Halutz rescued, for now

It appears that the endless list of IDF commissions of inquiry, teams tasked with drawing lessons, and expert investigators was yet another daring operation by the Air Force's search and rescue team. The incredible guys from the unit again carried out their mission with devotion, diligence, and bravery, while rescuing yet another pilot in distress. That is, they brought him back to his office safe and sound.

There is no other way to find logic or sense in the grotesque mountain of insignificant details, trivial conclusions, simplistic lessons, and bombastic nonsense that fills the working papers, investigation summaries, media reports, and officer discussions.

Some of those "conclusions and lessons" looked and sounded like a cruel parody produced by an uninhibited satirist: "The elimination of the Katyusha rocket threat was not defined as an objective," "the activity was not defined as war," "the objectives were not defined using clear military language…"

These scholarly lessons portray the army as a clumsy organization with the brain of a chicken, deep learning disabilities, and astounding difficulties when it comes to reading comprehension (as well as the inability to comprehend what is being said or what is happening.) Even sworn and dedicated leftists do not believe the army is so dumb.

The unfathomable seriousness of the investigators and the serious consideration shown by the public who read through their conclusions are even more bizzare. As if there's something to look into or discover, as if there's anything that wasn't clear and transparent immediately after the first days of that ugly, foolish brawl in the north.

Indeed, all the findings and conclusions could have been written up (and some already wrote them up) after 10 days of fighting. Back then it was already clear that we're talking about a failure, and back then it was clear that its roots can be found in two factors only: A military that had been corrupted and weakened during 40 years of policing work and brutality, and a particularly unfortunate combination of a prime minister and army chief who are both brash, arrogant, haughty, and possessing the decision-making and consideration ability of a neighborhood thug. This is the whole story behind the defeat.

The way to fix this failure is also apparent and clear: Those two should be removed from their offices soon, while the military should free itself from the burden of occupation, policing work, and brutality. Could it get any simpler?

However, as noted, for now this trick is working. Lt. Gen. Halutz is clinging to his chair, organizes group therapy conventions for his officers complete with purification and remorse, and hopes that this will silence his critics and accusers.

With touching stubbornness, he is also clinging to the fact that the gentlemen who appointed him have not yet asked him to quit. As if he doesn't know – is it possible that he doesn’t know? – that they are leaving him in his post just so he can be turned into a lightning rod for the expected Winograd Commission's stormy conclusions. In the hopes that the commission will make do with blasting him, but will have mercy on them. Based on a cold speculation that it is better to have a serving army chief as a convenient and readily available victim than an army chief that already went home and became worthy of compassion and sympathy.

But until that point, until the inevitable "Feast of Sacrifice," there's no doubt the objective had been met: Halutz was rescued.