How did it all come to this?
Disengagement was supposed to punish Palestinians. How did we wind up with Qassams, kidnapped soldiers?
The first faulty strategic decision that brought us to the tragic mess Israel now finds itself in was not the decision to vacate Jewish settlements in Gaza. The mistake was to do so unilaterally, without getting anything in return and without talking to the Palestinian leadership at that time.
Unilateralism stemmed mainly from the desire to win strong public support for the disengagement plan. Strangely, advisors to then-Prime Minister Sharon thought they could sell the plan to the Likud Party if it was packaged as some sort of punishment to the Palestinians. After all, it's a zero-sum game here in the Middle East: What's bad for the Palestinians must be good for Israel, and vice-versa.
Within this governmental PR bubble, the disengagement was carried out on empty, foreign land, rather than areas bordering on Israel and densely populated with Palestinians. They had nothing to do with the process, and from the earliest stages were excused from any expectations of diplomatic or political reward for Israel's biggest withdrawal since Sinai.
"Take Gaza and choke on it," was essentially the Sharon government's message to Fatah last autumn.
Choking on Gaza
And so it was. They took Gaza and choked on it. Ruling the Gaza Strip proved to be just about impossible. It took months for the Palestinians to create anything resembling a minimum of public order. The economic situation deteriorated, in part because of the loss of jobs once provided by Jewish towns, but also because no security arrangement was reached to allow border crossings to function.
International aid was slow in coming, and so the withdrawal that could have served to strengthen the influence of the moderate wing of the PLO, headed by Mahmoud Abbas, was lost. Hamas, which was supposed to be weakened by the disengagement, gained strength and raised its head: It presented Israel's unilateral pullout not as a punishment for terrorism, but rather – surprise, surprise!! - as a victory for it.
Democracy wins; Israel loses
But the pullout had barely been completed when the Israeli government gave its blessing to Hamas' participation in elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council. This was the second strategic mistake. Back in January of this year Mahmoud Abbas pleaded with Israel to use its weight to prevent the super-democratic elections from taking place, but his pleas went for naught.
Abbas wanted time, it was hoped, to improve the economic and social situation in the Palestinian Authority, so the Palestinian street would see the pullout as an achievement for the sitting Palestinian government and Fatah would be able to reap the rewards of disengagement, despite its unilateral nature.
But the Israeli government trampled forward, trying to "democratize" the Middle East a la US President George Bush, and refused to get involved in Palestinian election preparations.
The rest, as they say, is history. Hamas won the election, riding the wave of a disengagement it managed to portray as a humiliating loss for Israel and a victory for terror. The Hamas government was formed, headed by Ismail Haniyeh, and Israel had no idea how to react.
What now?
De facto, there is no more Fatah. President Abbas has shown a few sparks of opposition, but he has folded immediately. Qassam attacks increased, with no proper, decisive, deterrent Israeli response, and when Cpl. Gilad Shalit was kidnapped, the Israeli government lost both its senses and its credibility.
What now? At the moment, Israel's contradictory responses – from verbal threats to blowing up empty buildings in Gaza and arresting Hamas ministers who just yesterday were described as "moderate" – are crowning the next Palestinian national hero: Khaled Mashaal, recently brought back to life, through none other than our own generous help.
