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Ron Ben-Yishai

A ship with no captain

Leadership's war performance affected by career, ego considerations

The Winograd Commission dared to do what no other commission of inquiry did before: It ruled that the ministerial responsibility of a public figure is just as obligatory as personal and criminal responsibility. Moreover, the commission ranked the level of ministerial responsibility, and based on this ranking it marked the officials mostly responsible for the failures.

 

This is the reason why Olmert, who led the political establishment during the war, has been identified by commission members as bearing greater responsibility than other government officials for the difficult and disappointing results of the Second Lebanon War.

 

The bottom line emerging from the commission's conclusions is a call on the public to severely judge first and foremost the prime minister and IDF chief of staff, and immediately after them the defense minister. The commission let the public decide how to act.

 

As to Dan Halutz, the question is no longer relevant, because he quit. As to Peretz, the public is supposed to see whether he will be realizing his intention to quit the Defense Ministry following the Labor party primaries. As to the prime minister, the public is supposed to decide whether it wishes to remove him from office through massive non-parliamentarian protest and pressure on politicians to dismiss him, or wait for another opportunity – the next elections, for example.

 

Public pressure will likely lead to Olmert's eventual dismissal, although this will not happen in the coming months. The prime minister will engage in a battle of survival until the commission's full report is published, and possibly after it as well. The public realization that currently the political arena features no prominent or fitting candidate for the premiership will serve to moderate the pressures on Olmert.

 

The commission also looked into the previous governments' and army chiefs' responsibility for the current war's failures, and they too have been criticized. The Barak and Sharon governments not only failed to bring the State of Israel's overall security doctrine up to date, as required by the situation, but also failed to properly address the problem posed by Hizbullah on the Lebanon border. By doing so, the commission said, they contributed to the current government's and army's failure during the war.

 

The Winograd Commission charged the previous governments too with arrogance, because they assumed that Israel's military power is sufficient in order to deter enemies from engaging in an all-out war. Therefore, they failed to prepare for this war and allowed themselves to erode the IDF's power. This conclusion is of the utmost significance for the future, and a big hint regarding the position that should be adopted by the government in the next round of defense budget discussions.

 

Deep leadership crisis

Beyond the actual details, those who closely read the commission's interim report realize that the State of Israel is currently facing a leadership crisis that is apparently the most severe in its history.

 

The commission's conclusions show that none of the political and military leaders functioned properly; none of them was aware of the heavy responsibility they were bearing and failed to act in accordance with it; none of them was able to or decisively demanded that decisions be undertaken level-headedly and coolly, and all of them – and I mean all of them – were affected by career, ego, and media rating considerations in making their decisions.

 

Therefore, the failed decisions that characterized the war's early days continued and worsened until its last day.

 

We have never seen a situation like that in the State of Israel. Even in the Yom Kippur war, the first Lebanon War, and in the periods that preceded them, military and political leaders made grave and fateful mistakes. Yet at least some of them, and some IDF commanders, were able to regain their composure quickly, recognized their mistakes, and did everything in their power to fix what they did wrong.

 

Most importantly: The overwhelming majority of these leaders thought and acted based on relevant considerations. None of them calculated how one military move or another would affect their political fate or military career.

 

This was not the case when it came to our leaders during the Second Lebanon War and the period that preceded it. Most of these leaders, to this day in fact, fail to understand or admit they failed. Even Halutz resigned not because he reached the conclusion that he failed, but rather, because he felt he was losing the ability to lead.

 

Therefore, we are not talking about a specific failure, but rather, a deep and ongoing leadership crisis. It is doubtful whether it would be resolved even if we replace the current political leadership.

 

Those who currently compete for the premiership do not include even one person who we can point at with reasonable confidence as someone who can lead the required change in running the country and its security affairs through the power of his or her personality and wisdom. This situation should arouses grave concern for the fate of the country and its citizens, in the face of the fateful situations and decisions we shall be facing as a nation and state in the coming years.

 

In this regard, the Winograd Commission's report serves as a severe indictment against Israel's political system and society, both of which failed to give rise to fitting leadership and are failing to address national security problems properly.

 

Preventing leaks

What can and should be done in this situation? The commission's "institutional" recommendations are designed for that aim – those are the truly important conclusions and recommendations, because they deal with the future rather than with the past. Their objective is to force politicians and military officials, through structured decision-making and review processes, to exercise proper judgment and utilize all the resources and aides at their disposal.

 

These recommendations are topped by an issue that is seemingly minor: The prevention of leaks from security discussions through compartmentalization and minimization of the forums that deal with sensitive and operational matters. It appears that in the commission's view this is an important issue that will likely be addressed broadly in the full report.

 

Other recommendations have to do with the preparation work that is meant to provide the government with a broad knowledge base and assessments needed to make decisions. These recommendations are headed by the demand to turn the National Security Council into the main and most influential administrative body next to the prime minister.

 

The commission demanded that the NSC be granted powers and areas of responsibility at the expense of the defense system. The commission also proposed the establishment of a national crisis management center at the Prime Minister's Office, which will be based on preparation work by the NSC. Another proposal called for including the Foreign Ministry in security decisions that have diplomatic implications (something that almost never happened from Ben Gurion's days to this day.)

 

Simply put, the Winograd Commission is demanding that the focal point of decision-making power regarding decisions that touch on the State of Israel's national security be transferred from the defense establishment and the IDF to the Prime Minister's Office and the government – a move that has been required for a long time now, because the Israeli government is the army's commander in chief.

 

These proposals are expected to be met by resistance on the part of the IDF, Shin Bet, and Defense Ministry, but the Winograd Commission strongly demanded that they be implemented and that bodies tasked with reviewing their implementation be set up.

 

These institutional recommendations give Olmert a lifeline. Should he quickly start implementing them, he may regain a little of the great public trust he lost. The question is whether he is able to implement these recommendations, and whether this will be enough to prevent his dismissal within a few months.

 


פרסום ראשון: 05.01.07, 08:24
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