More determination, less sensitivity

As to medium and short range missiles and rockets – we have no response for those at all, even though their destruction capability is proven and well known. Assuming that Iran will possess nuclear weapons sooner or later, and knowing that Syria already possesses chemical warheads for the various ballistic missiles and rockets in its arsenal, it's clear that such weapons at the hands of the Arabs and Iran constitute the gravest, most tangible existential threat on Israel and its citizens.

Indeed, this threat isn't new: The State of Israel has been living with it since the 1960s. Yet never before had her enemies possessed missiles and warheads at such quantity and quality, which present a new type of threat. We should also recall that other countries in the Middle East may go through regime changes and join the axis of radical Islam, along with the weapons and modern missiles such countries possess.

National project 

This response should be undertaken as a national project with its own administration and budgets, including donations from world Jewry. This project should be undertaken quickly, simultaneously, and feature quantities and quality that would provide wide security margins. We must not allow the term "cost-effectiveness" to be mentioned even once more during discussions on this project's budget, because our very existence depends on it. We must note that the successful execution of such project would provide Israel with a power of deterrence it currently does not possess also against the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, as well as against any other country in the region that acquires nuclear capabilities.

Meanwhile, the IDF is tasked with the 2nd national defense mission on the agenda: Renewing the operational capabilities of ground forces. The failure of ground combat in Lebanon exposed numerous flaws – in the fighting itself, in command at all levels, in the reservist force, in logistics, and in cooperation between army branches – that we cannot escape the conclusion this is an overall functional failure by the IDF's ground force.

This failure was not malicious, heaven forbid, but rather, a result of a lethal combination in the past six years of intensive fighting in the Territories, no less intensive cutbacks to the defense budget, and at the same time, needless investment in digital and high-tech projects earmarked for ground forces that contributed marginally, if at all, to a boost in fighting capabilities.

Noble acts of bravery 

They also forgot how to plan and manage such classical battle. No wonder that almost all noble acts of bravery in the last war were carried out in operations aimed at rescuing the wounded rather than carrying out missions. This happens, among other things, because the mission was not clear to commanders on the ground and because it wasn't defined clearly and to-the-point by their superiors; the same senior commanders who in army schools were imbued with pseudo-scientific language, which is possibly proper for management academies but not for a fighting force.

Even terms such as "conquering" and "eliminating the enemy" almost disappeared from the commanders' lexicon, and due to political and legal correctness they do not dare use such terms even when that is the proper and practical definition of the mission. Therefore, the process of regaining the abilities of the IDF's ground force must begin with commanders at all levels, and from there continue in a series of assault and defense drills combining the firepower of armored forces, infantry, artillery, and engineering ranging from companies to battalions. Such exercises must include all active duty units as well as reservist forces.

New combat methods needed 

The third defense mission on the agenda also belongs to the IDF: Developing and implementing new combat methods and new protection means for combat troops: The armored corps, infantry soldiers, and gunships that assist them. This is required in order to boost the survivability of ground forces and allow them to carry out their missions on a battlefield replete with anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, roadside bombs, and landmines.

In a few years, the IDF is likely to encounter in the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, and Golan Heights similar problems and possibly even graver ones than the ones encountered by tanks, infantry troops, and choppers in Lebanon. Therefore, we must examine such questions and decide where it is possible and effective to use tanks, and when to avoid this. We should also look into when to use infantry troops under cover of artillery, gunships, and fighter jets in an area were the battle lines are not clearly drawn and distinguishing between friendly troops and enemy forces is difficult.

The fourth defense mission is to institutionalizes and reinforce decision making processes and clear areas of responsibility during wartime in the junctions connecting political and military officials. It would be preferable that the government utilize opinions presented by the National Security Agency when taking decisions and overseeing the army, as is the custom in the US and Britain.

Media's role 

We must also examine the justification of the penetration of soldiers' families and the media into the military enterprise, and how deeply it hinders the commanders' ability to decide and implement – a problem that later influences the battlefield too.

Is it really justified for parents to call a regiment commander and attempt to dictate to him the manner of handling a disciplinary offence by their son, sometimes with an implied threat of turning to a Knesset member they happen to know? Or that they attempt to exert pressure on a brigade commander through the media so that he refrains from punishing troops that abandoned their posts and deserted? Is it really justified for bereaved families to burden the army endlessly with investigations they initiate into training and operational accidents, - inquiries that often do not uncover new information? The forgiving and encouraging attitude of our society to such phenomena leads a significant number of commanders to suck up to the families and media, thus losing the ability to make practical decisions.

Failures could repeat 

Israel's army and society must provide answers for these and other questions, and that's why the Winograd commission should also look into these matters. If it fails to do so, the failures of Lebanon could repeat in the next war too.