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Photo: AFP
Firmness and deterrence
Photo: AFP
Sever Plocker

War of elites and spider webs

Second Lebanon war was different than expected, but Israel won it

What kind of war was the second Lebanon war? Different than previous Israeli wars, different than what is written in science-of-war books, different than expected. It was a justified, needed war replete with achievements, but also a confusing, bitter war with many victims.

 

It was also this:

 

The spider web war: Hassan Nasrallah's supreme strategic objective when he provoked Israel was to expose what he views as the fundamental weakness of Israeli society (which is made up of "spider webs," as he characterized it); adoration of stability and the good life, and as a result, an Israeli unwillingness to risk a war.

 

The Zionists in Israel, claimed Nasrallah in his many speeches, are not as determined to fight as we are, the Muslim "resistance movement." They became soft and conceding in pursuit of the good life. This conception collapsed in the second Lebanon War.

 

Israel proved that its strength has not been eroded and that its motivation to respond to a threat perceived as existential through total war has not been eroded either, regardless of this war's price in both human lives and economic terms.

 

This willingness by the Jews to defend their country, to the point of losing proportion, is a basic component in the Israeli power of deterrence vis-à-vis its near and far environs.

 

The war of elites: Financially established Israeli families sent their best sons and fathers straight into the battlefields of Lebanon, to the heart of the bleeding front, where they fought bravely. The high rate of fathers and sons of this class who were killed or wounded in the second Lebanon War is prominent. The death of author David Grossman's son is the most symbolic, dramatic expression of this.

 

Ethnic demagogues attempted during the war to present it as a military move where the "Ashkenazis" (Jews of European decent) use the "Mizrahis" (Jews of Middle-Eastern decent) as cannon fodder. In practice, the demographic statistics show a completely different picture, but more significantly, the use of ethnicity in war is improper and outrageous.

 

The war of the commentators: During the second Lebanon War we discovered a new natural resource: It turns out that alongside the authorized military commentators, whose numbers are limited, Israel is home to hundreds more military experts on behalf of themselves, who have the ability in one second to analyze the most complex battlefield, provide detailed advice to war managers, identify the proper timing for moving armored corps divisions, and criticize decisions taken by commanders.

 

Those who ever served in the IDF in the rank of second lieutenant and above (and those who have not) assumed the pose of a praised military expert in this war, brimming with confidence and particularly with decisive, critical assessments. Through this process, some media outlets also lost their sanity and forgot they must serve the public, not themselves.

 

The war of gains and losses: Some wars end with unequivocal results, while in others the answer to the question "who won?" is provided through the use of calculations and comparisons. Regarding the second Lebanon War, it will be written that Israel won, militarily and diplomatically, 80 percent of it and lost 20 percent. Hizbullah, on the other hand, lost 80 percent and won 20 percent.

 

With the ceasefire going into effect, Israel's situation is much better than what it was on July 12, while Hizbullah's condition is much worse. But a 20 percent loss also hurts.

 

The war of the home front: Ever since the war of the cities between Teheran and Baghdad in the early 1980s, no geographical area sustained such a large quantity of rockets and missiles as the Israeli north did during the second Lebanon War. The Katyusha rockets killed, destroyed, hurt both physically and mentally, and caused huge damages.

 

Yet despite their damage, it turned out that this weapon, which Hizbullah amassed during the last decade, does not constitute a strategic threat on the country.

 

Better, more proper government organization that is more humane and considerate and less bureaucratic could have prevented the suffering of the weak, who have been abandoned in the north of the country at the outset of the war.

 

Nasrallah, take a look: Those who survived your 4,000 Katyusha rockets constitute an unyielding home front.

 


פרסום ראשון: 08.15.06, 12:51
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