Hizbullah's divine defeat

A few days ago a prominent US journalist, Thomas L. Friedman from the New York Times, wrote an article that summarizes the failures of Hizbullah during the Second Lebanon War. The creative Friedman quoted incriminating evidence by an official Lebanese commission of inquiry into the war – fictitious quotes by a fictitious commission that was not established and never will be.  

In Israel and in the Arab world alike an erroneous perception has taken root - that Israel lost and Hizbullah registered a "divine victory." Although the opposite is true, this distorted image takes precedence.

In the case of the Second Lebanon War, the task of blurring reality and turning it around is particularly easy: In their speeches Assad and Nasrallah presented the conclusions of the Winograd Report as crushing proof of Israel's downfall. If Israel itself admits its failure, why, they wondered, should they look for other evidence? 

Indeed, the Israeli cabinet and its military failed more than once during the war, yet nonetheless, Friedman is right: Israel ended the war in a superior position, in all aspects – tactically, strategically and politically.

Tactically, Hizbullah's infrastructure suffered a fatal blow, which cannot be rehabilitated, certainly not under the watchful eyes of the relatively large international force and the Lebanese sovereign army. Strategically, our position on the Lebanese border and our relations with Lebanon's elected government are better than they were prior to the war. And diplomatically, never before has a Security Council resolution been so convenient for Israel as resolution 1701, which brought about the end of the war.

Nasrallah concerned about TV ratings

Hizbullah, on the other hand, cannot register a single achievement unless it deems the barbaric holding of two abducted IDF soldiers as such. Hizbullah also failed in its efforts to undermine democratic life in Lebanon after the war and to start a revolution by means of organized street protests. The Siniora government survived the putsch and did not surrender.

The fear that Nasrallah would turn into the young Arab public's new charismatic leader also proved to be false: His evil charm has dissipated, his confused statements have ceased to excite the masses and Nasrallah seems to resemble an ousted preacher who disappointed his followers and is now forced to present them with a report of his iniquities. Proof of this is his frenzied running around Arab TV studios and the learned interpretations he is providing with regards to the Winograd report: His prime concerns are divided between TV ratings and his own hide.

If this is a "divine victory" what does a defeat look like? The Arab difficulty in admitting defeat is not limited to the Second Lebanon War or to Hizbullah. It typifies societies that tend to ignore uncomfortable realities and pass on the responsibility to others. Forty years after the Six-Day War there are still no prominent opinion leaders in Egypt and Syria who would admit defeat and responsibility.

However, things are gradually changing in this respect too. Under the pressure of the independent and critical Arab media, introspection regarding the Second Lebanon War has also begun on the Arab side, while Israel's preparedness for investigation and self-flagellation is serving as a model for rectification and rehabilitation.

Even Nasrallah was forced to openly praise Israel's drawing of conclusions, without heaven forbid, applying it to himself or to his organization.

The new Middle East is still not new; however, new things are happening.