Lessons of Iraq strike

The Winograd Commission would do well to watch the movie "Tammuz" before it publishes its conclusions. Nir Toib's documentary (aired on Channel 1 Wednesday) on the bombing of Iraq's nuclear reactor 26 years ago presents the antithesis of how things were managed in the Second Lebanon War.

The movie illustrates how a political and military establishment can address a strategic threat level-headedly and responsibly and exhaust all the overt and covert means to thwart it before deciding on a military strike. Moreover, the movie illustrates the direct connection between the motivation of those asked to carry out a difficult military mission that could have led to their death or torture-filled captivity and the sense shared by the eight pilots that political and military leaders fully considered and debated the issue before sending them on a risky yet appropriate mission.

For almost a year, Prime Minister Begin consulted his ministers, with many opposing the operation. He did not give the "green light" to the army before facilitating agreement among members of the security cabinet, who themselves looked into the operation's chances of success before sending the pilots to enemy territory.

Indeed, in the Second Lebanon War, Olmert, Peretz and members of the security cabinet did not have months to consider every detail and aspect. But they could have dedicated 48 hours and even more than that not only to clearly and accurately wording the mission assigned to the IDF in Lebanon, but also to examining, even in an artificial manner, the IDF's level of readiness to perform the mission and the manner in which the army intends to start and finish it. That is, the campaign's operational plan.

The movie also features several lessons that should be examined in another relevant context: The current response to the Iranian nuclear threat. The movie revealed, for the first time, that for years the Mossad was able to delay Iraq's efforts to acquire military nuclear capability through covert actions. Only after all these efforts and diplomatic moves were exhausted, and after it was made absolutely clear that the Air Force is capable of performing the mission, Prime Minister Menachem Begin, may he rest in peace, approved the military operation.

At first, the option to carry out a combined aerial and ground assault by elite units and the Air Force was also weighed. This option was rejected out of hand because of the distance and difficulties inherent in returning the forces home. Therefore, Defense Minister Ezer Weizmann rejected this option and it was decided to proceed with an aerial assault.

Israeli society has changed

Meanwhile, the interviews with the pilots in the movie clearly create a sense of how difficult it is to hit one large and obvious target 600 kilometers (roughly 400 miles) away from Israel's territory. This was particularly true in light of the fact that the Iraqi nuclear reactor was protected by anti-aircraft missile batteries and Iraqi Air Force jets. This is even truer when it comes to Iran, whose military nuclear plan is dispersed through dozens of underground targets, with the closest ones located about 1,400 kilometers (roughly 850 miles) from Israel.

And yet another lesson: The final decision on the operation was taken only when it was clear that the Iraqi reactor was completely ready for operation and that it would be able to produce the materials needed for a nuclear bomb within several months. That is, the operation was carried out a moment before the reactor became a clear and present danger.

The candid remarks by the eight pilots who bombed the reactor show that they were well aware of the dangers involved in the mission. They were convinced that some of them would be downed or hung on Baghdad's streets. Yet because they were deeply convinced that their mission was necessary for the security of Israel's citizens, they did not hesitate at all – in fact, they were eager to carry out the mission.

There are those who would say that the pilots in 1981 were imbued with a different spirit than young Israelis today. This is not true. Young Israelis today are willing to sacrifice no less in order to defend their home – this was proven by the reservists' enlistment during the Second Lebanon War.

What changed is the political and military leadership, which sent them to battle without considering it in a thorough and substantive manner. Israeli society has also changed, as today it wants the IDF to emerge victorious without providing it with the required material resources and without recognizing the fact that self-discipline and willingness to invest and sacrifice, which are very much needed on the battlefield, have to exist in the army long before the first shot is fired.