The future of Gaza is increasingly at the center of a strategic rivalry between Gulf powers, with reconstruction and demilitarization emerging as key battlegrounds. Israel hopes to see Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates lead the rebuilding of Gaza, but both countries have made clear that their involvement is conditional: Hamas must first be stripped of its weapons — at least its offensive capabilities — and a new governing framework must replace its rule. A long-term ceasefire and gradual Israeli withdrawal are also prerequisites.
For Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, rebuilding Gaza is part of a broader effort to reshape the Palestinian arena, anchored in a fundamental shift in the balance of power in the Strip. Their call for demilitarization is not only a security concern but also a financial one: With tens of billions of dollars at stake, neither country is willing to invest in a territory still controlled by an armed faction.
There is also growing fatigue across the Arab world from the ongoing conflict and fears of regional escalation that could derail Gulf economic expansion. Polls suggest that in both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Hamas is viewed as a destabilizing extremist force that undermines broader Palestinian interests. As a result, the demand for disarmament is also a domestic political move — framing their aid as conditional to justify it to their own citizens.
Riyadh has made clear it will not provide substantial funding without transferring authority to the Palestinian Authority or another body with international legitimacy. The UAE, already active in the humanitarian sphere, is reportedly open to joining a multinational security force in Gaza, but only under a disarmed framework and after deep reforms within the Palestinian Authority, including leadership change and a formal invitation for Abu Dhabi to engage in Gaza.
Both Gulf states bring serious resources to the table: immense wealth, administrative expertise, and diplomatic leverage — potentially in the form of gradual normalization with Israel. However, their participation depends on clear security mechanisms, international backing (especially from Washington) and a new governance structure in Gaza.
So what’s holding them back? From their perspective, the situation on the ground hasn’t changed enough. While Hamas has suffered heavy blows, it still maintains de facto control over nearly half the Strip. Qatar remains its primary sponsor and mediator. For years, Doha and Hamas have shared a symbiotic relationship: Qatar provided money and political legitimacy, and in return, Hamas offered regional influence.
Qatar walks a tightrope — balancing its loyalty to the U.S. with its desire to be seen as a champion of the Palestinian cause. Though it signed onto the Trump-era “New York Declaration” supporting Hamas’s disarmament, its approach is more pragmatic: expressing support for a framework it knows may be hard to implement. This secures Qatar a seat at the negotiating table while maintaining its influence in Gaza.
From Washington’s perspective, Qatar is a credible mediator that played a key role in securing the latest ceasefire. This makes it difficult for Israel to directly challenge Doha’s involvement — any such move would likely be seen as undermining American interests and jeopardizing the broader negotiation process.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE, meanwhile, struggle to accept Qatar’s dominant role. They continue to tie their economic and security cooperation to the full removal of Hamas and its weapons. Qatar, by contrast, prefers rapid reconstruction with few conditions — a path that could restore direct funding to Hamas and deepen Doha’s influence.
The recent absence of Saudi and Emirati leaders from the Sharm el-Sheikh summit reflects dissatisfaction with the U.S.-led framework and with the prominence given to Qatar and Turkey. While all three Gulf states publicly support Gaza’s reconstruction, their underlying interests diverge. For each, disarmament is key — but their motivations for promoting or delaying it differ.
Regarding a multinational force, all remain cautious. There is concern about open conflict with Hamas, ambiguity about the mission’s mandate, and fear of being seen — particularly in the Arab world — as fighting Israel’s battles.
Ultimately, while Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar all endorse rebuilding Gaza, their conditions vary. Behind these positions lie broader goals: enhancing regional standing, advancing security and economic interests and maintaining public support at home. All share a common doubt: whether the ambitious plan can actually be implemented. With oil prices down, financial commitments elsewhere (in Syria, Lebanon) and no clear political horizon, investments may remain only on paper.
In the end, Gaza’s future hinges on whether a framework can be found that gradually demilitarizes Hamas without derailing the entire process. Poor handling of the weapons issue — or rigid insistence that no deal can move forward without full disarmament — could render the ceasefire fragile. Only a combination of phased disarmament, coordinated Israeli withdrawal, and deployment of trained Palestinian security forces can stabilize the regional effort. Without this, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi warn, reconstruction will remain theoretical — and war will return.