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Photo: AP
Ground forces in Lebanon. 'Very distrubing'
Photo: AP

We must not break down

Defense establishment should ask itself some very tough questions about ground fighting in Lebanon

What is happening these days in terms of the ground fighting in southern Lebanon is very disturbing, to put it mildly. Although this war did start due to failure in initiating force on the tactical level, its results must not be dictated by problems in the forces' functioning on the tactical level. Problems on the tactical level must not affect the strategic level.

 

This curved equation should deeply disturb the defense minister and chief of staff. They should ask themselves and the field commanders, and not necessarily the junior commanders, some very complicated questions.

 

There are tough days when fighting. Not every battle ends in victory. People get hurt, helicopters are brought down, and ships are hit. Even Nasrallah's appearance Thursday, after 23 tons of bombs, is a blow to consciousness.

 

But there is need to make sure not to create a sequence of such blows to our consciousness, as they may affect the public's tolerance. Our neighbors, God forbid, and those nations who support us across the globe, should not get the false impression that perhaps we are unable to properly deal with Hizbullah. We must create a switch in consciousness, and we must do it fast.

 

Ask tough questions

 

In order to bring about this switch, we first of all must ask ourselves some profound questions. We must not have mercy. We must not be nice. But we have a habit: We don’t ask our commanders tough questions in times of war, because we don't want to hurt their morale.

 

This is a mistake. The defense minister and chief of staff have the right and duty to challenge the commanders, on all levels, with difficult questions. Otherwise, when will they fix the mistakes? After the war?

 

The Israel Defense Forces is operating with special forces in south Lebanon, and not only in the Avivim area. It is not a ground invasion. These are not even the armored invasions we are familiar with from the Gaza Strip. Here we are talking about small forces, of the IDF's elite units, which are meant to back the aerial fighting against Hizbullah's strongholds in the south.

 

These are the best forces the IDF has – there are no forces better than them in small warfare. These units operate in small bodies, capable of long-term independent activity, inside enemy areas, while assimilating in the field. Their role is to collect information, mark targets, carry out deception and fraud activities, and strike in those sites which Air Force shells are unable to reach.

 

Making the same mistake twice

 

The first surprise waiting for such a special unit on Wednesday, in Maroun al-Ras, was basically an intelligence surprise. Hizbullah's level of hiding and assimilating in the area was above expectations. They built there complex underground arrays and underground shooting posts.

 

A Hizbullah member could have been staying in one of those underground tunnels, concealed, with food, water and ammunition, and then go find him. The force that was meant to arrive secretly was surprised, and most of its soldiers were hurt.

 

On Thursday, another elite unit was sent to the same place. This time the results should have been different. That did not happen. Another encounter, more soldiers hurt. The problem is definitely not with the fighters. One does not make the same mistake twice.

 

Even if other IDF elite units are now carrying out extraordinary operation in other place in southern Lebanon, the accumulation of these operational failures affects both Hizbullah's fighting spirit and the Israeli public's consciousness. We are creating a demonization of Hizbullah's abilities, just as we did when the IDF was in Lebanon.

 

Area should burst into flames

 

True, this is a complicated and difficult war against a stubborn and cruel enemy, and all the other superlatives we are bombarded with each time a professional problem pops up.

 

And true, there are casualties in war, and its momentum must not be stopped due to a tactical problem. But when one asks how many casualties the enemy had in this battle, no one can answer you. They don’t know. This is also a problem. It would have been easier to "digest" this encounter had there been 20 bodies on the other side once the mission was accomplished.

 

At a certain stage, the IDF will obviously send in massive ground forces in order to clean the area and establish a new situational reality prior to an agreement. And one asks himself: If when operating the special forces, the elite units, there are professional problems, what would happen when larger, armored, conventional forces are brought in?

 

Once it had become clear that Hizbullah members are hiding in the Maroun al-Ras village and in the nature surrounding it, under the ground, waiting for the IDF's ground forces coming toward them and ready to sacrifice themselves in fighting, the entire area should have burst into flames. Fire from the air and from the ground. This village should have been leveled.

 

It turns out that in the combined fighting system built by Hizbullah in the south, one village provides cover to the other village by firing mortar sells and anti-tank missiles. After several villages are leveled and these areas burst into flames as they should for a number of days, the covering villages will undoubtedly not manifest the same firmness.

 

The IDF called on the villagers to leave, and thus the fear of environmental damage should not have served as an obstacle for creating the optimal conditions before bringing in the ground force.

 

Tales of bravery

 

Alongside the professional problems, in the past couple of days there have also been quite a few supreme tales of bravery. During the Maglan unit's first battle at the Maroun al-Ras area, a medic who attended to an injured soldier was killed, while the paramedic who rushed to assist him in attending to the injured soldier was also killed. The injured soldier himself survived thanks to these two fighters' self-sacrifice and devotion.

 

On Thursday morning, a paratrooper from the anti-tank company was hurt after being shot by a sniper in his head. The rescue force that entered the area in order to take him out arrived on an airlifting with the Air Force's rescue and escape unit – 699.

 

The pilot, under fire of anti-tank missiles and light weapons, did not give up. He floated over the injured soldier, risked his life, until the paratrooper was rescued and arrived at the hospital. In this case, the speed of the rescue determined the difference between life and death.

 

To this day, since the day the two reserve soldiers were kidnapped on July 12, 14 IDF soldiers have been killed in Lebanon. Twenty-four have been injured, two of them sustaining serious wounds. Most of the injuries are in the limbs. This may testify to the fact that personal protection of the chest and body does the job.

 


פרסום ראשון: 07.22.06, 20:07
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