Bomb shelters or fighter jets?
In face of missile threat, Israel must decide whether to invest in defense or offense
Any one of us would be suffering from insomnia had we heard the intelligence briefing presented to the special ministerial forum. The 11 forum members, who convened in order to discuss the readiness of the home front in the north ahead of a possible clash with Syria, quickly realized that this subject, as well as the threat, is much wider and more complex than expected.
Intelligence and home front officials presented four disturbing basic facts: Firstly, it is highly likely, that in such a clash with Syria Hizbullah would also join in, with a new rocket arsenal that has (for the most part) already been set up in Lebanon. Secondly, not only will the northern home front will bombarded, but rather, most Israeli territory, including central Israel. Thirdly, we must take into account the possibility of the Syrians making use of chemical weapons. Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, the IDF at this point in time has no reliable and rapid response, either offensive or defensive, that would put an end to such a rocket and missile offensive within a few hours or days.
Indeed, it is likely that Air force jets and the Arrow missile arsenal would be able to prevent a significant number of the heavy ballistic Scud-type missiles from hitting the Israeli home front. Yet the Syrians possess hundreds of launchers and thousands of heavy rockets whose range can reach up to 250 kilometers (roughly 160 miles) with 150-500 kilogram (approximately 330 – 1,100 pounds) explosive or chemical warheads. In addition, Hizbullah possesses hundreds of heavy and medium-sized rockets.
The IDF still has no reliable response for these rockets. It is also likely that heavy rockets would partly be used to target IDF bases and may hinder a reserve call-up. Hence, even a large-scale ground offensive by the IDF aimed at curbing the rocket fire could be delayed. The bottom line: The rockets that hit the Israeli home front in the Second Lebanon War would appear like an insignificant sample compared to what may be in store, heaven forbid, if the heavy arsenals possessed by Syria and Hizbullah will be used in the next year or two. And we still haven't taken into consideration the thousands of short-range Katyusha rockets that would be landing in Galilee and Golan Heights communities.
In a year or two, the situation may change for the better – if and when several defense projects are completed successfully. For example, the "Magic Wand" system for intercepting long-range heavy rockets and the "Iron Dome" system for intercepting light, short-range rockets (Katyushas and Qassams) as well as several offensive and intelligence systems. Yet until then, the Israeli home front – and particularly the northern home front – will remain dangerously exposed.
No guarantees
This is the bad news. The good news, courtesy of the intelligence community, is that at this time at least there are no signs that Syria or Hizbullah intend to initiate a war. Yet this information doesn't offer much comfort. History shows us that often wars erupt as a result of a coincidence that leads to escalation; as a result of a flawed understanding regarding the other side's intentions; or as a result of a flawed assessment regarding the other side's response. The Second Lebanon War, for example, broke out as a result of Nasrallah's false estimate regarding Israel's response to the abduction of its soldiers.
This grim snapshot, as well as existing budgetary limits, require the government to choose between two strategic doctrines that are supposed to provide home front protection. The dilemma is whether to put an emphasis on and invest most money in the "offensive doctrine," or alternately, the "fortification doctrine."
The first strategy is premised on offensive operations and means to be utilized by the IDF in order to paralyze the missile arsenals and quickly cause such grave damage to the civilian infrastructure in both Syria and Lebanon that it would force Assad and Nasrallah to hold their fire.
On the other hand, the "fortification doctrine" is supposed to minimize the damage of a missile attack on the home front until the IDF methodically eliminates, through aerial and ground operations, the source of the threat. In other words, provide the Israeli home front with a basic "defensive shield" that would prevent a high casualty toll among civilians, enable the IDF to call up reserves and embark on a counter attack, and allow the government to provide vital services to injured civilians without putting them at risk.
There is no doubt that the "offensive doctrine" is better. Not only is it the cheapest in terms of the required financial investment (the cost of building fortified rooms for all citizens is estimated at $5.5 billion,) applying it determinedly and efficiently would produce better and more reliable deterrence for the future.
The problem is that there are no guarantees that even an exceptionally devastating offensive against civilian and military infrastructure, and even government centers in Damascus, would bring about a quick end to the missile attacks. Assad may wish to stop due to concern for the survivability of his regime, yet the army may disobey the orders. We should also keep in mind that an offensive on Syrian infrastructure may undermine the regime and instead of the secular Baath party we may see the emergence of a regime ruled by the radical Islamic Brotherhood.
As to Hizbullah, an even greater problem exists, because the organization does not bear direct civilian responsibility for the welfare of Lebanon's residents. The destruction of infrastructure there may outrage Lebanese civilians and weaken those who today hinder a Hizbullah takeover in the country of cedars. Not to mention international public opinion and the outcry in the face of Israel's "disproportional response."
A bottomless pit
The "fortification doctrine," which bases the home front's protection on the provision of better fortification for every citizen, is also problematic. In budgetary terms this is a bottomless pit. Moreover, the implementation of such plan would take years, and so it may not be ready for the next war. Not to mention the nuclear threat from Iran and other countries.
Therefore, it appears that the right solution for the Israeli government is to invest in an offensive-defensive mix. In one track – speed up development and creation of intelligence systems and defensive and offensive means for paralyzing the heavy rocket and missile arsenals and intercepting them; in the second track – the construction of a minimal and categorized defensive shield for Israel's civilian home front.
The categorization will be determined on a regional basis and in accordance with the number and types of rockets that may land there and the advanced warning time to be offered before these areas are hit. In northern border communities, for example, we cannot make do without fortified rooms and defensive reinforced cement structures on the streets used to take cover in case of an attack.
In the town of Ramat Hasharon in central Israel, on the other hand, it would be enough to inform residents where in the house, or on the street, they should be taking cover when they hear the sirens. The experience accumulated in the last war shows that there were almost no causalities among people who stayed in reinforced structures. Most of those hurt were walking the streets. In addition, we must ensure that all residents have effective gas masks in working order.
Ephraim Sneh, who up until recently served as deputy defense minister, did more than any other politician perhaps to protect the home front through fortification. Therefore it is surprising to hear him of all people declaring that national priority (both budgetary and otherwise) should be given to developing offensive means.
"At the same time," he says, "it is essential to earmark about NIS 700 million (roughly $170 million) every year to fortification of the home front." This sum would be divided between the identification and establishment of bomb shelters and warning systems, particularly to Gaza-region communities and Arab communities in the north, where such infrastructure doesn't exist at all, to purchasing gas masks (NIS 300 million per year) and instructing the public on how to conduct itself during a rocket attack."
According to Sneh, such instruction program already exists and may save the lives of dozens at the moment of truth. It appears Dr. Sneh is right. However, the problem is not a principled budgetary decision, as he thinks. Rather, the problem is that the current Israeli government, even when it makes the right decisions, is unable to implement them for some reason. And this is in fact the main danger threatening the Israeli home front.
