Netanyahu's Gaza dilemma
Analysis: Prime minister utilized restraint to the fullest although he knew this carries a political price and could even have electoral consequences.
The same rules that apply to Sderot apply to Tel Aviv, but a rocket that hits Tel Aviv will be a red line. We must not stop till we restore calm in the south, but between you and me, when was it ever calm there and when will it be? Well done, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, for being level-headed rather than trigger-happy, but on the other hand, Bibi is so hesitant, he is conveying fear. We must destroy Hamas, but if we do destroy it, something even worse will come along.
At least the differences of opinion in the government are over. The leaks from the cabinet have stopped. Even Minister Naftali Bennett is keeping silent, or has at least toned down his comments.
The opposition is also keeping quiet for now. Even if it really wanted to, it would find it difficult to complain about Netanyahu: He utilized the restraint, the containment, to the fullest, although he knew that it carries a political price and could even have electoral consequences.
The prime minister and defense minister are in complete agreement that there is no point in recapturing Gaza. It has no operational logic, just deterrence. We must create a feeling that we are prepared to enter Gaza if there is no other choice, but such a move will clearly not benefit Israel in the long run.
Netanyahu took the risk of profound criticism from his camp members over what they see as hesitancy, indecision, fear. He realized that if Israel wages a battle which could encounter difficulties, if he sends soldiers to war, calls up tens of thousands of people torn away from their workplaces and families and takes them to life-endangering places – he needs legitimacy.
The goals of the operation were defined in a non-ambitious manner: To stop the fire. Not to bring down Hamas and not to destroy infrastructures, but the most basic and sober goal. The lessons have been learned, mainly from the Second Lebanon War but also from Operation Cast Lead.
There is no reason to envy Netanyahu these days. He appears to be the loneliest prime minister we have ever had here. In the cabinet he finds too many inexperienced people, people he doesn't trust. It's not easy for him to make decisions with people whose discretion he doesn't trust, people whose considerations, he is certain, stem from a desire to undermine his status or from other interests.
In his party as well, Netanyahu feels a cold wind blowing down his back. Many of his faction members don't agree with the restraint policy he has adopted, and some say it openly. The criticism is over the moderate use of force. People think it's too little too late.
On Wednesday, discussions began for the establishment of an emergency government. Netanyahu, according to rumors, made initial contact with Labor Party Chairman Isaac Herzog and Shas Chairman Aryeh Deri about a unity government.
Political sources say these rumors were spread by Deri, who has issued many statements recently about his meetings and conversations with the prime minister and supports and praises him quite often.
Herzog, on the other hand, strongly denied the rumors. Even if Netanyahu is looking for an opportunity to reinforce his coalition, the Labor Party is in no rush.
