Zalman Shoval
The Annapolis trap
Experience shows that Arabs view any Israeli proposal as an obligation and a starting point
Last week, our prime minister claimed that the Annapolis conference would not be a peace conference, but rather, “an international meeting aimed at creating the proper atmosphere for continued talks.” However, it is hard to assume that Condoleezza Rice would travel to our region eight times just to serve as an impresario for a non-binding seminar.
Indeed, Rice does not hide her intention to see Annapolis leading to concrete steps, and said she is considering the need to exert pressure in this context. Prime Minister Olmert, who failed to read the American political map, also believes that Israel should reach an agreement by the end of Bush’s term in office.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not at the top of the US Administration’s agenda – the top priorities are Iraq and Iran, and Pakistan as well at this time. We can therefore assume that in order to win the support of Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries over these matters, Washington’s pressure could manifest itself in ways that are more commensurate with Arab-Palestinian demands, rather than with Israel’s demands.
A hint of this appeared in a report that the US intends to submit a “bridging proposal,” which could turn out to be unfavorable to Israel. Israel’s inexperienced team got itself into another potential entanglement when it agreed that Washington would oversee the Road Map initiative’s implementation. In other words, the Americans will rule whether the Palestinian side properly fights terrorism (we have terrible experience on this front following the Wye Agreement.)
The United Nations Secretary General’s intention to turn the Annapolis understandings into Security Council resolutions could emerge as another obstacle for Israel. Meanwhile, it appears that many of those dealing with foreign policy in Washington already decided that the Annapolis conference is expected to fail. For example, Jon Alterman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies wrote that Rice is bringing together the wrong people, and that her effort is futile as both Olmert and Abbas are approaching the end of their political career.
Rabin’s imprudent pledge
Olmert does not believe he is facing the end of his political career, and he actually intends to use Annapolis in order to stop the decline in his status. To that end, he intends to talk about far-reaching principles, including those that pertain to the “core issues,” but he has no intention of committing to anything.
If this is his intention, reality will disappoint him. Experience shows that the Arab side approaches any proposal on Israel’s part, whether it is referred to as “principle,” “understandings,” or “declaration of intent” as an obligation and a starting point. This is how the imprudent pledge made by Rabin regarding the Golan Heights makes it more difficult to engage in talks with the Syrians. Just recently, the Palestinians reminded us that they are still holding a letter from Shimon Peres, the foreign minister in Rabin’s government, promising to allow them to maintain PLO institutions in Jerusalem.
There is no doubt that whatever Olmert says in Annapolis, and what he possibly already told Abbas, would make it difficult for Israel in the future when genuine peace talks are launched. This is just a part of the problem, as any concession offered to Abbas may be later cashed in by Hamas.
All of this raises the following question: How could the government that would replace Olmert’s cabinet be able to free itself from the pledges and commitments to be made in Annapolis? A basic principal of international law is that every government inherits the rights and obligations of its predecessors, although this relates to ties between states – and after all, it is difficult to define the Palestinian Authority as a state. There is also a principal that enables states to free themselves from past obligations in case of an extreme change in circumstances, or if the other side violates its own obligations in an extreme manner.
If such reality emerges in the wake of Annapolis, it would do well for all parties to realize they should not be taking for granted the assumption that future Israeli governments would view the conference as something that binds Israel under any circumstances.
