Israel buying time in Gaza, threatening Assad
Jewish state's current security strategy vis-a-vis Gaza, Syria: Biding time, salvaging lives until better options arise
Two strategic goals currently top the defense establishment's list of priorities: The more urgent one is the neutralization of the rocket and missile threat on all of Israel, while the second is thwarting the Iranian nuclear threat.
Should Israel find a technological, operational or political solution to these threats, its main enemies will be left without their violent pressure tactics, with which they hope to defeat Israel in a war of attrition or wipe it off the map. Then Israel will be able to move on to the next stage, during which it will come to the negotiating table from a position of power and reach political agreements with the Palestinains and Syria that will finally determine the permanent borders with Arab consent and international backing.
The burning question now is: What do we do until these threats are lifted? How should we handle the current threats immediately in order to ensure a more comfortable security situation down the line without the spilling of unnecessary blood and without eroding the IDF, the home front's resistance and the international community's legitimacy? How do we reach the economic stability that will allow the allocation of the huge resources necessary for the implementation of these strategic goals? Or in more concrete terms: Will the IDF launch a major operation in Gaza to quell the rocket fire and curb Hamas' growing strength, or is there another way to free the residents of Israeli communities surrounding the Strip from the Qassam horror until the "Iron Dome" (interception system) is put into use to protect them?
Is there a way to prevent escalation in the North that will likely follow a terror attack launched to avenge the assassination of (Hizbullah commander) Imad Mugniyah? And what will Israel do if Iran succeeds in crossing the technological threshold on the way to a nuclear bomb by the end of 2008?
These questions have already generated fierce debate within Israel's political and defense establishments. In analyzing recent statements by Defense Minister Barak and IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, one can readily gauge the strategic responses proposed by the duo—and readily endorsed by the cabinet-- to these burning security concerns. There is a gaping chasm, however, between proposals and implementation, both in the financial realm and otherwise. This is a chronic problem for the Olmert government, and not only as pertains to security. Nevertheless, a thorough examination of the remedies proposed by the security establishment for the recent, pressing security concerns facing Israel is undoubtedly warranted.
4 main reasons for lull
On the Gaza front, the security establishment is trying to bide its time. Their aim is to postpone, if not avoid all together, a full scale IDF operation in the Gaza Strip. This, by containing the threat posed by Hamas with Egyptian aid, which is proving decidedly more effective in recent days. The aftermath of the breaching of the Philadelphi route and operation “Warm Winter” has lead to a rare accord of interests between Israel, Hamas and Egypt. The latter seeks to utilize these shared interests as leverage to negotiate a lull in hostilities between Israel and Hamas. Israel on its part is willing to ease its demands, and agree to this aforementioned lull, especially should Egypt agree to combat smuggling and infiltrations along the Gaza border as part of this deal.
Egypt has proven more than capable at fortifying its border in recent weeks. With Israeli aid, Egypt has thwarted the infiltration of several terror operatives into Israel from the Sinai Peninsula in recent weeks. This undoubtedly spurs Barak to commit wholeheartedly to this Egyptian initiative, even if this means that Israel must ease the economic restrictions, as well as the blockade, which it has imposed on the Gaza strip. Furthermore, Barak is also willing to abandon—for the meantime—Israel’s central goal of toppling the Hamas government in Gaza.
Israel’s softened stance comes in wake of harsh condemnation, both internationally and in the Arab world, of the sizeable civilian casualties endured by the Palestinians during operation "Warm Winter". This international upheaval, which nearly led to a third Intifada and to Israel’s isolation of the global scene, has made the security establishment highly reluctant to launch a full scale excursion into Gaza.
Furthermore, Israel hopes that an Egypt-brokered lull will also lead to further advances in negotiations to free kidnapped IDF soldier Corporal Gilad Shalit.
A third reason for Israel’s keenness to achieve a lull, is that it would allow Israel’s citizens to celebrate the country’s 60th anniversary in relative peace and quiet, and permit dignitaries such as United States President George W. Bush and French President Nicolas Sarkozy to visit Israel and share in the festivities.
A final reason for the softened Israeli stance is that, the “Iron Dome” interception system aside, a lull will give Israel leave to complete construction of a more advanced technologically-based defensive system surrounding Gaza. Such a system will utilize land, sea and air based "shooting robots" which will minimize the need for IDF manpower, as well as casualties sustained in combating infiltrations from Gaza as well as from explosive devices placed along the security fence. That being said, a lull would also allow Hamas to establish its own infrastructure along the security fence; namely security fence-traversing tunnels.
In the meantime, Israel is granting Egyptian envoy, Omar Suleiman, extremely wide berth in negotiations. The defense minister has also instructed the IDF to act with utmost restraint and avoid all offensive maneuvers as long as there is still any hope left for this Egyptian initiative. Israel, furthermore, poses no preconditions to a lull bar three minimal demands to Hamas and Islamic Jihad: An end to rocket and terror attacks against Israel, as well as arms smuggling into Gaza. In return, Israel asks that these organizations not call for an end to targeted assassinations in Gaza as a precondition to the Egypt-sponsored lull.
What would happen should this Egyptian “accordette” (has it has been nicknamed in security personnel circles) fail, or if this lull comes to an end relatively quickly as the shin Bet and the IDF’s Intelligence Branch predict? Even in this worst case scenario, the security establishment is in no rush to launch a full scale operation in Gaza.
Instead, the IDF will escalate its current operations in Gaza and place increased pressure on Hamas by targeting its core leadership—a step the IDF has avoided taking thus far—and by launching more intensive, broader based operations in the Gaza Strip. The IDF’s goal in launching such Gaza operations would be to compromise Hamas’ ability to control the region, at the risk of increasing support for the organization as was the case following operation “Warm winter”. This course of action, furthermore, does not guarantee cessation of Qassam rocket fire, and could allow for more radical leadership in Gaza should the Hamas government topple. Al-Qaeda, among other groups, would just jump at the chance to fill a Gaza leadership vacuum and establish a stronghold in the region.
A full scale excursion into Gaza is a last and final resort should all else fail. If such a scenario should arise, Israel would enter into a full scale, lengthy war of last resort in Gaza, even without a clearly defined exit strategy. Both standing army as well as reserve troops are fully prepared for such a scenario; not so the military administrative system which would have to meet the needs of the Gaza populace should such a war arise. The political establishment, which would have to launch an all out, international media and PR campaign to support IDF troops and their actions, is also hardly prepared for such a scenario.
It would take a few more months before Israel is truly prepared, in all respects, for such a large scale Gaza operation. In the meantime, out of deep respect to Quartet envoy Tony Blair, and also in order to appease the current United Sates leadership, Barak is making goodwill gestures toward Palestinian Authority President and attempting to ease restrictions placed on Gaza’s civilian population.
Disproportionate response
On its northern front, Israel faces a threat far greater than any posed by Gaza. As long as Israel does not have a multi-tiered, reliable, board based interception system, it remains vulnerable to the daunting arsenal of rockets and missiles possessed by Syria and Hizbullah, which can cause havoc and destruction throughout the State of Israel. The good news is the Israel’s deterrence has increased manifold, vis a vie Teheran, Hizbullah Secretary-General Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, as well as Damascus, following the Second Lebanon War, which left Lebanon in utter ruin, as well as Israel’s strike on a suspected nuclear plant in Syria. Both Syrian President Bashar Assad, as well as Nasrallah, are also subdued by growing Lebanese opposition to Syria’s de facto rule of the country, as well as by Hizbullah’s continual efforts to control the Lebanese government Nevertheless, the possibility still remains that Hizbullah, perhaps even Syria, might be tempted to launch a massive missile strike or terror attack against Israel in solidarity with their Palestinian brethren, or in retaliation for the assassination of assassinated Hizbullah commander Imad Mugniyah. Especially in the last month this is becoming a more plausible scenario.
Israel can also take a political approach to dealing with this northern front. The security establishment recommends that Israel be willing to enter into political negotiations with Syria immediately. Damascus, on it part, would welcome peace talks with Israel in order to escape the isolation it currently faces both in the Arab world as well as on the international arena. If Syrian President Assad feels that Israel is seriously willing to negotiate with Syria, he might be less willing to resort to military action and more willing to reign in Hizbullah. Both Defense Minister Barak as well as the head of the IDF’s Intelligence Branch endorse pursuing such an accord with Syria. Mossad Director, Meir Dagan, objects. Prime Minister Olmert, on his part, also seems willing to pursue a peace treaty with Syria, provided the Syrian president lower his extensive demands of Israel. Until then, Tension in the north remain high, and Israel’s security and intelligence efforts continue at full force.
This, more or less, is Israel’s current security strategy, as proposed to the government by the IDF chief of staff and the defense minister. It is geared predominately toward salvaging Israeli lives and labor, and biding Israel’s time until its current technological and political efforts pay off, and it garners more effective means to contend with its existential security threats.
