I was in Israel during the 1973 war and I witnessed troops being pulled off the street in Jerusalem into buses the night before the war began this was no surprise. The soldiers told me that they were going up to The Golan Heights And couldn't talk about it. This conversation took place 18 hours before the war began. Someone is hiding something because if I knew a war was about to begin why didn't The Israeli government. There are rumors that there was conspiracy between Henry Kissinger and a traitor within the Israeli government for Israel to absorb the first attack on October 6, 1973 to give the Egyptians back thier pride so they would negotiate peace with Israel and force a compromise on the Israelis. This As described in the Israeli documentary who shot my father the story of Joe Alon. This was no surprise there appears to be a conspiracy of silence from higher authorities.

The fact is that because Golda was afraid of what americans will say, 4000 soldiers on Sinai died. There was plenty if intel about egyptian and syrian intentions prior the war.

Meirs' decisions costs thousands of israeli lives.

Yo ,Meir cost Israel dear ,with her fear ,like a Deer ,caught in da headlights, she was too nervous to fight ,her decisions were a blight ,on humanity ,her name is a profanity ,my words I do not mince ,when I hear her name I just wince ,she cost da nation ,with her hesitation and procrastination and prevarication ,no jubilation .We all make mistakes ,but the Biscuit she did take .Don't want to kiss her ,and I blame Kissinger.

GOLDA MESSED UP .

The one-eyed arab lover was a disaster in 1973 .Only Ariel Sharon and his brave Troops saved the day.

Or so the saying goes, but it's not always true. I confess to being a galutnik (although I was in Israel for more than half of of February 1974, during the Sinai pullback), but four and a half decades in the news business taught me that it's enormously easier to say later what should have been done than to see the right decision clearly when you have to make it -- especially when it's based on limited, often conflicting information with no idea of the consequences of whichever decision you make. So Golda & Co. made the wrong decisions, but even if they'd have mobilized reservists earlier, would that have seemed then to be the right decision? Don't forget: The Egyptians had been making similar feints for some time, calling them exercises. And if the IDF was maximized, who's to say that Egypt and Syria might have packed up and gone home. If the bad guys remained poised to attack for months, Israel's economy would have been in ruins, its manpower all on the fronts. Recalling the YK war as an American, I am sure Golda was correct that Israel would have had major problems with its chief -- and now sole -- ally had it attacked preemptively again. This is like any other fraught situation (including one's first time in combat): You don't really know what you'll do until you're in the situation. Are we all so sure we'd have acted differently than Golda and her government? In hindsight, sure -- but think about the decision she had to make on the basis of imperfect information and, of course, no knowledge of the consequences.

Under constant US and European pressure, Meir was 'asked' to restore Arab pride lost after their humiliating defeat in the Six Day War. The West feared that a preemptive strike and a second Israeli victory would cause the price of oil to skyrocket or even worse initiate an Arab oil embargo. Of course, it happened regardless. Meir/Dayan believed that a 'limited military loss' would restore UN sympathy for Israel. By showing the world that Arab armies 'went in for the kill' in a surprise attack on Israel's holiest day of the year would finally show the world who are the true aggressors - even if it meant absorbing the first blows of a unified Egyptian-Syrian strike. Meir feared that a preemptive strike would force the UN to declare a total economic and military blockade against Israel. She was probably right. In her mind, all options where bad. David Elazar demanded a general call up of the reserves on October 5 and a preemptive IAF stike at 11:00 on October 6 but Dyan denied his requests. According to the Agranat Commission report "Elazar bears personal responsibility for the assessment of the situation and the preparedness of the IDF", a sentiment still widely held among most Israelis. Elazar is buried on Mount Herzl, in the plot adjoining that of Yoni Netanyahu.

Kissinger threatened Golda and Dayan promising " If Israel initiates the coming war they will not receive as much as a single nail or screw nor any other equipment or spares."

For several weeks before the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, the Northern Command, and specifically the Golan Heights, was on highest alert. To say that it was a surprise attack was, and is, total BS. The only surprise was 2pm instead of 6pm. BFD. To add insult to injury, Golda and the Labor Party used the politically appointed Agranat to cast the blame on a true hero, Dado (David Elazar).

I can't stand the name Kissinger !!! that disgusting man!!