Defense Minister Amir Peretz. Refuses to become scapegoat
Photo: Avihu Shapira
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. 'Shouldn't resign'
Photo:Reuters
Former Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz. To blame for war's failures?
Photo: Niv Calderon
IDF Chief of Staff Dan Halutz. Grew old suddenly
Photo: Gil Yohanan
Peretz: Go after Barak, Sharon, Mofaz
In first interview after war, Amir Peretz speaks in no uncertain terms: Persons responsible for war, the way it was conducted are those who managed this state over the past six years
If anyone has ideas concerning Amir Peretz, they should know right now: The defense minister will be nobody's scapegoat. He will let no one drop the failures of the second war of Lebanon on his shoulders.
He swallowed the criticism, the insults, the polls, and the spins for a long while and did not react. Here, in a first interview after the war, he puts things on the table and speaks in no uncertain terms: The persons responsible for the war and the way it was conducted are the prime ministers, defense ministers, members of the security cabinets, and practically anyone who managed this state over the past six years.
Should Olmert resign? Absolutely not. According to Peretz, the prime minister's performance throughout the war was completely transparent, he cooperated with all the relevant bodies, and the two worked well together. As a rule, the prime minister has no reason to fear a national commission of inquiry.
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"Calling me a scapegoat," he said, "is a bit too far fetched, but I cannot understand why those who should have prepared, trained, established, and defined the rules concerning the threats are forgiven, while charges against me are exaggeratedly grave. Accusations are leveled at me and I am not indifferent, nor do I ignore them. It hurts me, but I am already used to that," he stated.
"The issue of a civilian defense minister was a central one to begin with, and I have no doubt that the struggles inside the Labor Party contribute to that. All in all, the public is looking for someone to blame for its sense of disappointment with the results of the war. Naturally, it all comes down to me."
The right model
It is amazing to see what two months can do. There are three people among us who look like they received an anti-anti-aging treatment: They grew old suddenly. Olmert, Peretz, and Halutz - three men with plenty of ego, self-confidence, and self-worth - were on top of the world until recently and it seemed that nothing could rock their boat or crack their supremacy.Today, only two months later, they seem listless, their self-confidence shaken, their morale is low. Remarks they made, which when the war started appeared like necessary vanity, now seem tasteless.
Still, Peretz is certain that having a civilian as defense minister is the right model.
"After all, any intelligent person can see that the situation in the north did not start today. The decision to take such huge risks and minimize the scope of training was made by people with plenty of security experience. Those who rationed the investments in the various arms were security men. Those who accepted the policy of turning a blind eye were seasoned security experts," he stated.
"They introduced a policy that supported restraint, which made the other side become increasingly bold. This came with the intention to minimize the IDF's preparedness in any way, believing that a confrontation, if it happens, could be dealt with swiftly and easily," Peretz added.
"Therefore, I am not trying to assign blame, but a little humility will not hurt. The attempt to blame it all on a defense minister who has just assumed post is unjust. In the future, we will hear the details on the number of times I made a crucial impact during the war."
Peretz did not speak of all those incidents in which forces were sent in without considering the logistic axis, the numerous complaints by soldiers that they did not receive food and water because there was no way to get it to them. Where was his influence then? When he points at the failures of his predecessors - referring to Prime Ministers Barak and Sharon and Defense Ministers Barak and Mofaz - he speaks only of past mistakes, not of the mishaps of the last war in Lebanon.
So who is guilty?
"Who is guilty?" he wondered out loud. "Guilt should be assigned to those who designed this policy over the years, not to those who activated it. I believe that any inspection made and any committee appointed should go back at least six years and start with the Lebanon pullout. After all, if a determined action on our part followed the kidnapping of our three soldiers in 2000, we may have never reached the recent kidnapping incident."
Should they resign?
Should the chief of staff resign? Peretz does not think so. The General Staff and its commander should brace themselves and examine the various issues that surfaced in the wake of the war.
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What about you? Is there a mistake you made in this war that you can point at?
"I cannot find anything. I am certain that my performance as defense minister contributed to the shape of the campaign.
I was the one who established that the first and most important mission is to create the special security space along the Blue Line. I was the one who recommended that the long-range missiles be hit first when the war just started… As a rule, I am at peace with the contribution I made for Israel in my capacity."
Peretz's confidence is not shaken even when he is asked about the final days of the war, when he pushed for an extensive ground operation shortly before the implementation of the UN resolution. He believes that the last, disputed 60-hour drive was as necessary as the month that preceded it. He also rejected accusations that the war started impulsively, instead of taking the time to prepare for it.
'We had to go on'
According to Peretz, he decided to expand the forces that were moving in a week before it was done."I believed that we could no longer tolerate the fact that a million citizens were sitting in bomb shelters when the army's job was to get them out. I determined that seizing the launching regions and paralyzing the firing of smaller rockets should be a goal we have to prepare for. I never defined it in terms of territory.
"The army made plans to reach those regions and seize them. We started calling up and training reservists, which lasted until Wednesday, when the cabinet session was held. Then, we decided to approve the expanded operation that the IDF had recommended."
Why was the operation not stopped after the UN resolution was endorsed?
"The situation the forces on the ground were in and the demands that the IDF made determined that. We had to wait and see whether the Lebanese Government and Hizbullah accept the resolution. Thus, the combination of the need to reach better operational positions and the need to wait and see that the cease-fire resolution is taking effect made the operation continue.
"It was not for that last operation, we would have ended with nothing, and the agreement drafted would have significantly worsened our standing. We would have lost the entire purpose of the war. Those 60 hours provided the necessary completion."
Are the reservists right when they say that the political echelon did not let the IDF win?
"The only thing that the political echelon stopped was the bombing of Lebanese infrastructures. The army wanted that and the political echelon prevented that."
How do you define the results of this war?
"I believe that such definitions cannot apply to a war waged against guerilla organizations. As long as they have just one squad alive, they will raise a flag and claim they won. We scored very significant achievements which, in the long run, change the strategic situation in the region.
"If there is bad mood, it is because we did not bring the kidnapped soldiers back. This casts a shadow on all the achievements of the operation… I hope that once they return home, we will have a more somber and objective view because the fact is that the Lebanese Army is presently in southern Lebanon, Hizbullah no longer dominates the region, international forces are there on the ground, and the entire situation around our border has changed."
In view of this, it is easy to conclude that the defense minister never considered a resignation; not during the war, and certainly not now.
"I am the defense minister," he said with determination, "and I intend to invest in this job day and night."
Not for a moment does he regret that he accepted the defense portfolio.
"I wanted very much to be finance minister, believing this was a position where I could fully realize my concepts. Still, when it turned out it will not happen, the defense portfolio provided me with an opportunity to realize a national mission and to implement my security and peace concept of security and a new and just society. Before the war, I was preparing for the model of a peacetime defense minister. I have to go back there now."
'I am even more suitable'
Considering his troubled relationships in the party and the fact that his public status has been eroded, I asked Peretz whether he still believes he is a candidate for prime minister.
"Of course. Today more than ever. After I endured the biggest storm of the recent period, where I addressed some of the most complicated issues of the State of Israel, I see things much clearer. More than others, I can anticipate the threats that might befall Israel. Today I am even more convinced that Israel cannot avoid combining the security and the social issues. National durability comprises of elements such as human worth, human capital, deterrence capabilities, and the hope for peace.
"I believe I am the one who can lead Labor, bring it out of its crisis, and prepare it as an alternative for the ruling party."
