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Nahum Barnea

Olmert made his own mess

PM cannot dispute Winograd's findings because he appointed him

The bottom line is Ehud Olmert has to go. Not because of the failures of the war, but because should he remain in office following such a report by such a commission of inquiry - a commission whose members he himself appointed - it is doubtful whether we will ever see accountability about anything around here. Israel will festively be joining the Third World.

 

Yet despite this, he may survive politically. Not because the war was successful, but rather, because the alternative, even according to the commission's standards, is not much better. Not Bibi, not Tzipi and not even Ehud Barak.

 

He is slated to remain in office amid a hostile public mood, on borrowed time. To paraphrase a well-known saying; the prime minister can fight part of the people part of the time, but he cannot fight all of it all the time. Ultimately, the public's sentiments will be translated into a political maneuver. Winograd gave the political establishment an extension until August. He is implicitly threatening that in his final report, due to be submitted in August, he will recommend Olmert's dismissal.

 

Ironically, of all the war's shortcomings the most destructive move from Olmert's point of view, was his insistence not to appoint a state commission of inquiry. He garnered all his political clout to prevent the president of the Supreme Court from determining his fate. We can only guess how a report compiled by Aharon Barak or Dorit Beinish would have been phrased, but one thing is certain: It would not have been any worse than the report compiled by the members of the Winograd Commission.

 

In consultations held by Olmert with his aides last autumn, in the midst of the debate over the commission, a row broke out. Dov Weisglass recommended opting for a state commission of inquiry, saying Olmert had no choice. Uri Shani and Tal Zilberstein said absolutely no. Olmert decided. He knows how to make decisions. The problem, as fully revealed during the war, is that he doesn't always make the right decisions.

 

And thus, after Olmert made the decision, and his legal advisors examined, disqualified and approved, the commission of inquiry was established: Five honest and respectable people, three of them over 80 years old.

 

Age is said to soften things. It is doubtful whether this is true at all; it definitely didn't hold true in this case. Members of the commission, just like many veteran Israelis, view Israel's reality with a sense of disappointment, criticism, and often, bitterness. They have acquired plenty of experience in life, and therefore they place extraordinary importance on experience.

 

Despite this, members of the commission underwent daily attacks in the media for allegedly cooperating with Olmert. They became nervous. A state commission of inquiry would have been spared such allegations.

 

Olmert is disputing the severity of the commission's phrasing, some of its arguments and the wisdom of its recommendations. Nonetheless, he can't say a word about the report; he made his bed with his own hands. On the contrary: He has to appear as one who will execute every word of recommendation in the report. Winograd is his probation officer.

 

Justice Minister Daniel Friedmann, who doesn't get it, came out with a learned attack of the report at the Kadima party ministerial meeting Monday evening. "There's not much to implement in it," Friedmann concluded, taking a heavy blow at Olmert's key argument that the cabinet must remain in office to avoid a political crisis, which would prevent anyone from implementing the report's conclusions.

 

Unprecedented allegations

Did the Winograd Commission really place the resignation pistol on Olmert's desk? The report, which stands out with its clarity for the most part, relates to this issue rather vaguely. On the one hand, it brandishes Olmert (alongside Amir Peretz and Dan Halutz) with a stamp of failure for which there is no pardon. It accuses him of acting impulsively, ignorantly, mismanaging the decision-making process, setting unrealistic war objectives, and lacking proper judgment.

 

Never has a commission of inquiry leveled such profound, sweeping allegations at a prime minister.

 

On the other hand, the report expresses reservations regarding the eagerness to see dismissals.

 

In a footnote to clause 17 in the conclusions chapter (note 8, page 181 in the printed Hebrew version) the commission states: "There is a tendency in Israeli culture to reward every admission of error with dismissal. Only those who don't act don't err. Errors should be treated differentially, and of course should be subjected to the extent and severity of the error. A culture that doesn't enable those who have erred to continue in their posts in certain cases is not a culture that can learn, and it is likely to lose its most experienced people just for the sake of allowing those who have not yet erred to repeat the errors that would have been otherwise avoided by those who had already erred."

 

Olmert clung to this footnote Monday evening as though he had stepped on a great treasure.

 

Supreme Court Justice Meir Shamgar, who headed two prominent commissions of inquiry in the past, one on the Hebron massacre and the other on Rabin's murder, avoided going too far in his investigations. The Winograd Commission took the opposite course. Its full report is a far-reaching, courageous and pretentious attempt to change our political culture.

 

It aspires for a different leadership; a compact cabinet, whose ministers have the adequate knowledge and experience needed in their posts; a leadership that intelligently seeks assistance from experts from opposing camps; that discusses in depth the issues on which it votes, and whose sessions are kept confidential without being leaked.

 

There is no such government, and there never will be. The model the commission's members saw before them may have existed in the time of the Greek philosopher Plato, but it does not exist in political establishments running for elections. At least not in Israel.

 

This doesn't change the fact that Olmert made a serious mistake when he chose to appoint Amir Peretz to the post of defense minister, and Peretz erred terribly when he jumped at the offer. The commission has rightfully said that the combination of a hasty and inexperienced prime minister, an inexperienced defense minister who shows no interest in the material presented to him, and a chief of staff mired in his own concepts is destructive. In fact, it is pointing an accusing finger at all three: You are charlatans.

 

Is Bibi better?

In two days from now, Benjamin Netanyahu is planning to appear on stage at the Rabin Square as one of the leaders of a rally calling on Olmert to step down. If Netanyahu reads the report right through, he will find some scathing words about the conception he advanced as the finance minister by contending that Israel could allow itself to cut back on its ground forces because there is no war in the offing.

 

When he quotes what the report says regarding Olmert's lack of experience, he should recall his own self-confidence when he entered the Prime Minister's Office in 1996, despite possessing no experience.

 

Tzipi Livni, who many in the Kadima ranks are counting on, will find an unflattering comment about her lack of political experience in the report. Ehud Barak will find criticism, albeit polite, of his policy of restraint that avoided response to Hizbullah provocations and allowed it to grow stronger. When Barak reads the harsh criticism regarding the decision-making process in Olmert's cabinet, perhaps he should recall the decision-making process in his own cabinet and office.

 

The commission, similar to the Agranat Commission, places considerable importance on the establishment of a serious National Security Council. It is right in doing so, of course. However, its members should have asked themselves why such a powerful NSC wasn't established thus far. This is not so incidental: A NSC is the right institution on paper, yet in real life, it's very crowded next to Olmert's ear, and any further addition would involve endless disputes over powers and access.

 

Monday evening, two hours after publication of the report, US President George W. Bush announced his support for Olmert. Olmert was happy: It was a ray of light on a dark day. I suggested that in appreciation of this gesture he should suggest that Bush invite the Winograd Commission to investigate the war in Iraq.

 

 


פרסום ראשון: 05.01.07, 13:15
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