32. Sure, invade: Do we want to unite Gazans for Hamas
David Turner , |
Richmond |
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(02.11.08) |
The Bush Doctrine of Democratization overwhelmed Abbas and Olmert concerns that elections should not take place, and Hamas was victor. Immediately after their win Hamas offered Israel a truce: following the historical precedent of Fateh, while they would not formally recognize the Jewish state the Islamists would abide a 50-year Hudna. Not exactly an olive branch, Hamas leaders were said to believe that given 50 years of quiet borders internal Israeli conflict, that the Jewish state would disappear on its own, that the One-state Solution would become reality without having to fire a single bullet. Olmert et al chose to ignore the possibility of a long-term truce in what, I believe, was a misguided effort to eradicate the Islamists by a combination of diplomatic, economic and, in face of failure and frustration, military means. The result? Countless lives lost, constant Qasams landing on Sderot. Is it not yet obvious that, unless Israel is willing to re-occupy Gaza, that every targeted killing, every retaliatory response to the Qassams only convinces the Gazans that Israel, not Hamas, is the aggressor; that war on Gaza only increases sympathy and identification with Hamas (the Underdog Effect, locally and internationally) resulting in local and foreign support, increased volunteers for martyrdom?
Hamas is real and not likely to disappear to satisfy Israel. The alternative to the endless and fruitless war of attrition is to test Hamas intentions. If the Hudna is a ploy, will this provide Hamas the tactical opportunity, the breathing space to re-supply? Yes. But according to Dichter and Military Intelligence Hamas already has little difficulty do so without a truce. And should the proffered Hudna be but a ploy Israel still has the option, with greater credibility and justice, of reoccupation.
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