How should we use defense budget?
Top security officials divided on need to invest in defensive means
Part 3 of series by Ron Ben-Yishai
Israel’s current security doctrine is premised on three pillars: Deterrence, early warning, and victory. In the face of the emergence of the missile and nuclear weapon threat, a committee headed by Dan Meridor added a fourth pillar – self-defense.
The Meridor committee for updating Israel’s security doctrine was established four years ago, during the Sharon-Mofaz era. However, to this day, two and a half years after it submitted its recommendations, they have not yet been officially adopted by the government. Meridor’s attempts to initiate a discussion on the new doctrine in the security cabinet were rejected, apparently because some of the conclusions were not to the liking of Defense Minister Barak and IDF Chief of Staff Ashkenazi. These conclusions include defense budget cutbacks and preference to aerial fire over ground maneuvers. However, the principle of “self-defense,” mostly through a multilayered missile interception system and fortification, has been accepted by both Barak and Ashkenazi.
In the bottom line, Barak and Ashkenazi, just like Ben-Gurion, believe that we should prevent, or at least delay as much as possible, a war or a large-scale military confrontation with our neighbors. This can be done either through deterrence or through diplomatic and economic moves. Barak believes that “wars of choice” are not an option for Israel under the current circumstances, because in any case they won’t end well for us in domestic-social and international terms.
However, if a war is forced on us, we must be ready for it (early warning, reserves call-up, etc.) and capable of quickly winning it, in enemy territory. This doctrine is mostly accepted by IDF General Staff generals, as well as top Shin Bet and Mossad officials. However, a significant number of generals object to the “self-defense” clause. In their view, the Israeli home front needs to be defended via diverse offensive moves, including accurate aerial fire directed at the enemy wherever it may be, as well as targeting the state that gives it shelter and massive attacks on ground forces. These generals argue that investing billions in anti-rocket systems and fortification is a waste of money – it would be better to invest in massive procurements of offensive means.
Objections to Gaza lull
For similar reasons, we see quiet yet quite significant objection to the Gaza Strip “lull” within the security establishment. Barak agreed to the Egyptian “temporary ceasefire” initiative in line with the principle that it would be good to prevent a military confrontation or postpone it as much as is possible. This approach is not endorsed by quite a few generals, as well Shin Bet Chief Diskin and Mossad Director Dagan. In their estimate, the lull enables Hamas to build up its strength and would allow it to exact a much higher price once the fire resumes. The facts on the ground support this argument.Another argument is that the IDF was ready and able, before the lull was declared, to deliver a harsh military blow against Hamas without sustaining many casualties and without needlessly endangering Gaza-region residents. Moreover, if we embark on some kind of negotiations, either indirect on direct, regarding some kind of “regularization” in the Strip, it would be better if this was done by us, from a position of power, with Hamas begging – not when it holds the winning cards and dictates the terms. Those who make this argument, including very senior military officials, refer to Hamas’ conduct in the Gilad Shalit negotiations as proof of their argument.
Barak and Ashkenazi are aware of this criticism, which is growing stronger every day. The defense minister is annoyed and angered by it, yet for the time being at least he is unwilling to stray from his policy, mostly as not to anger the Egyptians and in order to enable Negev residents to take full advantage of the lull. However, disagreements exist not only in this area. Bitter and fundamental disputes are also taking place in relation to the IDF’s procurements and buildup - More on this in the next part of the series.
Part 4 of Ron Ben-Yishai’s series will be published next week
