Giora Eiland
Photo: Ofer Amram
The war option
Following Second Lebanon War, Syria views military clash as viable option
Fifteen years ago, following the Madrid conference, Syria realized that a significant part of the Arab world preferred peace with Israel. Hence, Hafez Assad concluded that it was incumbent on Syria to attain a strategic balance with Israel - namely, to ensure an achievement in the event of war, even if Syria has no partners.
The operative interpretation of this was preparing for a surprise attack whose objective would be to take over a significant part of the Golan Heights. The military achievement may be limited, but would be impressive enough to ultimately lead to a diplomatic settlement whereby Israel would be forced to relinquish the Golan.
Towards the end of the ‘90s Assad senior switched strategy: He realized that following the fall of the Soviet Union the military divide grew in favor of Israel. The military option did not seem viable. Assad answered the calls by Clinton and Barak and engaged in negotiations for comprehensive peace. The dispute over 400 meters in the vicinity of the Sea of Galilee prevented the parties from reaching an agreement.
Since March of 2000, the Syrians found themselves greatly frustrated. On the one hand it was impossible to reach a peace agreement with Israel, and on the other the military option was perceived as impractical. From Israel's standpoint these years (2000 – 2006) were very convenient. There was no diplomatic pressure, there didn't seem to be an option of war, and the Israel-Syrian border continued to be the quietest.
The current Syrian policy is the outcome of events that transpired over the past two years. In 2005, under international pressure (to which Israel was a partner behind the scenes) the Syrians were forced to withdraw their troops from Lebanon. Their key objective since 1976 – preserving political rule and economic profit in Lebanon – was severly undermined.
New focus
The focus of the Syrian political effort has hence shifted from preserving the lost Lebanese asset to securing another asset – the Golan. The second and more significant event was the second Lebanon War: "Hizbullah's victory" led some Syrian military leaders to the conclusion that a significant military achievement is possible vis-à-vis Israel.
Hence, these two events explain Syria's current policy, which says the following: Syria is determined to take back the Golan Heights. The preferable option would be to do so via a diplomatic agreement. However, if Israel continues to refuse – it would do well to know (as should the US) that a military option is once again a possibility.
The demonstrative way in which Damascus described the penetration of Israeli Air Force aircraft into Syrian airspace is designed to serve this policy. On the one hand Syria emphasized the "Israeli aggression" vis-à-vis Syrian peace overtures, and on the other hand, if and when Syria decides to initiate a military maneuver against Israel, Israel's recent violation will be recorded as "another Israeli provocation that forced it to respond."
The bottom line is that it seems that Syria, like Israel, is not interested in a military confrontation at this point in time, yet contrary to the good years of 2000-2006, now it is simply unwanted or not a preferred option. And the difference is clear.
The writer is a retired IDF major-general and former head of the National Security Council
