Countdown to the next war
Past experience can teach us about nature of future confrontations
Now that the wave of warnings about a war breaking out in the summer of 2007 has passed us by, and while tensions occasionally peak, it's important to ask the following question: How well is the State of Israel prepared for the possibility of a change of course and escalation to an unforeseeable war?
Assuming that our estimates were wrong and that a war does ultimately break out, besides the question as to the actual scenario of the war, we should focus on what it will look like and how long it will last. This stems from the real challenge faced by Israeli cabinets; how to respond adequately when the sand in the hourglass begins to flow.
The Winograd Commission took a similar stance – an intermediate report that dealt with the process leading up to the outbreak of the battles, and a final report that will primarily focus on the management of the war.
Occasionally, from the moment the first signs become evident up to the outbreak of a war, several weeks and often months go by. In such cases the cabinet and the defense establishment must make the necessary preparations. However, when the timeframe between the initial signs of war and the actual outbreak of the war is short - there is insufficient time for military preparations and decision-making processes.
Right after the end of the Second Lebanon War it was estimated, by almost everyone – that the next round of war was expected this summer. We cannot know on what this assumption was based - perhaps it was derived from the conclusion that our role in the Second Lebanon War had not been completed, or that Hassan Nasrallah would seek to take advantage of his success by embarking on a second round soon after.
Time is needed to prepare for 'next round'
As a matter of course, each side has time to "recuperate" after every "round." Following a ceasefire, a political picture is reconsolidated; each side draws conclusions and proceeds to implement them, each side focuses on rehabilitating its forces, replenishing stock, recruiting and rehabilitating human resources and finally also stabilizing its internal political situation and foreign affairs.
In other words, unless there is an unexpected change of direction, time is necessary to prepare for the "next round," and based on past experience this timeframe can be estimated.
Israel's wars, up until the first Lebanon war, broke out once every 10 years on average. These wars were wide scale and all-encompassing, and included standing armies led by governments and nations. The timeframe from the initial signs of war until it actually broke out was relatively long, often weeks and sometimes months.
On the other hand, "low-intensity" wars that comprised operations in Lebanon (Operation Accountability and Grapes of Wrath), the intifadas and the Second Lebanon War – were limited in scope and were led by terror and guerilla organizations. Wars of this nature broke out once every five years on average, and advance notice was short - often just a few days and even hours.
Based on this index, which is obviously not the only one used to evaluate the probability of war, the next round, if it breaks out, is apparently only expected two years from now – however, when it does occur, we can assume that escalation to actual war will be very rapid.
If this is indeed the situation until the next round (if heaven forbids it breaks out) we have sufficient time to rehabilitate the IDF. However, the short timeframe for a sudden change of course until the opening shot necessitates not only weaponry, but also troops, officers, trained headquarters and an IDF on a state of high alert.
Namely, adequate maintenance of equipment, a stock of munitions and spare parts, and above all a pre-determined decision-making process required in a sudden crisis situation according to which, prior to the opening shot a series of proper decisions must be made.
We must not gnaw away at the preparedness of the IDF in favor of other national assignments, however important they may be.
The writer is a former commander of the Israeli Air Force
