It has become a trend that is transcending parties and political denominations. Our senior politicians have identified a yearning among the Israeli public for a way out of the despondent and bloody quagmire of conflict with our neighbors from the north and south, and thus are clambering to provide an answer. At least on paper.
Even before they decided whether to comply with the proposals coming out of Damascus and while they stand helplessly by as the barrage of Qassam rockets continue to land in Sderot, despite the "agreement for calm," senior ministers are publicizing their plans pertaining to an overall political settlement with the Palestinians. Each minister has his or her own plan.
First there's Olmert's voluntary convergence plan (this is an upgraded version of the unilateral convergence plan), next comes the political plan presented by Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni in an interview granted to Haaretz newspaper a week ago, and then on Monday of this week came the political plan presented by Defense Minister Amir Peretz to his senior party members.
It goes without saying; each one of these plans constitutes a well fitted and creative masterpiece that aims to adapt President Bush's Road Map to current conditions with the addition of the Saudi peace plan.
Each contains the assumption that an agreement can be reached with Mahmoud Abbas – beginning with an interim settlement and later a permanent settlement – and that the Palestinian Authority chairman would succeed, with the aid of his silent majority and the support of moderate Arab nations, in implementing the agreements on the ground.
How exactly would Abbas exert his authority on the armed factions opposing him? The compilers of these plans assert that when the Palestinians see a clear political and economic horizon, and when offered economic benefits and relief in their everyday lives, Abbas would call for a referendum or new general elections.
Perhaps then the Palestinian street would turn its back on Hamas and Islamic Jihad and will force them to cease the armed struggle against Israel.
Those same ministers, with their good plans and intentions, are ignoring the fact that Hamas, along with other armed Palestinian groups and families would want – and are able to under the current circumstances – to hinder any referendum or elections in the Territories by use of armed force.
Furthermore, Abbas and the security forces under his command do not at this point in time have the practical ability to prevent the ongoing Qassam fire from Gaza or the terror attacks from areas in the West Bank that would be evacuated by Israel within the framework of such an agreement.
It follows, therefore, that regardless of whether Tzipi Livni's plan calling for talks with Abbas under fire with the objective of reaching an agreement that would tempt the Palestinians to support it is implemented, or whether Israel tries out Amir Peretz's plan calling for the "stabilization of the security-economic situation" in the first stage – Hamas, who receives its marching orders from Damascus and the armed recalcitrant factions (some of whom are supported by Hizbullah), is the one who will inevitably decide what would transpire on the ground.
Therefore, until Abbas and his security forces defeat Palestinian infighting and impose their rule on Gaza and the West Bank, there is no point in holding talks with the Palestinian Authority's chairman.
Any concession made by Israel within the framework of an agreement with Mahmoud Abbas would serve as a precedent and a starting point for negotiations that would begin once Palestinian infighting is resolved. This is besides the international pressure that would be exerted on Israel to fulfill our part in the agreement even before the Palestinians fulfill an iota of it.
Even if we assume that Abbas is able to deliver the goods, can the current Israeli cabinet - whose public support is at an all-time low and that is awaiting the Winograd Committee's verdict regarding the second Lebanon war – evacuate settlements and land in the West Bank and hand it the over to Palestinian rule as would be stipulated by the agreement?
Indeed, the incumbent government is unable to evacuate even illegal outposts despite its commitment to do so several months ago.
This bleak reality leads to the conclusion that as long as anarchy in the Territories prevails, and as long as the political leadership on both sides is weak and void of power, there is no point in even discussing possible talks. Any agreement, even a limited and temporary one signed with the Palestinians at this point in time would not be worth the paper it is written on.
There is no doubt that Olmert, Livni and Peretz know full well that this is the situation – why are they then rushing to offer political plans and agreements that have no chance of being fulfilled?
The primary reason is the internal political struggle being waged between them. Olmert and Livni are quibbling over the leadership of the Kadima ranks once the current regime collapses, and Peretz is fighting a war of survival in the Labor party.
The political plans are being used as trump cards to demonstrate their political prowess and to gain public sympathy.
A further reason for the influx of Israel's political plans stems from the pressure Western leaders are currently exerting on Jerusalem to calm the Palestinian arena. Bush, Blair and European leaders want to see a significant achievement in the region that would embolden their allies in the Arab and Muslim worlds.
The problem is, however, that in this current state of affairs, neither talks nor the political plans initiated by Israel could achieve this goal.
The only worthwhile thing the cabinet can do at present is to politically and militarily strengthen Mahmoud Abbas and his people and indirectly help them take effective rule over Hamas and the armed factions on the Palestinian street.
Relief should also be given to West Bank populations; funds should be funneled for distribution by Abbas; prisoners released and his security forces strengthened. Such measures are likely to find us a partner. Such activities would last a few months before they bear any fruit.
Meanwhile, the Winograd Committee would hand down its ruling and the Israeli government - whichever it is - would become stable and in a position to keep its commitments. If and when this transpires, the time would also be ripe for political plans and negotiations.
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