Livni's time has come

The Winograd report has created quite a stir for at least one senior minister. Tizpi Livni read the report, heard the prime minister announce that he would not resign, and proceeded to initiate a series of talks. Livni is determined to be a different Livni after the Winograd report.

The difference can be summed up in one short sentence: Livni has decided to become prime minister; she is convinced she can do the job. She wants to. And it may be assumed that she believes the post will become available pretty soon. She is debating what she should do - whether to resign the cabinet and in so doing perhaps prompt her demise.

Livni will likely take the middle road Wednesday by convening a clarification meeting with Olmert that would more resemble a confrontation.

The question is more tactical than strategic: The first signs indicating the coalition's collapse emerged Tuesday, when Labor Party Minister Eitan Cabel announced his resignation and Ami Ayalon announced that he had changed his mind and instead of standing behind the Olmert administration he would quit the government immediately if he won the Labor primaries.

Signs of collapse also emerged in the Kadima ranks: Two Knesset members, Marina Solodkin and Michael Nudelman, called on Olmert to resign. Their announcements could have been interpreted as a rebellion by the neglected ranks sitting on the backbenches, but the desire to oust Olmert didn't stop there. Coalition Chairman Avigdor Itzchaky spoke like someone standing opposite Olmert with a stopwatch in his hand.

Asking the right questions

The war didn't bode well for Livni. She entered it as a popular politician, whose feet were firmly on the ground while her future was sky high. The war left her on the sidelines: Her influence on the decision-making process was negligent. She believed the campaign should have been halted after the first phase but didn't stand her ground. She created a somewhat feeble, apprehensive image. Olmert didn't appreciate her. His office didn't cooperate with her. She primarily stood out because of her silence.

The war reinforced the expectations for a general to head the government. Livni believes that good generals should be in the army, not necessarily heading the government. The role of the prime minister is to ask the right questions, and that's what she did during the war.

The Winograd Report made it clear to her that she couldn't continue this way. The report praises the work of the Foreign Ministry (the key findings on the Foreign Ministry will appear in the final report set to be published in August,) and mentions in a side-note the fact that she, just like Olmert and Peretz, lacks adequate experience.

However, what shook Livni up more than anything was Olmert's part in the report, not her part. She reached the conclusion that the report would lead to the end of his term in office and if she doesn't succeed him, someone else will, Shaul Mofaz, Shimon Peres or Benjamin Netanyahu.

She maintains that she is bringing a list of impressive achievements into the fray. At Camp David, Ehud Barak skipped over the question of the right of return. This was a fatal error. She convinced Sharon to let her broach the subject with the US Administration. Sharon's office ridiculed her, but she insisted. Talks were conducted quietly; she didn't want to step over Silvan Shalom who was the foreign minister at the time.

Ultimately, President Bush was talked into issuing a written announcement stating that the return of refugees would not be within Israel's borders.

In her view this move constituted the greatest political achievement in the Sharon era. She created the "Livni Compromise" between Sharon and Netanyahu that ultimately enabled the disengagement. As justice minister she convened nightly meetings with the Gush Katif settlers that led to the founding of the Nitzan community. She initiated the move that enabled removing the rubble left from the settlements in Gaza to Sinai.

Sharon founded Kadima, but made a point of inviting her to a crucial meeting over the departure from the Likud ranks. He knew she had a choice. The Kadima manifesto is her document.

Personality problem

According to Livni, in all her activities she has always preferred the quiet working methodology over blatant headlines (she has filled a ministerial role in seven ministries within a very short timeframe) - and this applied to the war as well.

She voted against the Air Force's aerial operation in Beirut's Dahia neighborhood along with Minister Avi Dichter. She opposed the destruction of two empty houses, one of them the private home of Nasrallah, which according to Livni could not have led to a victory but did obliged Hizbullah to escalate its bombings and launching of long-range missiles at Haifa. The bombing was carried out at the whim of the generals, riding the waves of glory.

She suggested that Olmert end the fighting after the initial phase. She didn't make similar proposals later on. According to her, what could have been achieved on Thursday could not have been achieved on Sunday. Israel's power of deterrence was at stake.

She opposed the extension Olmert gave the army to continue fighting 60 hours after the ceasefire resolution was reached. The 60 hours that were given to the IDF were also given to Hizbullah; it could continue bombarding the home front with missiles.

Livni chose not to force her opinions. One doesn't quibble openly during wartime, she said. She asked questions but didn't fight for answers. The same applies to Shimon Peres and Rafi Eitan. They are praised, the others are criticized.

Olmert's aides are denying a major part of the allegations. They contend that Livni did not object to the Dahia strike but instead proposed postponing the attack until after the G8 meeting. Even if she did oppose the fighting after the ceasefire resolution, her reservations were not recorded. She primarily complained that she was not enough of a partner in the decision-making process.

In short, Olmert reached the conclusion that Livni has a personality problem, and Livni concluded that Olmert suffered from the same ailment. Politicians know how to overcome differences of opinion; they find it harder to do so with differences of personality.

Tzipi Livni does not have a set agenda for fighting Olmert. She doesn't work that way. But she is apparently convinced that her time has come to get off the grandstand and step onto the court. No green pitch will be awaiting her, but rather, a muddy bathtub. It would be interesting to see if she can deal with it.