Shmuel Gordon
Why is the IDF failing?
Since Lebanon War, IDF preparing for wars of past, not future challenges
Former Brigadier General Dov Tamari, an officer boasting a glorious military service as the commander of Sayeret Matkal and a senior officer in the Yom Kippur War, harshly criticized Dan Halutz's recently published book. Among other things, the former chief of staff's book deals with the management of the Second Lebanon War.
The book provides another angle for understanding the war. However, the basic assumption in Tamari's criticism is that an intellectual process is more important than the end result when it comes to using force. We wish this was the case, yet the army is not a university and its supreme test is actions and their outcome.
In my view, the truth is that in 2006 the IDF was in the midst of a revolutionary process in its combat and buildup doctrine, its strategy, and its adaptation to the focal points of present or future wars; that is, engaging in the war on terror and coping with states equipped with massive missile arsenals such as Iran and Syria.
Some of the pillars in this doctrine were the development of various types of anti-missile systems, the buildup of an offensive force premised on up-to-date technological intelligence, boosting the Special Forces and turning them into a major force in the ground corps, making the Air Force dominant in providing a response to the security challenges we face, and reshaping the ground corps.
The new approach was manifested through the first week of the war, which was a success story. Later, after ground forces were thrown into the battle, we saw deterioration that continued until the campaign's last day.
After the first week where the Air Force was deployed with great success, the IDF's two main arms – the ground corps and the Air Force – did not meet the test, did not come up with an answer, and did not achieve satisfactory results as result of the flawed changes in their deployment.
Mother of all wars
The argument whereby the quiet in the north points to a military victory is invalid. The calm is mostly dictated by political and diplomatic considerations, Hezbollah's desire to take over Lebanon, Syrian moderation and so forth, and not only by military considerations.Ever since the Second Lebanon War, the IDF has been going back and preparing for past wars, which will likely not repeat. Not much can be done about the ground forces, under the current structure, losing the dominance they enjoyed dozens of years ago yet we are failing to see it. When Saddam Hussein spoke about the "Mother of all wars" almost 20 years ago, we laughed at him and continued to prepare for precisely that war.
At one prominent junction, Dov Tamari is right. For many years now, the IDF has been failing military tests and not reaching the achievements it secured in its first 20 years. We better pay attention to that. Is the General Staff able to adopt the doctrine shaped by the previous army chief, avoiding the massive deployment of armored and ground forces and emphasizing the integration of the Air Force, Special Forces, and real-time intelligence? Is the current General Staff capable of properly preparing for future challenges? I doubt it.
Shmuel Gordon, a former Air Force colonel, holds a Ph.D. in strategic research and international relations
