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Ron Ben-Yishai

Israel’s surgical strikes

Op-ed: IDF assassinations hurt terrorists the most; will Israel take such strikes up a notch?

Part 2 of article

 

While terror groups in Gaza recognize the need to prevent suffering by residents of the Strip and fear a ground incursion, they still wish to realize their ideology, which requires them to continue the armed struggle against Israel.

 

On this front we are seeing disagreements within Hamas. The group’s political leadership in Gaza, led by Ismail Haniyeh, is responsible for the safety and welfare of non-combatants and is interested in a lull. However, the organization’s military wing, Izz al-Din al-Qassam, and the group’s leadership in Damascus have a different view. They are interested in “limited warfare” that will not force Israel to embark on a Cast Lead-style operation, but prove to the Palestinian street and to the patrons in Syria and Iran that the “armed struggle for Palestine’s liberation” goes on.

 

Islamic Jihad, which is supported and equipped by Tehran and is directly activated by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, is more radical and wants an escalation, yet for the time being it aims to avoid a clash with Hamas. The other Gaza factions more or less toe the line dictated by the two large organizations.

 

What stops Hamas, Islamic Jihad and their affiliates from engaging in an effective war of attrition is the IDF’s anti-terror effort along the fence and deep into the Strip. These groups are especially bothered by the targeted eliminations carried out when the IDF identifies what it refers to as “operational opportunities.”

 

This happens, for example, when the Shin Bet and IDF secure credible information on a terror cell planning to fire long-range rockets, a major attack along the fence, or a strike via the Sinai. Such cells are monitored by the various means available to the Shin Bet and the army. The moment circumstances allow for an op that would hit all cell members, without harming non-combatants, a surgical strike takes place using an Air Force aircraft, or more rarely, via accurate armaments fired from the ground.

 

Such assassinations, like the one carried out early Saturday that killed three terrorists, are the most painful for Gaza terror groups. They usually harm senior figures and boost the sense of insecurity among group members. More significantly, the surgical strikes gravely erode the terror groups’ prestige and their ability to carry out “high quality attacks.”

 

Price tag of assassinations  

Hence, terrorists respond wildly to these assassinations, in the aims of exacting a high price tag from southern Israel residents. This price tag is meant to deter Israel from carrying out such surgical strikes in the future. On the other hand, Hamas and Islamic Jihad show relative understanding and restraint to IDF operations aimed at targeting a cell during or immediately after the course of an attack or while it fires at Israel.

 

According to Hamas’ and Jihad’s perception, such operations are part of routine combat ops and therefore do not necessitate a harsh response. The rule terrorists try to set vis-à-vis the IDF is as follows: Strategic surgical strikes are forbidden, while strikes during actual combat are tolerable, as long as no civilians were harmed.

 

However, Israel has no intention of reconciling itself to the terrorists’ “rules of play.” Officials reached the conclusion that accepting this will prompt growing provocations. Given that Hamas has to a large extent lost its control over rogue groups, a rapid, major deterioration will follow later, leaving Israel with no choice but to embark on a sequel to operation Cast Lead.

 

Hence, Israel adopted a strategy aimed at maintaining and restoring deterrence, mostly by boosting preventative surgical strikes against cells aiming to carry out major attacks. At the same time, Israel reinforces the efforts and means used to target terror cells before, during and immediately after attacks. A third step is the early deployment of two Iron Dome anti-missile batteries in the south.

 

Officials took into account the possibility of further rounds of escalation as result of this policy, with the IDF’s Southern Command and Home Front Command preparing according. Should this policy not secure deterrence and calm, Israel may very well boost its operations and shift to “personal” surgical strikes against the leaders of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other large groups.

 

The latter tactic has proven effective vis-à-vis Hamas in the past, but involves great difficulties as it requires Israel to secure high-quality intelligence information in real time, with the IDF deployed out of the Strip. Moreover, such strikes may prompt international condemnations. While this strategy has a chance to succeed, it will apparently come with a price – ongoing suffering by southern residents, further delay in securing Gilad Shalit’s release, and growing diplomatic isolation.

 

 


פרסום ראשון: 04.04.11, 18:50
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