Light orange
Netanyahu plans to court centrist voters, not settlers
He could have assumed power in early 1889. However, in the midst of a crisis he chose to travel abroad. The rest of the story is irrelevant: Support dwindled, and two years later he shot himself at his lover’s grave in Brussels. Boulanger became Europe’s laughingstock.
The moral here was learned for generations: If a politician wants to fight, influence, to “go for gold,” the least he owes his voters is to stick with them through the tough times. He who deserts, shall be deserted.
Escaping or indulging?
Thursday, Benjamin Netanyahu, along with his wife and kids, left for the United States. They will combine a lecture tour with family fun. Netanyahu isn’t running away; he is indulging himself.
He missed Thursday's anti-pullout mass protest in Rabin Square in Tel Aviv and he will miss the first stages of the disengagement.
Upon resigning Sunday, Netanyahu said he was finally at peace with himself. He felt free, liberated. Freedom is much more pleasant in New York.
Security, not settlers
Even if Netanyahu had stayed, he wouldn’t have participated in the orange protest in Rabin Square. He made that clear: “I am not bright orange,” he said, “I am light orange.”
Read a selection of Ynetnews coverage of Benjamin Netanyahu's resignation
- Bibi-bashing
- Free, and alone
- 'I used up my ability to influence'
- 'Good riddance
- Right-wing supports Netanyahu
- Bibi may challenge Sharon
- Sharon: Bibi ran away
He knows Sharon is trying to push him to the rightist edge of the political map, together with Uzi Landau. Netanyahu will do a lot to remain within the Likud’s mainstream, which he believes Sharon broke away from to the Left.
Right after handing Sharon his resignation letter during Sunday's government session, phones began to ring in his office. Orange Likud activists wanted to congratulate him for joining their camp. “Be here at 9 p.m.,” Netanyahu told them.
Over 100 activists arrived, very excited. This might be the miracle they prayed for; perhaps the resignation would thwart the disengagement.
Netanyahu put them in their place immediately. “Guys,” he said, “don’t be deluded. There is no going back. Settlements will be evacuated. At best, we will minimize the risks. We might save Gaza's Philadelphi route, possibly prevent the construction of a port in Gaza.”
Some expressed their disappointment. Others kept quiet. This was not what they had expected. Netanyahu, on the other hand, was pleased: Word of this meeting would reach the Likud, the entire nation: Netanyahu is concerned with security, not with the settlers.
Different terms
I, too, am willing to evacuate Gaza, Netanyahu says, but my terms are totally different.
His criticism of Sharon is based on security and politics. Security-wise, he claims post-disengagement Gaza will turn into a terrorist state that will launch rockets at the southern cities of Ashkelon and Ashdod; when it comes to diplomatic efforts, he has said even less.
He says that Sharon’s actions have reduced the chances for future agreements with the Palestinians. Sharon wanted to strike interim agreements with the Palestinians, but he eliminated that possibility with his own hands.
Indeed, Sharon is saying that the disengagement is the last unilateral move, but no one believes him.
Me, says Netanyahu, they’ll believe.
All-for-nothing
Why would the Palestinians sign an agreement, Netanyahu asks, when they can have it all with no effort, when the Israeli government’s resolve is weakening? He also claims that Sharon’s concessions are hurting Mahmoud Abbas and strengthening Hamas.
The Netanyahus have two homes: in Jerusalem and in Caesarea. Only the closest associates are invited to confer in Caesarea. That forum is referred to as “the submarine.” Loyalty is a prerequisite. It’s a closed forum that accepts no new members.
This time, the forum had little to do with his decision to resign. If anyone had influenced him it was his wife, Sarah.
Political earthquake
For the first time since 2002, surveys conducted among Likud members give Netanyahu a considerable lead over Sharon. Netanyahu sees it as an earthquake, an avalanche. He is not the only one: The survey results shook up political scenarios within the governing party.
He explains what appears to be a massive shift of members from Sharon to him (some shifted their support to Uzi Landau) as the gut feeling of hardcore Likud members that something bad happened to Sharon. Members of Likud aren’t suckers. They only give something to the Arabs if the latter give us something in return.
The Likud, says Netanyahu, was willing to yield Sinai to the Egypt in exchange for a peace agreement. It was willing to accept the Wye Agreement because it gave little to the Palestinians and got little in return. But suckers? Not us.
Netanyahu estimates the decline in support for Sharon is connected to corruption charges. Some supporters take offense. Yet what bothers the overwhelming majority is that their prime minister keeps on conceding, and is being worn down.
About a quarter of Likud members agree with Sharon’s policy. Others feel there is no alternate leader. Netanyahu is convinced that the majority within Likud is with him.
He knows that during negotiations with the Israelis, Mohammad Dahlan said: “Gaza? You should be paying us for pulling out of Gaza.” Netanyahu is not impressed with such comments.
Happy birthday
Netanyahu estimates there will be no Likud rift. He does not take Uzi Landau’s bid seriously. He will not invest an ounce of energy trying to dissuade him from running.
He believes that if Sharon’s camp splits, it will follow in the footsteps of the now-defunct Center Party, it will disappear. It will start at 20 Knesset seats against 20 Knesset seats, and end up with 10 against 30. It will be crushed between Likud and Shinui.
Netanyahu views his record as prime minister in a positive light. He was reasonable, measured, and cautious with concessions to the Palestinians. When reminded of his commitment under the Wye Accord to deal, “within 60 days,” with the construction of a seaport in Gaza, he blames Sharon.
“I left the room for five minutes,” he says. “When I came back, I realized Sharon had given them the port. It took great efforts to backtrack by assigning a committee that put it on hold.”
Still, he signed that agreement. At the signing ceremony, on October 23, 1998, in the East Room of the White House, Netanyahu spoke excitedly about the birthday card he received from Arafat a couple of days earlier: “I will never forget your kind words,” he said. “Your cooperation is extremely valuable.”
Some people at the Prime Minister's Office keep a copy of this speech handy. They never know when they might need to use it.
What-you-see-is-what-you-get
With me, Netanyahu says, what-you-see-is-what-you-get. The truth is a bit more complex.
As prime minister, Netanyahu maneuvered between the risk of igniting the Palestinian camp and his mental resistance to the spirit of Oslo. For electoral reasons, he committed himself to advancing the Oslo process, yet he did everything in his power to empty it of any substance.
If what Sharon is doing in the disengagement is legitimate, Netanyahu’s actions at the time were just as legitimate. He can’t be slammed for both killing and continuing the Oslo Accords.
Disengagement made him uncomfortable from day one, but his sweeping critique came late, and therefore, is less convincing. Someone remembered that only four months ago he said: “I support the plan because Israel is getting a lot and the Palestinians are losing a lot.”
He is like the yeshiva student who demanded his bride take off her clothes before the wedding. After the bride complied, he cancels the wedding claiming her nose is too big.
Ominous predictions
On Wednesday, he personally attacked the plan in the Knesset. His predictions are ominous. If only parts of it are realized, we will be on the brink of war.
Minister Matan Vilnai stood up and offered a reply.
"It is easy to scare the public," Vilani said. Netanyahu, meanwhile, was busy shaking hands with Likud "rebels," who oppose the pullout. He listened half-heartedly.
Six years ago, on the eve of the 1999 elections, Vilani was the IDF general Netanyahu admired most. When Yitzhak Mordechai left to the Center Party, Netanyahu secretly turned to Vilnai and offered to make him defense minister.
Vilani mulled the offer, and reply positively. The next morning, Vilani's friend Yossi Kuchik, one of former Prime Minister Ehud Barak's people, came to him. He managed to convince Vilnai to change his mind, and join the Labor party.
