What's next?
Desire to reconcile Israeli factions will result in lengthy healing process
Pullout foes from right and left dispute its unilateral nature. On the left the belief that a dialogue prior to implementation, would have resulted in fruitful negotiations; from the right the complaint is that had we bargained with the Palestinians, we would have gained more concessions.
Dual objections warrant dual answers: First, the assets we handed over were not valuable but rather burdensome. A white elephant that is costly to upkeep, will not sell at the elephant market; thus, there was no point in bargaining.
Second, history proves that negotiations between us and our enemies, ended in failure. As stipulations are broken down to clauses and sub-clauses, the parties expose their counterpart's broken promises, and negotiations fizzle.
Both parties are to blame. Only the self-righteous believe we are spotless. Bottom line; if we hadn't taken the step, if it wasn't Sharon at the wheel, we would have had to wait many more years to be rescued from the quick sands of Gush Katif.
What's next? The chance for pragmatic negotiations will not be significantly increased as a result of the disengagement. Sharon – as explained by the loyal Dov Weissglass – will not budge. The "big bang" is an illusion. After wallowing in futile discussions, Israeli politics will once again be enslaved to settlers' rhetoric and Yesha Council's trickery.
The desire to reconcile the various Israeli factions will result in a lengthy healing process, during which politicians from right and center will avoid reawakening internal animosities.
The Palestinian Authority is wobbly. Mahmoud Abbas's fine bird feathers will not be transformed into an eagle's wings over night. The willingness of the Palestinians to comply with Israel's smallest demands will fade following the election for their legislative committee. An immediate consequence will be the strengthening of the influence of the fundamentalists.
'Entrench ourselves behind the security wall'
Terror will resume – if only on a smaller scale than during the second intifida. We should adhere to the "Road Map" because the international community – primarily the American benefactor – backs it. Further, peace should remain the goal.
Yet, we must not base our policy on the slim chance the "map" will yield a stable agreement.
In light of this gloomy prediction, a policy of careful risk assessment is crucial. The biggest risk is not terror which can be contained, but the loss of the country's Jewish and democratic identity. It is more than a threat to our culture; it's a threat to our existence.
Currently, only half of the population between the Mediterranean and the river Jordan is Jewish. There are no "reservoirs" of Jews in the diaspora to settle the hills of Judea and Samaria. Thus, the only way to avoid this fate is to withdraw from the occupied territories and entrench ourselves behind the security wall.
The fate of 20 percent of the territories that Israel will keep will be discussed. Yet they are not as burdensome as the areas heavily populated by Palestinians. Unfortunately, this means the disengagement of tens of thousands of Jews from their homes.
The success of the Knesset and the government in implementing the Gaza pullout weakened the "no-revolutions" theory of the right. Instead of reinforcing the ideology opposing further withdrawals, it seems that the opposite has been proven: When there is wide consensus about the necessity of a painful act, implementation is possible.
The realization that another withdrawal is needed will take root slowly. Initially, sobriety will clear the way to myths, emotions, and scare tactics. Yet, we shall slowly awaken to reality. An opposition from the Left would have expedited the process, but where is it?
