Yossi Ben-Ari
Avoiding past mistakes
Israel should weigh all parameters before embarking on Gaza operation
The cabinet's decision to refrain, for the time being, from embarking on a large-scale operation in the Gaza Strip has not diminished the thick scent of gunpowder lingering in the air in recent days.
When the defense minister was quoted as saying, following the cabinet meeting, that "it is very possible that we're approaching the need to embark on a major ground assault...," it appears that a wide-scale IDF attack on "Hamastan" is only a matter of timing: It would be enough that one of the next Qassam rockets fired at Sderot and its vicinity cause casualties, heaven forbid, for the public-political pressure to leave Olmert and Barak with no choice but to give the green light to the forces. And this move would be problematic and no less complex than the war in the summer of last year.
In order to refrain from repeating the Second Lebanon War mistakes (even if the challenges are not exactly the same) it would be good for the political-security establishment to consider several issues before attacking the Gaza Strip:
First and foremost, a clear objective should be defined for the military maneuver. It would be good for such objective to be focused, modest and one that can be achieved and as much as is possible also maintained.
It would be advisable to weigh whether in addition to an attack in the south there is also room for a simultaneous attack on Hamas and Islamic Jihad headquarters in Damascus, so that not only the tail and body of the snake would be hurt, but also its head.
It would be good to make it clear in advance what parameters would be used to define success, not to say victory. After all, any confrontation against the "dark forces" in Gaza won't be different in essence than the battle that took place a year ago in the north. In the absence of clear victory, the arena will be left open to a battle of images. Therefore, clear parameters that are known in advance are better than amorphous struggles aimed at etching consciousness – we have failed in such struggles up until now.
Assuming there is no (silly) intention to regain our hold in the Strip, it is important to try and plan the optimal exit point following the campaign's end. This exit point will be of course affected by the definition of the target, the ability to achieve it, and the response of all the parties involved. In light of the complexity of the matter, it would be worthwhile to examine it through a political simulation game – much can be learned from such exercise.
It is vital that we define how to turn military success into a diplomatic achievement. This is complicated as Hamas is not a partner to this, and any asset handed over to Mahmoud Abbas will only bring him closer to dying.
Are talks with Syria a better idea?
The government should plan and implement a public relations campaign aimed at moderating public expectations: Define operational success, prepare for the possibility that even such offensive won't resolve the Gilad Shalit problem, and prepare for the reasonable scenario that rockets will continue to land in the western Negev even after an operation. Most importantly, a ground assault would exact a significant casualty toll among our troops.
If in the past we could make do with the declaration that war results in casualties, in the post-heroic era, which Israel reached too early in its new history, this is no longer sufficient. Public opinion should be prepared for this reality in advance and the earlier the better.
It is also important to engage in a global public relations effort in order to gain broad support like the one Israel enjoyed in the beginning of the last war in the north. As surprising as this may sound, it appears that it would be easier to elicit international support for a military move than for "softer" moves that will result in humanitarian damage.
Finally, we should carefully consider whether the timing should stem from a disaster, or perhaps, as many writers have suggested, it would be better to determine the timing in advance. We already saw what happens when we embark on war while shooting from the hip and responding emotionally to a catastrophe on the ground.
If the Knesset Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee chairman is indeed right, and Israel does not face a problem of international legitimacy, it is possible that we should to act early.
Is it complicated? Very much so. So perhaps it would be better after all to make do with the IDF's current activity, or expand it, or implement the "punishment system" discussed earlier by ministers? Or maybe it's better to change direction: Instead of dispatching jets deep into Syrian territory in the middle of the night, perhaps we should make every effort to go back to the negotiation table with Bashar Assad? An agreement with Syria will spare much blood and may make it easier to resolve the conflict with the Palestinians and the terror produced by them. It's worth a try.
Dr Ben-Ari is a brigadier general (Ret.), a former high ranking intelligence official, and a senior instructor in the National Security College
