Itay Landsberg

A gift for Ahmadinejad

Israel’s enemies overjoyed that army chief’s term isn’t being extended

Itay Landsberg|Published: 04.08.10 , 11:07

Let’s assume that former Prime Minister Ehud Barak would have been very successful in his first term in office as PM – would it be reasonable to assume that he would turn to the public and ask for a vote of confidence in the form of another term? That makes sense.

Yet in the land of dwarfs that is Israel, a successful army chief cannot similarly turn to the public. He depends on the defense minister and prime minister – two politicians who would have trouble pointing to proven success stories in managing the establishments they’re in charge of.

Criticism

Peretz: Barak owes Ashkenazi his success

Attila Somfalvi

Former defense minister slams his successor for harming relations between himself, IDF chief

Peretz: Barak owes Ashkenazi his success

Two years before the Second Lebanon War, I wrote an article in favor of choosing Gabi Ashkenazi over Dan Halutz titled “A chief of staff from Golani.” Halutz was chosen, yet the Lebanon War proved that the decision was wrong. Immediately after Halutz resigned, Ashkenazi was appointed as army chief.

The IDF started to train in earnest, both the regular and reservist forces. Next, the public regained its trust in the army, in the wake of a series of successful operations – the strike on Syria’s nuclear reactor, the relative quiet we’ve seen in the territories, Cast Lead in Gaza, and Hezbollah’s quiet and realization that the next war will not be similar to the last one.

The quiet had also been maintained on the IDF’s media front. We haven’t seen feuds between generals or daily storms as result of odd statements by senior military officials. The public trusts the army chief.

This trust is needed by Israel in order to send its sons to war. There is nothing more important for a state in war than a commander’s ability to convince those who follow him and are deployed on his orders that the helm is occupied by a responsible, credible, and moral person.

Barak’s advisors at fault?

So what exactly went through the defense minister’s mind when he decided to confront the army chief and not extend his term for another year? Was it a case of a political agenda that prompts every defense minister to eliminate his army chief in his last year in office, so that the latter doesn’t threaten the minister’s status once he retires from the army? Was it a case of bad advisors, who in order to score a few more PR points with their boss-minister were willing to undermine the image of a successful army chief? Or was the decision a result of a solo brainstorming session by the defense minister?

One way or another, it’s hard to fathom why Barak doesn’t consider, for example, granting Ashkenazi another term, instead of informing him that he will end his current term as scheduled. After all, it makes sense that a complex organization such as the IDF, which had suffered management failures in the form of Mofaz, Yaalon, and Halutz, would be eager to secure Ashkenazi’s proven services and skills and ask him to stay in the post for another term.

However, in this country, the army rushes to get rid of its successful commander – despite the fact that his three predecessors, who prepared the catastrophe we saw in the Second Lebanon War, were responsible for 10 years where our national security deteriorated to a dangerous level, with only Ashkenazi being able to extract us from this state.

So why is it so urgent for Ehud Barak to get rid of Ashkenazi at this time? How many successful officers of his type does he have to spare? Is it better to take a chance with one candidate or another considering the threats faced by Israel at this time?

Ahmadinejad must be happy. Nasrallah will again celebrate the appointment of the “rookies,” as he did upon the appointment of Olmert, Peretz, and Halutz ahead of the 2006 Lebanon War. Our other neighbors will simply wonder why the Jews were always said to be a wise people. Perhaps we’re too wise.