Tanks or education?
Defense officials make legitimate demands, but what about social causes?
The battle over the defense budget this year will be more difficult and bitter than anything we experienced in the past decade. The charged debate during the government session last Sunday is only a preview of things to come. Why? Because both sides are right.
The defense establishment and its top officials are truly convinced that without a significant boost to the defense budget, the State of Israel won't be able to win the next war and may be unable to regain the deterrent power that was severely eroded in the Second Lebanon War.
Senior IDF and defense establishment officials estimate that the next war could break out in one to five years, and that it will be more complex and different than all previous wars. In order to enable the IDF to develop and build the required components required to win such a war, it needs at least two years of investment and intensive training sessions.
Therefore, military leaders say, the large addition to the defense budget must be provided immediately, as soon as the upcoming year. This sense of urgency and the almost desperate need to convince the government led the chief of staff to deviate from the course of political correctness, and in a direct manner indicated that ministers would be bearing the responsibility for the next war's outcome.
Along with Defense Minister Barak, Lieutenant-General Ashkenazi presented the government a package aimed at building up military power and equipping the army. Both claimed that each component in this package is vital for a military victory in the next war. This package aims to enable the IDF to thwart threats on Israel and win based on the old Ben-Gurion defense doctrine, but with modifications to the current situation and the threats on the horizon. According to this doctrine, for example, Air Force jets and combat formations, which transfer the war to enemy territory, are the ones that prevent attacks on the home front in wartime.
According to the new doctrine, a multilayered technological defense system for intercepting missiles, rockets, and planes should be bearing most of the burden of defending the home front, at least at early stages. Barak demands funds for an accelerated development process of these systems, so that they are ready within two to three years.
In addition, the Ben-Gurion doctrine called for a holding defense effort on one or two fronts and a concentrated ground offensive on one front. Later, the offensive effort is transferred to other fronts, either simultaneously or in phases. The new defense doctrine calls for a ground assault at the beginning of the war on two or even three fronts, in order to curb the threat of missile attacks on the home front. Fighting on each front would take on different characteristics based on the geographic conditions and enemy (Syria, Iran, Hizbullah, or Hamas.)
In order to implement this doctrine, the IDF needs ground and air forces that are much larger than what it has today, as well as much larger quantities of ammunition and equipment. Indeed, it was reported that Barak and Ashkenazi demanded the establishment of two more combat divisions at this time, and another division or two later, as well as an integrated aerial-naval force for striking at distant strategic targets. They also demand that stockpiles at warehouses be increased, of course.
These are the main items in the defense establishment package, and the price tag is an addition of another NIS 7 billion (roughly $1.5 billion) to the defense budget this year.
Brain-drain danger
However, the "defense camp" is facing the "socioeconomic camp" led by Prime Minister Olmert and Finance Minister Bar-On. Their arguments are no less convincing: We must not breach the budget framework so that the State of Israel won't lose its solid status as a country that attracts investments and as a borrower in the global economic arena, and also to avoid inflation.
And this is not it: Olmert knows that in order to maintain his coalition and survive in power, he will have to meet at least some of demands of his coalition partners. Moreover, a significant part of those demands are justified, and a failure to meet them would further undermine social cohesion and the education system, which constitute important components of our national strength and national security.
Should Olmert agree to the defense establishment's demands, he will be facing a difficult dilemma: Should he breach the budget framework and threaten economic growth, or should he let the social situation and education system deteriorate even further?
The situation is even more complex because of the Brodet Commission report submitted to the government several months ago. The findings of the commission, which was established in the wake of the last war in order to examine the genuine security needs and to extent to which the budget addresses them, were grave.
As it turned out, the process of preparing the budget by the defense establishment in past years was neglected and tainted by lazy thinking and wasteful perceptions. It introduced cuts where it was easy to cut back, and not where cutbacks where needed, while always asking for additional funds.
Most of the budget was used to cover salaries, service terms, and retirement benefits, and too little was left for developing and purchasing vital weapons systems, building up power, and training exercises.
Therefore, the Brodet Commission recommended that the government establish a multi-year framework for the defense budget. Such framework is needed so that the IDF can plan the building of power based on priorities. Establishing a combat formation, for example, takes two to three years; developing a major weapons system and acquiring it takes about 10 years. Therefore, the IDF must know in advance how much money would be at its disposal in the next five years.
Senior defense officials, who have been demanding a multi-year budget for a while, adopted this recommendation warmly. They also loved the commission's recommendation to boost the defense budget by a percent and a half every year. Yet they were outraged by the demand to make the defense budget more efficient mostly through cutbacks and changes to the salaries, service terms, and retirement benefits of career officers and civilian employees.
We can understand Barak and Ashkenazi. This time around, it isn't the regular response of current and former defense figures who behave like union heads. This time, we're talking about genuine fears over a brain-drain among low-ranking and mid-range officers and professionals in technological units.
In the wake of the last war, the IDF is facing a serious problem on this front – a problem that is mostly about morale and stems from the decline in the social status of those who serve in the army. The IDF fears that this problem will worsen should service terms and retirement benefits be harmed. This is one reason why the minister and army chief are attempting to postpone the Brodet Commission report's implementation by two years.
The other reason is that the bonus, in the form of the annual addition to the defense budget proposed by the commission, is too small; less than half of what the defense establishment demands. Yet Olmert and Bar-On are sticking with the recommendations and demanding that they be adopted as is at this time.
Under such circumstances, the question isn't who's right, but rather, who's able to enlist a political majority for his demands in order to twist his opponent's arm. It is reasonable to assume that the Second Lebanon War's shadow will cause the ministers and prime minister to think twice before they reject the defense establishment's demands, and that the budgetary compromise that would be secured eventually will give Barak and Ashkenazi most of what they wanted.
