Iran's vulnerability revealed

Iran’s nuclear program and activities are eliciting a growing sense of urgency on all sides. The two month period provided Iran to demonstrate its compliance with the UN Security Council's demand to cease uranium enrichment activities has ended with Iran as defiant as ever; the IAEA report reflects that Iran has not only not suspended uranium enrichment activities, but has indeed expanded them.

The members of the Security Council will have to decide whether they will follow through on the threat of further sanctions issued two months ago. Meanwhile, the US is increasing its military presence in the Gulf, and providing Gulf states with missile defenses, while continuing to maintain that it has no intention as of yet of attacking Iran. At the same time, reports on Israel's supposed preparations for attack are becoming more and more prevalent in the press.

But one development that we should perhaps be paying more attention to is the open criticism that has been recently leveled at Ahmadinejad, with particular emphasis on his handling of the nuclear issue.

Following the setbacks that Ahmadinejad suffered in two elections in December, and on the heels of the UN Security Council decision on sanctions, a number of prominent voices in Iran – culminating in statements attributed to Supreme Leader Khamenei – have expressed strong dissatisfaction with the president, while urging a less confrontational approach with the international community.

The decision on sanctions in particular has driven home to leaders the consequences of an extreme approach: a Security Council decision and potential crisis with the international community. Up until December it seemed that the president’s defiant approach was doing the job – it was enabling Iran to progress with its program, while the international community proved incapable of backing up its threats with determined action.

Change of tactics

On the backdrop of the current escalating dynamics vis-à-vis Iran, the change in tone is even less likely to gain our attention. With a pending decision on further sanctions, we are once again hearing defiant rhetoric from Ahmadinejad.

This most likely reflects the assessment that Russia and China will preclude agreement on more severe sanctions, especially with the current tension in US-Russian relations. This would enable Iran to once again rely on the debilitating lack of consensus in this decision-making body.

But, even with Iran enjoying this renewed sense of confidence, other voices are back on the scene, most notably Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani, who is sending a much more conciliatory message, joined at times by Foreign Minister Mottaki. Beyond calling for meaningful discussions and continued negotiations, Larijani has offered to delay installing more cascades of centrifuges. He is also stressing the role that Iran can play in confronting regional developments.

What should we make of the critical new voices and the change in tone in Iran? Those that discount their significance emphasize that what we are witnessing is merely a change of tactics, but not of basic strategy, and therefore they don't mean a thing.

Delaying Iran's nuclear plans

Inasmuch as there is no indication of any cracks in the virtually unanimous support in Iran for its right to enrich uranium and to fully develop its nuclear program, these skeptics are right. Moreover, the history of Iran's cynical use of an outwardly moderate approach, in pursuit of its not very moderate goals is quite clear.

But where the skeptics might be mistaken is when they conclude that if there are no hints that Iran is about to change course in the nuclear realm, the internal debate is of no relevance. What is missed by these skeptics is that when parties are engaged in a diplomatic process, the question of tone is not irrelevant.

Even if it doesn't signify the embracement of a different course, the shift in approach does mean that Iran is sensitive to how it is being viewed – by the international community, as well as in the region. This is an important message because it means that when Iran feels that its image and/or support are being eroded, this is something that it takes seriously.

Iran's sensitivity in this regard has been demonstrated in the past, and is underscored today also by the importance Iran attributes to political coalition building in the Middle East. Indeed, in order to assume the role of a dominant regional power, Iran will have to secure a degree of acceptance among the states it wishes to influence or control.

All of this translates into a vulnerability that should be recognized by those engaged in diplomacy with Iran: there are ways to make Iran feel the pressure, short of military force.

The option of military force against Iran, in order to stop it "if all else fails”, is a strategy that faces many challenges, and it might not work. And even if it does succeed in achieving the desired short term benefit – defined by its supporters as delaying Iran's nuclear plans – it is not a strategy for the long term.

Dealing with Iran down the road will mean paying much more attention not only to aggressive behavior, but to the non-aggressive manifestations of its regional ambitions – coalition-building activity that is generally not brought to the fore, especially in the face of the nuclear challenge as such.

This, however, might prove to be the major policy challenge in the future Middle East, and attention should be focused on finding ways to play on Iran’s vulnerability and torpedo its regional designs.

The writer is Director of Arms Control and Regional Security Project Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)