Sderot pays price for Winograd

If there is anyone who deserves all the decorations, prizes, and honors bestowed by the State, it is the residents of Gaza-region communities. Their willingness to live their lives in the shadow of the Qassam roulette should be scientifically studied and we would do well to turn it into a national brand. The mental strength they are displaying may lead Nasrallah and the Iranians to reexamine their "spider web" theory.

Yet the problem persists and requires a solution. It would do well for us to honestly ask ourselves how long we would be willing to live there with our children while rockets explode near the house every day. It is also unreasonable that a democratic country, and particularly one that possesses considerable military strength, would allow such situation to go on for years.

We can assume that if we were talking about Tel Aviv or Jerusalem, the government would have sent the IDF on a wide-scale military operation a long time ago with the army seriously attempting to at least minimize the attacks on innocent civilians.

Especially worrisome is the fact that with every day that passes without an operation, the problem becomes more serious and resolving it through military or diplomatic means becomes more difficult. This is in light of the uninterrupted boost in the power of Hamas and Islamic Jihad and the increasing Iranian penetration of the Strip.

As a result of this strengthening, the few rockets currently fired at the Western Negev will look like child's play vis-a-vis tomorrow's long-range and more accurate rockets. The boost in Hamas' power would lead the IDF to eventually go into the Gaza Strip, suffer more casualties, and face greater difficulties in completing the mission.

Hizbullah's 'nature reserves'

The tunnels currently being dug by all armed organizations in the Strip may create a "Vietnamese scenario" - a situation whereby the enemy, with its rockets and explosive belts, disappears underground, forcing our troops to invest great efforts - and human lives - in order to locate it. In Vietnam, as we know, the American military failed in a similar mission, and the ultimate result of that war is well known.

The IDF also didn't quite succeed in effectively handling and uncovering Hizbullah's "nature reserves" in the Second Lebanon War. These reserves are merely a sample of what awaits the IDF in the Strip, and may lead any wide-scale operation to be lengthier than predicted.

It is important to realize that at this time there is no good diplomatic or military alternative to the current situation. Should Israel decide to give in to Hamas and Islamic Jihad demands and stop counter-terror operations in the West Bank in exchange for an end to rocket attacks from Gaza, such an agreement would collapse within a few weeks. Another temporary takeover of "launch sites" would not achieve the objective. The only realistic alternative to the current situation is a broad military operation by the IDF across the Strip.

'Winograd Effect'

All these facts are well known within the IDF, and are also clear to the prime minister and defense minister. Yet there are several elements that hinder a large-scale operation in the Gaza Strip.

In the framework of such an operation,  forces would have to stay in the Strip for several months. During this period they would gather intelligence information and carry out wide-ranging engineering work to dig a tunnel alongside the Philadelphi Route.

As happens in such situations, the operation will involve casualties and scathing criticism against Israel in the international arena. This basic difficulty has been recently augmented by the "Winograd Effect": This type of operation would require a wide-scale reserve call- up - at least a division and several brigades. It is easy to assume that several reservist soldiers, who currently demand Olmert's and Peretz's resignation, will take the opportunity to give their demand more weight and validity.

How will they do it? They would refuse to honor the call-up order by arguing that this government lacks the skills and moral authority to direct the IDF to embark on a large operation replete with casualties. We, in the media, would do the rest. There's no need to make guesses - we already saw it happen, with the story of the "brigade that didn't enlist" during the First Lebanon War. Moreover, a government that knows it has lost the public's trust fears military failure much more than a regular government.

Lack of exit strategy

Yet the main difficulty in deciding on a large-scale operation in Gaza stems from the lack of a reasonable "exit strategy." The Winograd Commission emphasized the error of the military and government, which failed to present realistic objectives and did not prepare an exit strategy before embarking on the Second Lebanon War.

When it comes to objectives, we can confidently say that a Gaza operation has a good and reasonable list of viable objectives that would resolve or significantly minimize the problem. This list has already been presented to the prime minister and defense minister, and they approved it.

Yet the defense establishment and political leadership do not know how to ensure that rocket attacks and tunnel attacks would not be renewed once the IDF leaves the Strip following several months. The problem is even more severe in light of the almost absolute certainty that an Israeli invasion would make whatever is still left of the Palestinian Authority and Mahmoud Abbas' authority collapse.

Multinational force

Abbas' people will fight against us, so as not to be considered collaborators. Therefore, Israel will have to stay in the Strip for a prolonged period or see it shifting into the hands of Hamas and the Iranians, who would be able to rehabilitate their military capacities within six months.

Therefore, the only exit strategy that appears to be acceptable for Israel is similar to the one in Lebanon: The deployment of a large and effective (European) multinational force that would replace the IDF in the Strip and also manage its civilian aspects, until the reestablishment of a stable and representative Palestinian Authority with a powerful security arm.

It is also likely to assume that most Palestinians today also aspire for such sa olution, which will free them from the lethal anarchy prevalent in the Strip. However, in order to do that, the government first needs public and international legitimacy to embark on a major operation that would stimulate the process. The current government lacks this legitimacy.

Therefore, residents of Sderot are the only ones who currently pay the price of the Winograd Commission's conclusions. Only a lethal Qassam attack or a multi-causality terror attack can free them from this catch-22 situation; the current government can only regain its ability to act through bloody terror attacks.