We haven't learned a thing

"No one starts a war, or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so, without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it." (Karl von Clausewitz)

The Winograd Commission's interim report published Monday is replete with harsh statements, exasperating accounts, and grim conclusions. Yet beyond the criticism leveled at Israel's political and military leadership, the most infuriating conclusions have to do with the grand failure to formulate clear objectives and an exit strategy ahead of the Lebanon campaign.

This is particularly upsetting because the fundamental flaws identified by the commission bear startling resemblance to the flawed decision-making process that led to the first Lebanon War – 25 years have passed, yet apparently we have not learned a thing.

An examination of the report's main conclusions would leave anyone familiar with the ultimately disastrous 1982 campaign shaking their head in disbelief. Some of Winograd's conclusions, including the most fundamental ones, can be applied to the first Lebanon War word-for-word and still be just as relevant.

"Managing the campaign on the go, and not on the basis of defined objectives and a clear operational outline – that is the fundamental failure"; "…the war's objectives were not formulated clearly and cautiously"; "…incongruence between the proposed and approved modus operandi and the objectives that were set" – those are just a few of the striking similarities.

Then as now, the war was initially presented as a limited operation meant to achieve its goal with relative ease, sweeping speed, and a low number of casualties. Then as now, Israel was led by a troika (PM Begin, Defense Minister Sharon, and IDF Chief of Staff Eitan) determined to strike in Lebanon without fully grasping the implications of such move.

Traumatic experience

Then as now, one dominant figure (Defense Minister Ariel Sharon) presented ministers with a misleading picture and used his superior experience and military credentials to convince a weak government to support his proposals. This time around it was Army Chief Dan Halutz, slammed by the commission for conducting himself as he did despite "knowing that both the prime minister and defense minister lacked adequate knowledge and experience."

Then as now, the government failed to grasp what it was voting on and supported a military move "without being clear on how it would end, and without knowing the scope of the planned operation, its objectives, and its actual purpose."

Then as now, ministers voted on moves that could be easily foreseen to lead to escalation, without grasping the full meaning of such maneuvers. In 1982, it was military maneuvers on the eastern front that made a clash with Syria all but inevitable; this time around it was a military strike that was certain to provoke a ceaseless Hizbullah rocket barrage Israel was unprepared to handle.

More than anything, the Winograd report teaches us a fundamental lesson, which we were supposed to learn 25 years ago, about the implications of incongruity between declared goals and exit strategies. As Israel learned in 1982, and sadly had to discover again in the summer of 2006, ending a war under such conditions can be a very painful and traumatic experience.

The Winograd report's implications are unequivocal: Both Olmert and Peretz must go. Yet more than anything, it is the flawed decision-making process still prevalent around here that must go. Otherwise, the next war may turn out to be even more traumatic than those that came before it.