Public opinion polls show majority of Israeli public believes Israel didn't defeat Hamas
Photo: Reuters
Prof. Isaac Ben-Israel
Photo: Yotam Frum
Israel won Gaza war after all
Op-ed: There is not a single parameter in which Hamas is better off today than it was before Operation Protective Edge.
Large parts of the Israeli public accepted the ceasefire, after 50 days of fighting, with a feeling of bitterness. Where does this feeling originate? According to public opinion polls, it seems that the majority of the Israeli public believes we did not defeat Hamas.
In general, according to them, we should be making peace rather than war, and for that purpose we must not "humiliate" the other side. So not only can we not win (in the objective sense), but we shouldn't even do it.
Those on the left side of the map believed, even before the operation, that it's impossible to "win" these days. In the postmodern world they live in, the question of victory is a matter of subjective interpretation. They replaced the "reality" with "the reality story" (a "narrative"), which depends on the person telling it.
Protective Edge
Shimon Shiffer
Op-ed: Hamas is left with some 6,000 rockets, a functioning military wing and many more terror tunnels; Israel faces all of these with passive defense strategy after yielding on offensive initiatives that could have prevented future attacks on us.
Those on the right side of the map, on the other hand, believe that our victory was "insufficient." According to them, we should have concluded this war by "defeating" Hamas, bringing it down or wiping it off the face of the earth. And because we failed to do so, we didn't win.
One of the government ministers went as far as claiming that Hamas had won because it managed to stand up to us. A review of his comment reveals an almost accurate repetition of Iran's "victory" congratulations to Hamas.
Those who hold this opinion realize that the only way to reach their long-awaited goal is an overall occupation of Gaza, but they are avoiding the question of the price and especially the question of "the day after." What will happen after we occupy the Strip? As long as we stay there, no rockets will be launched towards us, but who can guarantee that the rocket fire will not be resumed after we leave?
In any event, both the right and the left are united in the opinion that we did not win. This view is wrong.
The supporters of the view that we did not win mention the series of Hamas "achievements": Firing rockets up to the very last moment, the survival of the political leadership, etc. One can argue about the achievement concealed in attacks which claimed a relatively small number of casualties (one civilian killed by a rocket throughout the entire operation and four killed by mortar shells), but one cannot argue over the fact that Hamas is worse off after the operation.
In order to understand that, it's enough to look at all the measurable parameters which determine who won at the end of the day. Is there a single parameter in which Hamas is better off today than it was before Operation Protective Edge?
In terms of the military assets, it clearly isn't: Hamas lost most of its rockets, the tunnel system in which it invested a fortune, a long list of senior military wing members, about 1,000 fighters, headquarters, emergency supplies, etc. All of its attempts to surprise Israel with unusual actions (like launching a terror cell from the sea, using drones, kidnapping soldiers for bargaining purposes, etc) failed with no exception.
The same applies to the situation in the diplomatic arena: Hamas has lost the support it had left in the Arab world, and its rivals in the region (the Palestinian Authority and Egypt) have grown stronger.
Its political situation in the Strip has deteriorated as well: The gap between the organization and civilians who were badly damaged has grown, civilian infrastructure has been destroyed at an unprecedented level, and its demands to open the crossings with supervision for a seaport and an airport have been rejected.
Hamas takes pride in two "achievements": First of all, resisting the "Zionist army" and shattering the myth of the undefeatable IDF. Second, opening the crossings for humanitarian aid, while ignoring the fact that they were closed because of the rocket fire.
Even if we agree that these are achievements "in Hamas' eyes," the following question remains unanswered: How did its situation improve compared to what it was before? As I said, a cautious examination will not reveal a single parameter pointing to that.
The source of the feeling of bitterness is not objective, therefore. It stems from unrealistic expectations in regards to reality, both on the right and on the left.
