Lebanese road map
Olmert knows the danger has passed: Despite the tragedy at village of Qana, he's got a few more weeks to act
"There is no ceasefire, nor will there be in the coming days," he told a group of mayors. And the civilian deaths in Qana vilage did less damage to Israel's image than would have been expected. Even Israel's window of time to make military gains didn't really close.
The sharp denunciations heard first from European and Arab leaders were more lip service intended for domestic political consumption than a call for real action against Israel. Even the tone set by international media has been more appropriate.
The direct reason for this is that international opinion has more-or-less reconciled itself to the fact that in asymmetric wars between terror and guerilla groups and state armies, civilians sometimes get killed. It happened in Iraq, Afghanistan and Serbia.
Even the intermission in air force bombing raids against stationary targets in Lebanon helps the process of calming the flames worldwide and makes possible. Condoleeza Rice didn't speak about a time frame or stages, a la the Road Map created by the Quartet to deal with the Palestinian issue.
They "only" spoke about principles, according to which the important Security Council discussions will take place. But anyone reading between the lines can tell that these stages are approximate.
The first stage in Rice's Lebanese road map is a discussion, to take place this week at the Security Council, to focus on creating a theoretical framework for an agreement. This will include three components:
- A theoretical call for a ceasefire without demanding its immediate implementation – that will come when the multi-national force and the Lebanese army deploy along the border
- Political conditions for a long-term solution – such as re-adopting Resolution 1559 that calls for the Lebanese government to assert sovereignty over the whole country and to disarm militias. Rice also added an important clause: Preventing the re-arming of "armed groups" via an international embargo against countries providing such weapons; namely, against Iran and Syria.
- Establishment of a multi-national force. This means a Security Council resolution to establish such a force.
Israel also wants NATO troops to intervene quickly, even before the UN force arrives. Then, it will be possible to reach agreement about a ceasefire. The force's mandate and composition must still be discussed, and the UN must agree to contribute soldiers or money or both.
Stage two
In the next stage, negotiations will begin and a process for planning to implement the principles on the ground. This will take time, and will encounter many obstacles.
The practical meaning of the road map is that there will be another two-to-three weeks until the Security Council reaches a final decision. This is acceptable to Israel.
If the Security Council also agrees, Israel will have the opportunity to achieve more military goals – provided there are no more humanitarian catastrophes.
Exhausting the air option
The IDF, and apparently the government, lean towards putting the current focus on the ground war. The air campaign has just about reached its end; therefore, Israel agreed, without too many reservations, to a time out.
This time out serves Hizbullah's interests. It allows Hizbullah leaders to rest easy. More importantly, it allows them to transport soldiers (dressed as civilians), rocket launchers (disguised as food and supply trucks), and missiles from places that have not been hit to places in which battle infrastructure has been damaged.
Hizbullah can also now better prepare for the IDF ground campaign. Therefore, without any official announcement, Hizbullah will also observe the time out. The IDF knows this, but it also knows this is the minimum price Israel can expect to pay for the mistaken bombing of Kfar Kana and the terrible toll.
There is a possibility that this time out will de-facto turn into a general ceasefire. This would be a stunning defeat for Israel. Therefore, we must hope the army resumes activity in 48 hours, but the emphasis must be on ground warfare, rather than on bombing strategic targets from the air.
The air force must focus on providing support for ground troops (while taking care, of course, to avoid friendly fire incidents) and on destroying missile launchers in plain view. Residential buildings suspected of harboring missiles or serving as Hizbullah headquarters must be left alone, unless we are absolutely certain there are no civilians inside.
It appears that we have another two weeks or so for the home front to absorb rockets and for the ground war to expand and grow in south Lebanon. If we succeed in this complicated project, IDF forces will control strategic points south of the Litani River and will crush Hizbullah soldiers, until the international force and the Lebanese army replace the IDF.
This could take several weeks, perhaps up to a month and a half. But if this ground campaign is not successful, it will be a terrible loss for Israel.
