Time to adopt 'Madrid Model'

Lebanon, meanwhile, rejected Olmert's call for a separate agreement. It is difficult to find comfort in the Palestinian arena either: Hamas' ongoing refusal to recognize Israel; the ongoing Qassam rocket fire; the reality of internal violence, on the verge of a civil war; and the inability to establish a national unity government on the Palestinian side – all of the above leave a very slim chance for diplomatic progress.

This is the time to abandon the attempts to reach separate agreements with "selected" partners around us. What worked in the past with Egypt and Jordan is currently inapplicable vis-à-vis Ramallah, Beirut, or Damascus. There's no choice but to return to the Madrid formula of 1991: The promotion of a regional and comprehensive agreement in the Middle East. We may fear that by returning to the multi-party channel, Israel will have to face many parties on its own. However, the international community will be there to balance the picture.

The one clear agreement among all participants in the latest Madrid Convention was that we should be going back to a comprehensive format based on the Saudi initiative (which was adopted in 2002 in the Arab League summit and was ratified again recently by Arab foreign ministers.) The tragedy of this special offer was the fact it was proposed during the second Intifada's most devastating suicide bombings of all times. Under such circumstances the Israeli government could not be expected to seriously address a new peace initiative.

Sunni protective belt 

However, even in later years this attractive option did not receive the due attention. It certainly appeared on the desk of decision-makers in Jerusalem more than once, but they did not allow it to take off, at least to an initial dialogue meant to clarify the intentions behind it – and that's a pity, as besides the difficulties presented by the initiative, it also includes many positive aspects for Israel.

This is the first (and only) peace plan that all 22 Arab states are party to. Therefore, any obligation to Israel in the agreement will be honored by each one of them and all of them together

• The initiative's objective is a comprehensive peace agreement, which in light of the Iranian-Shiite threat has become a clearer Israeli interest than ever and can provide us with a moderate Sunni protective belt.
• The initiative is committed to providing security to all regional countries. Its implementation will bring about an end to the conflict, recognition of Israel (as declared by the Arab League's secretary general) and full normalization in relations with Arab states.
• The plan recognizes that a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem, even if based on UN Resolution 194, must be agreed-upon by all parties. In other words, Israel cannot be forced to accept a solution it does not agree to.
• As absurd as this may sound, the plan's demand for Israeli recognition of an independent Palestinian state has become a clear Israeli interest, perhaps even more so than for the Palestinians. After all, the Hamas movement doesn't insist on it (it makes do with integration into the Islamic world or sets its sights on a "state of all its citizens") while for Israel this is perhaps the last opportunity to entrench the principle of "two states for two nations."
  

As to the problems inherent in the plan (the demand for full withdrawal to the 1967 borders, the absence of an option to trade off territory, and the east Jerusalem question,) we would do well to listen to former Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher's kind offer. In Madrid he invited Israel to request any change it wants in the initiative, as long as it would be possible to start discussing it jointly.

A "Yes" by Olmert would constitute a political lifesaver. By merely inviting to the Knesset three Arab presidents (Assad, Mubarak and Abbas,) two kings (Jordan's Abdullah and Saudi Arabia's Abdullah,) one Prime Minister (Siniora) and Arab League Secretary General (Amre Moussa,) Olmert would be credited with a constitutive event and guarantee his place in the pantheon of Israeli history.

What is currently impossible to achieve bilaterally will be more possible in a group: The influence of the Arab collective on the Palestinians would certainly be stronger than that of Israel alone. Finally, with backing on the part of Israel's civil society and a little determination by the Madrid steering team, Bush won't be a bother, and once the first understandings are reached, he will certainly join the successful journey.

Brigadier General (Ret.) Dr. Yossi Ben-Ari served in senior intelligence posts