From Mahmoud Abbas to Mahmoud Hamas
Israel has no alternative but to disengage from the Palestinians and to manage the conflict from a more secure position
The inauguration of the new Palestinian parliament signifies the official entrance of the Palestinian political system into the era of Hamastan. However, from the moment that the new legislative council was sworn in, Israel and certain forces within the international community have nevertheless begun attempting to strengthen Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) and the office of the presidency.
In other words, they are dealing with the Palestinian Authority as if there were no Hamas and dealing with Hamas as if there were no Palestinian Authority.
This is a hopeless undertaking. The Palestinian political system forces the president to be aligned with the legislative council. Accordingly, even if Abu Mazen is willing to be a partner, Hamas will be able to forcefully veto any move it disagrees with.
Thus Israel’s policy of strengthening the president ignores the fact that the center of gravity resides with Hamas, and Abu Mazen will be no more than a middleman. Mahmoud Abbas has become Mahmoud Hamas.
Basic law
The Palestinian Basic Law divides executive power between the prime minister and the office of the president. This division enables both entities to neutralize each other through different mechanisms, such as split control over budget allocations, security forces and legislative authorities.
In other words, if Hamas so chooses, it can use its newfound political authorities to undermine Abu Mazen and completely freeze any potential political process. However, Hamas, which has already demonstrated its organizational adaptability and sensitivity to the frequently changing international and regional conditions, understands that any move to destabilize the situation could be detrimental to the organization.
Therefore, Hamas would probably be in favor of a move making Abu Mazen the front-man to interact with Israel and the international community and freeing the organization from the responsibilities accompanying its newly-won power.
Political impasse
In light of the current situation, Israel finds itself at a political impasse. On one hand, Israel will not be able to agree with the Palestinian Authority on the establishment of a Palestinian State with Provisional Borders according to the “Roadmap”, a development which both Abu Mazen and the Fatah Central Committee have expressed their opposition to.
On the other hand, it is also impossible to reach a Permanent Status Agreement while the Palestinians are under the leadership of a terror organization which refuses to recognize any Jewish rights to self-determination.
Policies based on agreements, especially "package agreements" such as Oslo and the Geneva Initiative, tend to ignore these circumstances. Therefore, in accordance with military recommendations, Israel may better conduct itself within a framework of conflict management, instead of attempting to reach a solution to the conflict in the near-future.
Asymmetric conflict
One of the elements that obstructs Israel's ability to manage the conflict is the asymmetry between itself, a sovereign state according to international law, which carries inherent duties (and rights), and the elusive Palestinian Authority, which enjoys being the perpetual underdog free of such obligations.
Under these circumstances, a unilateral Israeli plan, coordinated with the international community, to unilaterally recognize the PA as a state (based on the Algiers Declaration that has already gained substantial international support), may allow Israel to manage the conflict from a more secure position.
Such a step would diminish the one-state threat; assign formal international responsibility to the Palestinian state, the sovereignty of which will be limited in accordance with Israel's right to self-defense; allow Israel to transform the "package approach" and divide the Permanent Status Agreement into a set of bi-lateral agreements dealing with specific issues (economy, water, etc.); and create an opportunity to begin solving the refugee issue by allowing for their return to the Palestinian state.
Such policy may suit "Hamastan", since it entails no commitment to end the conflict, and it includes elements that can be presented as "Palestinian achievements".
This move would not achieve end of conflict or finality of claims and would require ceding Israeli bargaining chips, such as an additional unilateral withdrawal in the West Bank in order to allow for Palestinian territorial contiguity, rescinding economic restrictions set by the Interim Agreement and more.
However, these bargaining chips are irrelevant when dealing with a Hamas-controlled entity, which is unlikely to be willing to resolve the conflict in the foreseeable future. As such, they only serve to perpetuate the Oslo perception of a Permanent Status agreement.
An Israeli government that wishes to remain relevant must change its own paradigm and, instead of simply responding to current problems, should examine policy options that would allow it to proactively manage the conflict from a more strategic position.
Jonathan Adiri is an Analyst at the Re’ut Institute for Policy Planning
