Wrong kind of gesture

In light of the up-and-coming release of Palestinian prisoners as a gesture to Mahmoud Abbas ahead of the Feast of Sacrifice, we should recall several basic principles pertaining to crisis negotiations in the Israeli-Palestinian context.

First, the prime minister must decide whether the release of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit will happen in the framework of a comprehensive deal that would include, among other things: The formation of a unity government on the Palestinian side, a stable ceasefire, and the establishment of a "return address" for diplomatic talks; or alternately, that this direction is no longer realistic and Shalit has now become a tradable asset in the gang war raging in Gaza.

It appears that by agreeing to release prisoners with no connection whatsoever to the Shalit deal, Olmert chooses, perhaps inadvertently, the second option.

Secondly, if the prime minister still views the release of prisoners as a move that would boost Abbas, who will then advance a comprehensive deal for Shalit, then he's wrong on three counts:

1. In crisis negotiations, building "trust" with the other side is not done through gestures, but rather, through "deals." The kidnappers (or those who can influence them) must understand that they must pay for anything they ask for. In Shalit's case ? a sign of life or his transfer to a known location. The iron rule in crisis negotiations is the establishment of a "give and take" pattern, and the prime minister is giving up on this already.

2. Prisoner release as a gesture is a rotten leftover of the Oslo period, where Israel faced a unified, consolidated regime. Even then, when the partner was known and familiar to us ("they can do it but don't want to"), gestures didn't lead to any results, and this is even truer today.

3. The release of a handful of prisoners as a result of "pleas by the collaborators" (this is how Abbas' people are referred to by Hamas supporters) would only weaken the moderate camp and toughen Hamas positions in the contacts on Shalit's release, in order to prove that the road of abductions is better than the path of obsequiousness.

At the same time, we can still use a release of prisoners that is not done within the framework of a Shalit deal in order to change the rules of the game in negotiations with Hamas, in two ways: First, by releasing many hundreds of Palestinian prisoners who are Fatah members, which would prove to the Palestinian public that only Abbas' road, the road of negotiation, would bring them dramatic results.

The release of many hundreds of prisoners would create a shock wave within Palestinian society that would lead to a fundamental change in contacts for the release of the abducted soldier.

The second way would be for Israel to release a small number of prisoners now and declare that from now on the release of prisoners would only happen as part of a diplomatic process vis-୶is Abbas-Fatah-PLO, and therefore the "basis of the deal" is changing:

From a deal that would see Shalit exchanged for hundreds of Hamas prisoners, to a "one for one" deal.

That is, Shalit is a high-quality combat soldier, and Israel will only release one Hamas member in exchange. Prisoners would be released through the diplomatic channel, not the military path.

Therefore, it is possible to leverage the release of prisoners as part of the negotiations process, but this requires creative thinking that does not repeat the mistakes of the past, but rather, attempts to customize the negotiation process to the changing reality.

The writer is an expert and lecturer on diplomatic and business negotiations and in the past was part of negotiation teams with Jordan and the Palestinians