War of the generals

As head of the IDF Northern Command, Udi Adam was responsible for several failures during the first two weeks of the fighting – beginning with the kidnapping, to the daylight attack on Maroun al-Ras and the mumbled rescue attempt, to a general impression that he has conducted himself more like a building contractor or a firefighter putting out fires, rather than a general who can initiate and lead.

At least that's the impression he's given several colleagues and senior officers under his command. It has appeared to them that General Adam was hurt by hinted criticism from Chief of Staff Dan Halutz and several colleagues behind closed doors.

Adam was also angry that the chief of staff and the political echelon refused to allow him to push forward his plans for a ground war, performed in training exercises about a month before the war began.

His frustration peaked when Halutz and the politicians let him and his staff shoulder the blame for the above-mentioned failures, and for the failure of the ground war to produce results.

Adam then sunk into humiliated silence, causing him to become small-minded, which in turn caused him to make a fatal mistake from his perspective: To charge the politicians with responsibility for the above-mentioned failures.

In a weekend interview last week, Adam hinted that the political echelon stopped him implementing the ground battle plan he wanted. Olmert and Peretz were furious, knowing full-well the political implications of such a statement the day after.

Their anger over Adam's unmeasured (and unfair) criticism, and Halutz's non-stop complaints about Adam's leadership, have forced the prime minister and defense minister to conclude they've got to do something before beginning the biggest campaign of the war.

Choosing Kaplinsky

Halutz went over Adam's head and got the green light to transfer the Northern Command to deputy chief of staff, General Moshe Kaplinsky. Kaplinsky is an experienced infantry man with reams of experience in Lebanon, a natural leader and served as the Sharon's liaison with the political echelon.

It is Halutz's right to feel that Adam, a veteran of the tank corps and logistics specialist, is not qualified to conduct a huge, complicated operation that is set to feature infantry and special forces, backed up by artillery, air force and navy support. It is also Halutz's right to believe that Udi Adam is not appropriate for the role he currently occupies.

More than that, it is reasonable to divide command between senior officers in a campaign such as the IDF is currently conducting in the north, a war that demands on-the-spot decisions, and in which forces commanded by the general staff are operating deep in Lebanon, alongside troops commanded by the Northern Command, and in which we must prepare for the possibility that Syria could get involved.

If this is an accurate description of Halutz's thoughts, he should have appointed Kaplinsky as battlefront commander and instructed the Northern Command to answer to him.

There is a precedent for such a move – during the Yom Kippur war Chief of Staff David Elazar appointed former Chief of

True, that was a more desperate situation, and the general staff received complaints that Gourdish had lost his mind and ability to function. But in principle, the situations are similar.

But Halutz didn't follow Elazar's example. Instead of creating a clear hierarchy and chain of command, he appointed Kaplinsky to be the "chief of staff's representative in the northern command." In doing so, he struck a blow to General Adam's ability and authority to lead, without giving clear responsibility to Kaplinsky.

For field commanders, it is now unclear to whom they must turn when they need quick decisions. It is also a huge opening for a war of the generals that could well trickle down to lower ranks.

Halutz apparently took pity on Adam, so he only went half-way. Hopefully, we will not be the ones to pay the price.