Keep your hopes down
Winograd report won't cause a political earthquake, may even help Olmert
Those expecting a political earthquake will apparently be disappointed. The Winograd Commission's interim report will indeed shake up the government and defense establishment, but the strength of this shakeup will barely reach 5 on the Richter Scale.
The political system will be shocked and cry out, we will see protest rallies where political opposition and non-parliamentary elements call for toppling the government, and petitions may possibly be filed to the High Court of Justice. Yet once the dust settles, within a week or two, it will turn out that the Olmert government is staying in place, and may even grow stronger.
This political forecast is not based on knowledge of what the commission's interim report contains, but rather, is premised on an estimate of what the report does not contain. The interim conclusions address the Second Lebanon War's first five days and what came before that, starting in the year 2000. That is, the interim report deals with a period where the current government's responsibility for failures is relativity minor.
Yet those who are even superficially familiar with what happened during that war know that most of the wrong decisions, confusion, and combat screw ups appeared in the political and military leadership starting in the war's second week and onward. The first five days were actually relatively successful.
The political leadership's failure during those days was minor. It is concentrated in the hours of decision-making between the abduction of IDF soldiers to the moment the fighter jets took off. During those hours, the government received from the IDF chief of staff the army's proposals regarding both the operation's objectives and its operational outline.
The prime minister, defense minister, and other ministers indeed rejected the army's request to bomb national infrastructures in Lebanon, yet they approved all other details. The political leadership's decision-making process was hasty and suffered from inadequate consideration and judgment, as it lacked an in-depth examination of future moves and the State of Israel's desired conclusion for the war.
Therefore, most ministers also failed to understand that they were in fact deciding on launching a war and did not demand that the army undertake the preparations required under such circumstances.
Policy of containment
Yet despite the serious flaws in the political leadership's decision-making process, Olmert and Peretz can also argue – with a great measure of validity – that the decisions taken by the government were reasonable considering the assessments provided by the army chief and top military officials, as well as the self-confidence displayed by military officers.
Olmert and Peretz also argue, and rightfully so, that they devoted quite a bit of thinking and engaged in checks with the army regarding the South Lebanon issue even before the war. Therefore, most of the responsibility for the mistakes made during the early hours and days lies on the shoulders of military decision-makers and particularly Chief of Staff Dan Halutz who fed the government with their assessments and did not demand that reserve forces be called up in preparation for a ground operation.
The conclusions and recommendations regarding the difficult, later chapters of the war, where the conduct of the prime minister, defense minister, members of the security cabinet, and IDF major generals was the most problematic, were left by the commission for the full report, to be published in a few months. The interim report will focus on those who were responsible for the "containment and restraint strategy" vis-à-vis Hizbullah in the years prior to the war.
The most notable figures in this regard are Prime Ministers Barak and Sharon, former Defense Minister Mofaz, and former IDF Chief of Staff Yaalon. They also hold significant responsibility for the degeneration of the reservist force during those years. Yet none of them face a situation where they will suffer grave political or public damage as a result of the commission's conclusions.
Those who will apparently suffer the most damage in the interim report are senior IDF General Staff officers who were partners to the decision-making process in the war's first stages and who are still in active duty. In this context we must note that the commission decided not to make personal recommendations regarding the political leadership, but merely "issue conclusions" regarding the conduct of the prime minister as well as past and current ministers.
New defense minister
However, recommendations and personal recommendations regarding the military and defense establishment's part in the war will be included both in the interim and full reports. Yet these conclusions have also lost their full effect because most of the senior officers involved in making wrong decisions have already retired or resigned after the war.
In addition, the army did not wait for the Winograd Commission, and already carried out an unprecedented, incisive, and comprehensive wave of inquiries under the leadership of resigning Army Chief Halutz.
As a result, Olmert will not only avoid irreversible damage as a result of the report – he may even make gains because of it. This is particularly true because of the effect that the commission's conclusions will have on Defense Minister Amir Peretz' public status and the results of the Labor party primaries.
We can reasonably assume that following the primaries, at the end of May, Olmert will not find it difficult to convince Peretz to leave the Defense Ministry's 14th floor in favor of another Labor party figure with a proven military record. Ehud Barak and Ami Ayalon are the leading candidates.
At the same time, Olmert would also be able to appoint a new finance minister and undertake other moves that would solidify his collation ahead of the next "bombardment" in about two or three months.
The Winograd Commission's full report, to be published at that time, will include conclusions and recommendations that are graver than those to be found in the interim report both in relation to the political leadership and to the army and security establishment. In between the two reports, the testimonies of key figures who appeared before the commission will be published.
To some extent, this process is reminiscent of the manner in which the Second Lebanon War was managed. Instead of taking a decision on a comprehensive move that should lead to a clear and measurable result, the process of drawing conclusions and presenting them to the public is spread over a period of time and divided into chapters that are connected but do not allow us to see the overall picture.
As a result of the high expectations and the time that has passed since the war, the Winograd Commission's interim report may become the main document the public addresses. It is possible that the full report will not enjoy the same attention and detailed examination, even though it will address the gist of the matter.
This may result in the softening of the public, political, and practical effect of the commission's conclusions and recommendations, even though its members apparently performed their task reliably.
