Return Shalit at any price

After Gilad Shalit was abducted, Prime Minister Olmert declared that releasing Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the captured IDF soldier "is not even on the agenda of the Israeli government." I wrote at the time that there is very little political, diplomatic, or any other kind of wisdom in this declaration, as there will be no other way to secure Shalit's release except for a prisoner swap, and that it appears that the prime minister's well known arrogance was again "working overtime."

I mentioned the case of abducted IDF soldier Nachshon Waxman, may he rest in peace, as an example and warning as to what happens when we attempt to release a captive in other ways. Meanwhile, we saw the outbreak of a needless war as a result of – officially at least – the abduction of two more soldiers. It was clear then too, from the outset, that we would only be able to return them through tough and cruel negotiations.

To our regret, Shalit's fate was removed from the public agenda immediately upon the outbreak of the war in Lebanon. Now the story is back where it belongs. At the moment, there is no issue more important, sensitive, and loaded.

Gilad Shalit has to return home, period. This is an ultimate formula that does not come with any buts, maybes, or conditions. Do we even have to talk about it too much? Is there a more difficult, cruel, and impossible fate than the fate of a captive at the hands of the enemy?

This is not only a humane question; it is a basic principled position that a state and its government must stand behind with no reservations, regardless of the price - and it seems that one way or another, it will not be a low price.

The other side, naturally, will attempt to maximize the benefits of such "transaction." This does not mean we must immediately comply with all its demands, but at the end of the day, Israel cannot end this move without Shalit returning. Arguments that show reservations to this unequivocal stance, as if "such move would encourage other abductions" or "the murderers will go back to terrorism" are at the moment akin to spilled milk. Even if they must not be taken lightly, their weight at the moment is smaller than the duty to secure Shalit's release as soon as possible.

The only way not to find ourselves facing such conflicts is to prevent abductions through any way or means possible, yet once an abduction has taken place – always as a result of some kind of mishap, as was the case with Shalit, Goldwasser, Regev, and those who came before them – then the price we must pay for the mishap, as problematic and frustrating as it may be, is high and difficult to bear, but unavoidable.

Caught with our pants down

We should also note that the validity of these arguments does not quite meet the test of reality. Hamas, Hizbullah and their ilk will continue their attempts to abduct Israelis in general and soldiers in particular even if Shalit remains in their hands for who-knows-how-long, and they will continue to do so even after he is returned. Our accumulated experience does not show that the desire for abductions increased or decreased following previous prisoner swaps or that is has crucial weight one way or another in our complex arena.

For the other side, abductions will always be a part of the rules of the game. For us, they are a constant  red light, and if we let our guard down for moment – we bear the responsibility and must pay the price.

In any case, the fact that there have been no other abductions since the kidnapping of Shalit, Goldwasser and Regev apparently proves that the essence of the lessons have been drawn, although even now there is no complete guarantee that would prevent a similar incident (or screw-up, if you will) in the future. Moreover, there is a significant extent of hypocrisy, self-righteousness and demagoguery in the distinction between "types" of Palestinian prisoners – "blood on their hands" is an elusive definition that can be interpreted in flexible ways and is mostly "literary" rather than "legal."

It is proper to take away the freedom of anyone who is involved in terrorism, and the extent of his or her involvement does not quite make a difference. Yet we must always keep in mind that these inmates are imprisoned against a backdrop of a complex national conflict and are not "regular" criminal offenders – as such, they are constantly used as hostages and bargaining chips in the process of the conflict, whether we like it or not.

This complex reality sometimes acts in our favor  – when we are able to nab them and imprison them – and sometimes in their favor  – when they are able to catch us with our pants down in such abduction operations. And when we are caught with our pants down, we must pay a heavy price.

We will have to pay it, with clenched teeth and while drawing lessons, but we shall pay it, because above all there is one unequivocal and inflexible formula: We must return the captives, at any price, and better now than later.