The logic of waiting
Ron Ben-Yishai analyzes motives for Israeli decision to refrain from attacking Gaza
Part two of analysis by Ron Ben-Yishai
The first assumption: Any IDF operation in Gaza, even if it is aimed at a specific, limited objective, will not only fail to bring an end to rocket attacks from the Strip, but rather, would prompt their escalation and intensification, as was the case during the Second Lebanon War.
As a result, the IDF will be forced to boost the military pressure and gradually escalate its own operations, to the point of having to conquer the entire Strip, or large parts of it. In other words: The IDF will have to carry out a “large-scale operation” in any case, even if it does not intend to do so at the outset.
The second Assumption: Even after the IDF will take over large parts of the Gaza Strip, sporadic rocket and mortar attacks will continue. The IDF and Shin Bet will need a few months before intelligence gathering operations on the ground, the detainment of wanted suspects, the clearing of smuggling tunnels, and activity aimed at destroying the military infrastructure of Hamas and other groups will curb the rocket fire and other terror attacks.
During this period of time, the IDF will sustain casualties, pay a hefty economic price for maintaining its hold on the Strip and calling up reserve troops, and the State of Israel will be condemned in the international arena; possibly even by the Obama Administration.
The third assumption: The Israeli government would not be able to pull the IDF out of the Strip unless there is a significant political and military power that would be able to replace the collapsing Hamas. Should such alternative body not emerge, the Strip will see the emergence of armed anarchy that would boil over to Israel and make us long for Hamas.
Heavy civilian casualties
For the time being, there does not appear to be any candidate that would be able to do it. Egypt does not want to, and it is doubtful whether it is even able to; NATO has presented impossible terms, and in the face of the “achievements” of European forces in south Lebanon it is doubtful whether it would be able to guarantee quiet in the Strip; meanwhile, at this time it is unclear whether Mahmoud Abbas and the Fatah movement are able to take over the Strip.
The fourth assumption: With the passage of time, Abbas and Palestinian Authority security forces will continue to gain strength and new capabilities in the West Bank. Should this process continue, and should Israel contribute to it, Abbas may be able to take over Gaza in the future, with the acquiescence of the population – and possibly even with the acquiescence of Hamas, which would be weakened in the large-scale operation.
These assumptions prompted the security establishment and the cabinet to reach the conclusion that it would be appropriate to delay as much as is possible any significant military response to the attacks from Gaza. For the time being it is better to reach new lull understandings and even sustain sporadic fire from the Strip on occasion – until the conditions mature for the “great military blow,” which would not only bring about temporary relief in attacks from the Strip but also a new government there. By that time, perhaps, the development of the Iron Dome rocket interception system would be completed, thereby providing further protection to southern residents.
This strategy features a sense of logic and judgment that cannot be denied, yet it also features significant drawbacks that raise a question mark over the ability to implement it. First, the State of Israel cannot afford a situation whereby residents in southern Israel are living in constant fear and anxiety for much longer. Secondly, a rocket or mortar shell that, heaven forbid, would directly hit a kindergarten or school could completely change the strategic equation in a moment.
Israeli public opinion would force the government to make a decision and would prompt the IDF to operate at full force before it is completely ready for it. Therefore, Israel would sustain heavy civilian casualties, pay an economic price, and also fail to achieve its strategic objectives. Moreover, with the passage of time, Hamas is growing stronger.
In part three of analysis, to be published Thursday, Ron Ben-Yishai examines the logic of a series of immediate operation against Hamas.
