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Land in exchange for terrorism

The Israeli version of 'land for peace' punishes the victim (Israel) and rewards the aggressor (the Palestinians)

Disengagement is a crossbreed between the Oslo process and the "land for peace" doctrine, both of which are logically, strategically, and morally flawed.

 

The "land for peace" notion (henceforth, LFP) expects Israel to hand over to the Arabs something it holds in short supply. After all, Israel's land area is equal to 0.2 percent of the Arab states' land area (not including Iran,) which is about 50 percent larger than the United States and 30 percent larger than Europe.

 

On the other hand, the Arabs are expected to grant Israel something they have failed to offer each other since the Seventh century, namely a comprehensive peace deal, honored agreements, and the curbing of violence and terrorism.

 

The logical and moral basis for LFP is, seemingly, the following equation: the depth of peace equals the depth of withdrawal. That is, a comprehensive peace in exchange for full withdrawal, or partial peace for a partial withdrawal. But is that in fact the case?

 

Can we expect the equation to remain relevant at a time of crisis as well? Would (another) complete breach of the peace by the Palestinians lead to a complete return of territories to Israel? Would a partial breach lead to a partial reinstatement?

 

The LFP doctrine is uncommon in the international arena, except for isolated cases, and under utterly different circumstances than those of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

 

The idea behind LFP was, ostensibly, to promote justice and peace, weaken and deter aggressive regimes, boost moderates within aggressor states, and compensate the victim.

 

For example, in order to compensate victims, Nazi Germany was forced to relinquish land in France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, which in turn agreed to grant Germany peace in exchange for the land.

 

However, according to the Israeli version of LFP, the victims would have had to hand over land to Nazi Germany in exchange for peace. Indeed, the Israeli version punishes the victim (Israel,) while rewarding and providing an incentive to the aggressor (the Palestinian Authority.)

 

Moreover, the Israeli version weakens moderate Palestinians who are hoping for the current leadership's downfall, hence helping to fan the flames of terror instead of suppressing it.

 

The LFP doctrine ignores a key Middle Eastern reality, particularly in the intra-Arab theater: deterrence promotes security and peace, while restraint and concessions promote aggression and war.

 

Is it logical to expect Arab states to exhibit a more genteel attitude toward Israel than they do toward each other?

 

Indeed, Middle East residents perceive the disengagement plan as an expression of fatigue, withdrawal, and flight, all of which chip away at the Israeli deterrence and encourage Palestinian terrorism.

 

It is true that the renunciation of the Sinai led to a peace agreement with Egypt, but we should not give in to illusions. After all, education for hatred in areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority is premised on Egyptian textbooks.

 

Moreover, Egypt encourages weapons smuggling into Gaza and poisons Israel's relations with African and Persian Gulf states. Meanwhile, the ongoing Egyptian re-arming process aims to turn Cairo into an effective threat to Israel.

 

In addition, we must recall that the demilitarized Sinai provides Israel with a strategic, 22,000-square-mile barrier, as opposed to Judea and Samaria's 2,200 square miles.

 

The "land for peace" formula assumes that the Arab-Israeli conflict is territorial, and that Arab and Palestinian terrorism stems from oppression. However, the Arab and Palestinian policy toward Israel is one of elimination, while Palestinian terrorism since 1993 stems from hope for the crumbling of Jewish endurance.

 

The Palestine Liberation Organization was established three years before the 1967 war in order to end the "1948 occupation" (that is, to eliminate Israel,) not in order to end the "1967 occupation" of Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

 

Meanwhile, official educational, religious, and media voices in the Palestinian Authority and in Arab states, (which are the clearest expression of the strategy guiding their governments) preach for Jew hatred and elimination of the Jewish state.

 

Palestinian terrorism reached its peak after Israel brought the PLO back, in 1993, from oblivion at terror camps in Yemen and Sudan, and granted it land, weapons, an admission ticket to the White House, and much hope.

 

Therefore, handing over more territories to the Palestinians (in the form of disengagement) would fan the flames of Palestinian aspirations, pour oil on the fire of terrorism, and push peace further away.

 

Yoram Ettinger is a consultant on U.S.-Israel relations, Chairman of Special Projects at the Ariel Center for Policy Research and frequent contributor to Yediot Ahronot.

 


פרסום ראשון: 12.27.04, 14:48
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