3. good article on a massive strategic blunder...
... for which Israel pays dearly to this day...
Yes... it's understood that Israel's occupation of Lebanon had run its course by 2000, and was painful and expensive.
Withdrawal or partial withdrawal (with Israel perhaps retaining Beaufort & a few other strategic outposts) made sense.
But the burning issue was "how" or in "what manner?" to withdraw.
That answer also seems clear: Israel should have done in 2000 exactly what it did in 2006: FLATTEN Dahiya in Beirut - or other adopted other harsh, punitive measures against Hizbollah and Syria... just so the message was clear...
(and why wasn't Imad Mughniyah didpatched with in 2000?)
The objective should have been to conduct a withdrawal that had a very high price to the enemy - and NOT provide a free-ride/ gift to the enemy.
Forget about chasing "agreements", etc - use the language best understood in the Mid East.
The overall objective at all costs should have been maintenance of Israel's credibility and deterrence. This obvious factor seems to have been completely neglected in Barak's calculus.
A tragic, direct consequence of Barak's move was the kidnapping & killing of two IDF reservists by Hizbollah in 2006 - not to speak of the costly war in 2006.
Every one of those deaths could be laid at Barak's and Sarid's feet. (At least Gen Halutz had the foresight to wipe out Dahliya!)
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