabling Hamas to continue controlling the Palestinian agenda without being held accountable by the international community and its constituents.
Meanwhile the international community is attempting to construct a policy which allows it to retain its foothold in the region and aid the Palestinian population. This is all the more poignant in light of growing ethnic tensions in Europe and the chance of Hamas turning to Iran. However, given the international recognition of Hamas as a terror organization, the world is searching for a non-Hamas entity to sustain its interests.
These parties thus have a shared interest in forming a new entity that serves their own motives. Recent proposals to revive the PLO, establish a technocratic Palestinian cabinet, or a Fatah-Hamas national unity government are presented as a legitimate and authoritative partner whereas in reality such bodies will be subject to Hamas' control and will at best serve as middlemen.
Hamas' control, in part, stems from reforms enacted during Yasser Arafat's tenure. These internationally sponsored amendments to the Palestinian Basic Law significantly weakened the office of the President in favor of the Prime Minister, transferring the responsibilities for forming the cabinet and supervision of the security forces.
The appointment of Ismail Haniyeh to the latter office signifies that Hamas now has concrete legal powers, as well as the ever-present armed faction. Hamas can therefore undermine Abbas through both democratic procedures and military vetoes.
Revival of the PLO – a non-starter
Abbas has proposed that the international community and Israel continue working with him, only now in his position as head of the Fatah-controlled PLO. The PLO continues to bill itself as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people," is therefore an enticing candidate to bypass Hamas.
However, the PLO's ability to implement decisions has been eroded since the establishment of the PA. The Oslo Process gradually bestowed upon the Palestinians partial autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza through agreements with Israel. Currently the PA has institutions, security apparatuses as well as democratic elections.
The PLO on the other hand has no such entities. Especially in light of the Palestinian's electoral rejection of the Fatah movement, any shift which seemingly restores its leadership is bound to elicit negative reactions and a desire to bloc any move Fatah may wish to pursue. The PA will choose whether or not to implement any PLO decision.
Reworking the PA – a clever ruse
Should the PLO option fall off the table, the international community will be tempted to work with a technocratic or a possible national unity government, headed by Abbas. This strategy rests on the assumption that it will be possible to make suitable arrangements with the non-Hamas body (technocrat option) or the non-Hamas members of the cabinet (National Unity government).
However, in either possibility, Hamas will dictate the proceedings through three main vehicles. 74 out of 132 parliamentary seats (56 percent) give Hamas a solid legislative majority, and thus the ability to veto budgetary issues and withdraw confidence from the government.
Additionally, a Hamas prime minister and likely interior minister will exercise control over the security apparatuses. Even if Abbas keeps control over the security forces and successfully marginalizes the legislative council, Hamas' militant wing remains armed and will be able to violently veto any move it disagrees with by carrying-out terror operations.
Israel should realize that Hamas currently controls the Palestinian leadership and its newfound responsibility is no reason to assume that movement will moderate and recognize Israel's right to exist. Dealing with alternative interlocutors presents the false veneer of avoiding Hamas, when in reality any address which is not Hamas itself will only be performing the services of a middleman.
There are already indications that the international front against Hamas is becoming fragmented. Under such circumstances, there is a growing need for American-Israeli coordination to prevent the legitimization of Hamas as a partner for the political process.
Should the current situation in the West Bank and Gaza require Israel to make arrangements vis-a-vis Hamas to prevent a humanitarian crisis, Abbas in any of his roles may serve as a mediator. However, his inability to implement substantial policies means that no matter how good his intentions, it is a mistake to view him as the partner himself.
Jonathan Adiri and Gabe Ross are analysts at the Re’ut Institute for
Policy Planning in Tel Aviv
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