Mofaz. Stands behind his decisions
צילום: דודי ועקנין
Mofaz: This is no way to end war
In interview with Ynet reporters, Shaul Mofaz details decisions, draws conclusions about war. In support of commission of inquiry, he has a lot to tell commission, and can't wait to do so
In interview with Ynet reporters, Shaul Mofaz details decisions, draws conclusions about war. In support of commission of inquiry, he has a lot to tell inquiry committee, and can't wait to do so
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert gave the go ahead to launch the major ground offensive at the end of the war in Lebanon on Friday, August 11, at 4:55 P.M. Shaul Mofaz testified that an hour later the phone rang at his Kokhav Ya'ir home. The prime minister was on the line. "I authorized the operation," Olmert said. "How much time do the forces have?" Mofaz asked. "Sixty hours," Olmert said. "The ceasefire goes into effect Monday morning."
"I thought this was a trick he played on the Americans," Mofaz said. "I could not believe they were really going for the operation. Sixty hours is not enough time to perform an operation that was planned to last several weeks.
"I asked Olmert, 'What will you tell the parents of the boys who will be killed in these 60 hours? What will you tell their mothers?'" said Mofaz.
"Good question," Olmert replied. "I don’t have a good answer."
"This is no way to end a war," said Mofaz. But he considers Kadima his political home, and this is not the time to burn down the house. He talked to Olmert and they reached a ceasefire agreement - Mofaz will not lash out at Olmert over the war moves, and Olmert will not attack Mofaz for the eight years that preceded the war, in which Mofaz served as chief of staff and defense minister.
They agreed to wait for the commission of inquiry to publish its decisions. Mofaz is still certain that they have to appoint a national commission of inquiry.
To his credit it must be said that, unlike others, he does not deny his responsibility. He played crucial roles in Israel's security leadership, first as chief of staff and then two terms as defense minister in Ariel Sharon's cabinet. He is at peace with the policy that was chosen, with the priorities, with the decisions made on Lebanese issues, including the self-imposed Israeli restraint in the face of Hizbullah.
Mofaz is primarily a professional, a soldier. In the last war, he found himself facing a serious conflict. He realized that any suggestion he makes might be viewed by Amir Peretz, and perhaps even the army command, as an illegitimate intervention of a former minister in his successor's deeds.
Shortly before this cabinet was established and he had the tough conversation with Olmert, who told him that Amir Peretz would replace him as defense minister, Mofaz said: "If you had any other minister in the Defense Ministry, the buck would stop with him. From now on, every security incident will reach you."
As could be expected, the war convinced Mofaz that he was right about Peretz's appointment.
"At war, the defense minister is in charge of the army. Imagine they would take me to an open-heart surgery theater, told me that from now on I was in charge of all heart surgeries, and that I should perform this one. Sure, it is a very respectable job, but I do not know what an open heart looks like. I would not know what to do with a scalpel.
"I am not against appointing a civilian as defense minister, provided that civilian knows what he is doing. A defense minister should be able to read a map of 1:50,000 scale. At least that, damn it! They say that I held no discussions on the Lebanese issue during my eight years as chief of staff and defense minister. Well, the number of discussions I held on Lebanon was larger than the number of strikes Amir Peretz's labor union organized." Mofaz asserted.
The old bull
Even before Israel pulled out of Lebanon in May 2000, Hizbullah had thousands of Katyushas ready to be launched in southern Lebanon - 7,000, according to Ehud Barak; more than 5,000 according to Mofaz. The Israeli cabinets - first Barak's and then Sharon's - actually and practically decided to live with this threat. As chief of staff and defense minister, Mofaz supported that policy. Now he explained why.
"In February 2001, a wave of suicide terror attacks started. The citizens were afraid to go out. Our way of life was completely disrupted. Seeking to restore the sense of security, we mainly focused on the Palestinian ring. I believed it would be wrong to carry out an operation against Hizbullah.
"Now they are asking me, why did you not launch a preemptive attack? How did you let them accumulate missiles? Hizbullah was preparing, and what did you do? I reply: The State of Israel has always gone to war when it had no other choice. We prepared ourselves to take action on the day in which we could lean on two things: international support and consensus in Israel.
"What would the Israeli public have said if we launched a preemptive attack on Lebanon? They would have said: is now the time to suddenly attack Hizbullah? There was no justification to do that even after the Palestinian front calmed down.
"Israel is facing a whole range of threats. The question is whether our distribution of attention was correct. I believed that Iran is our primary threat, and I still think so. The second threat is Palestinian terror. Hizbullah and Syria come only after those two. Iran and Syria presently have missiles that threaten every Israeli settlement. Is anyone recommending today that we attack Syria and Iran?
"Anyone who examines our preparations will find we acted correctly, including the consideration of our budgetary constraints. As chief of staff, I authorized all the plans for gathering intelligence about the rocket setup. If I told you how many soldiers we risked bringing good intelligence about the missiles in Lebanon, it would send shivers down your spines. We had good to very good intelligence. What of that reached the ground levels during the last war is already a different story.
"We made plans for a ground offensive. Then we made another plan. We also drew a plan for air raids. We had a bank of 700 to 1,000 Hizbullah targets. We tested our plan for the attack on Hizbullah's long-range missiles on a model. We spent 3 years working on it. According to the plan, which was acted on during the war with unusual success, we could have destroyed the missiles in less than an hour."
Have you failed to properly prepare the reserve forces?
"What are you talking about?" Mofaz asked. "In Operation Defensive Shield, in April 2002, we mobilized thousands of reservists. Officers who then served as battalion commanders are presently brigade commanders, and those who were company commanders are now battalion commanders.
"They are the same people, serving with the same army. With the exception of a single battle, the one held in the Jenin refugee camp, all the units attained their goals, including in the refugee camps. They were all mission oriented. I insisted on that. Every unit knew where it was going to fight. Today, two reservists who returned from there asked me, why didn't you let us carry out the missions we were trained for?"
Amir Peretz is speaking of years of negligence.
"These are irresponsible assertions. I cannot say that Sharon and I would not have checked the operational plans first hand. God is in the details. You cannot say that you do not care about the details. Someone should have checked the army, asked questions. I would have examined the operation plans of every division with my 40 years of experience right there on the table."
Did Ariel Sharon or Moshe (Bugi) Yaalon ever say that we should let their Katyushas rust?
"I never heard them make such a remark. Bugi and I saw Lebanon eye to eye. Many times I came to Sharon to consult him on whether we should attack in Lebanon. A soldier was killed by a Hizbullah roadside bomb. There were their provocations on Har Dov. Nasrallah made his remarks. I told Sharon: Perhaps the time has come to strike at them?
"Sharon used to calm me. It was like in this story about the old bull and the young bull. Patience, Sharon said, we will get to every one of them. We must maintain stability, keep things in proportion. We are on the right track on the Palestinian issue. If we start another front in Lebanon, we might enter a whirlpool. You cannot fire in every direction."
Do you regret the fact that Halutz was made chief of staff?
"Absolutely not. Every chief of staff has ground, naval, and aerial experts next to him. This chief of staff had the best ground people around him - Kaplinsky, Eisencott, and Gantz. He has an excellent Navy commander and an excellent Air Force commander."
None of this seemed to work in this war.
"At war, the defense minister is responsible."
Of the 7-men group that managed this war, you were the most experienced one. What impact did you have on the wartime decisions?
"It was a loaded situation. We had an appointed defense minister and, when discussions are held, a veteran defense minister sits in too. Who runs the show? In addition, you cannot give advice while not having the full situational picture, which is something the prime minister, the defense minister, and the chief of staff have.
"I believed that starting with air raids on the missiles first and raiding the Dahiyah neighborhood of Beirut later was a correct idea. Olmert summoned me for a personal meeting before deciding to raid Beirut on Friday, during the first week of the war. The general feeling was that there will be no ground operation and that if it is needed, it will be prepared.
"I told Olmert, if you are going to bring in the ground forces, you should take moves to fill gaps in your setup now. The IDF has an old plan on how to refresh the reserves, I said, activate it and you will have warriors ready for action."
So what happened?
"The government decided not to mobilize the reserves."
Shaul Mofaz is angry. He has things to tell the inquiry committee and he is only waiting for an opportunity. We asked him whether he did what many are doing these days and lawyered up. "I need no lawyer. I have everything here," he said pointing at his notebooks.
"Imagine that this war, the second war in Lebanon," he said, "would have ended differently. Where would Olmert be today? Where would Kadima be today? Where would the State of Israel be today?"
Shimon Shiffer contributed to this report
