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Ron Ben-Yishai

IDF takes the initiative

Army creates new equation in Gaza aimed at eroding Hamas’ power ahead of incursion

The rocket fire from Gaza at Ashkelon prompted the IDF to take the initiative. In the past 48 hours it is no longer Hamas that is escalating the fighting and determining the height of the flames based on its own needs and considerations – rather, the IDF is doing that.

 

The objective is to create a new erosion equation between Hamas and the IDF. Such equation would exact a much higher Hamas toll in terms of fighters and infrastructure than what was paid by the group before every time it initiated a round of escalation in the rocket terror aimed at Negev communities.

 

No longer do we have an Israeli military response whose strength is determined by the scope and deadliness of the Qassams as was the case so far. Nor do we see occasional operations by ground forces in the Strip and assassinations whose timing is determined by the availability of intelligence information. Now, the IDF has switched to ongoing methodical fighting from the air and on the ground deep inside the Strip.

 

This is indeed not the “major operation” discussed in depth in the media. However, the number of troops utilized by the IDF on the ground and in the air in the framework of the current offensive is greater than before, as is the depth of the raids into the northern Strip. Givati and armored corps units are operating between the Sajaiya neighborhood and the outskirts of the Jabalya refugee camp. This area is used as a major operational and training base for Hamas’ military wing and a significant number of the Qassams directed at Gaza-region communities and particularly Sderot are fired from there.

 

The objective is to exact an increasingly heavy price from the military wings of Hamas and other groups operating on its behalf in the Strip. However, activity of this scope and extent would naturally exact a price from IDF troops.

 

For the time being, Hamas is not showing signs of collapse, yet all indications attest that its leadership is stressed and concerned. Therefore, it attempts to exert international pressure on Israel by presenting inflated civilian casualty figures. Every 15-year-old gunman hurt in the fierce battles is presented to the media as an “innocent Palestinian boy hurt by IDF fire.” Even a one-year-old baby, who the Palestinians themselves admit was killed after a rocket exploded due to a “work accident”, is presented as a victim of IDF fire.  


No more fumbling around. IDF forces n Gaza. (Photo: AFP)

 

The IDF’s offensive can develop in two different directions:

 

The first possibility is that in the coming days Hamas would completely or almost completely stop the rocket attacks from the Strip and propose a lengthy ceasefire through the Egyptians. If this happens, the IDF will likely also gradually minimize the scope of its offensive on the Strip.

 

The second possibility is that Hamas will continue to fire rockets in the current rate and scope, while the IDF continues to escalate its operations to the maximal level – that is, a major operation all across the Strip while adopting patterns the Palestinians are unfamiliar with.

 

Better chance to advance Shalit deal  

This measured escalation also creates a diplomatic opportunity for Israel. A situation whereby Israeli communities sustain rocket attacks while high-intensity warfare goes on in the Strip draws international attention and grants Israel the opportunity to prepare the diplomatic and international arena for a major operation. The recent talks between Defense Minister Barak and Prime Minister Olmert with international leaders were held to that end. The postponement of Egyptian Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman’s visit is also part of the diplomatic campaign managed alongside the military campaign.

 

The Egyptian mediator planned to arrive for talks in Israel Sunday with a proposal for a deal involving Hamas, Israel, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, and possibly European elements as well. This proposal, aimed at bringing about long-term calm, was drafted in conjunction with Hamas and includes the following components: Ceasefire in the Strip, the release of Gilad Shalit in exchange for Palestinian detainees, and conditions for reopening the Rafah crossing and arranging the passage of Strip residents through it (under Palestinian Authority and European supervision.)

 

The main obstacle in the face of realizing such deal is Hamas’ stipulation that Israel make an obligation to end its military operations against Hamas men in the West Bank. Israel is unwilling to accept this condition under any circumstances as an end to ant-terror activity in Judea and Samaria would expose the residents of central and northern Israel to a new wave of suicide bombings and Qassam fire. Omar Suleiman knows that so he decided to forego his visit, apparently based on the assumption that Hamas would agree to renounce this demand after it’s exhausted in the battles against the IDF.

 

The IDF’s current operational pattern – measured escalation - is the last phase ahead of a large-scale campaign. Should this move succeed, it would make a larger operation unnecessary or at least enable Israel to postpone it for some time. Yet if the current move fails to achieve its objective, Hamas and its allies will be hit and weakened morally and physically and the ground would be “softened” ahead of a major operation. Gaza-region communities and Ashkelon are not facing needless danger – Hamas is firing rockets anyway at western Negev communities and Ashkelon where citizens are already prepared to be hit.

 

Therefore, it would be better to take advantage of this situation and embark on an intensive and ongoing IDF operation instead of bringing the height of the flames down now just so that Gaza-region and Ashkelon residents find themselves in a similar situation in a few days or weeks.

 

And there’s another consideration: The current operational pattern does not overly endanger abducted IDF soldier Gilad Shalit and the chances to secure his release – rather, the opposite is true. We should keep our fingers crossed and hope that the measured escalation will secure the desired results. Yet we should also keep our expectations low. The results of the ongoing and intensive fighting the IDF is engaged in at this time will not be seen within a day or two. Another week or two will pass before we would be able to know whether the pressure exerted by the IDF is effective.  

 


פרסום ראשון: 03.01.08, 23:59
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