The infiltration incident in Nahal Oz was supposed to end differently – with seven dead terrorists lying dead on the ground and zero IDF casualties. That was the scenario the soldiers from the IDF's company commanders school that were brought to the scene were trained for, but that was not how things played out.
However, if we are to believe the contents of the bloody propaganda video published by Hamas about the incident – which Ynetnews has chosen not to ppiost because of its graphic nature and from the desire not to aid Hamas in its propaganda – then the IDF has some tough questions to answer regarding what went down in the pillbox next to Nahal Oz on Monday July 28, 2014.
The gory video is a hard to watch but grants a rare glimpse into how terrorists use Gaza tunnels to penetrate into Israel. It also offers a dark opportunity to learn the lessons that must be learned in wake of the tragic incident in Nahal Oz
The soldiers seem unprepared and off guard, even in broad daylight. In Gaza, the IDF knew of the tunnel that was going to seal these forces' fate, and was about to demolish it, but the tunnel system is complex, and the terrorists entered through a different entrance and begun to make their way into Israel.
The Gazans exited the shaft on Israeli soil, and like Hezbollah before them, they came armed not only with guns, but also with head-cams to document their deadly incursion. They crossed Nahal Oz's main gate, entered the IDF position and opened fire on the forces.
Army Radio said Hamas fired a rocket-propelled grenade at the soldiers who were in the pillbox, now serving as an IDF watchtower, and then tried to drag one of the soldiers' bodies into the tunnel back to Gaza.
The onslaught ended only after a soldier in the upper part of the outpost returned fire at the terrorist cell and stopped them from taking one of the bodies back to Gaza.
It is also possible he succeeded in wounding one of the seven-man cell, but the rest of the gang managed to successfully return to the Strip, just as was the case in the two previous infiltration incidents.
Putting aside the issue of the forces' ill-timed laxness, the question that arises is: Where were the IDF lookouts who are supposed to identify and alert terrorists on the ground. How could this deadly incident been prevented?
Those who have heard senior IDF officers in recent days must notice that they seem to be addressing the special inquiry committees which will be set up after the operation ends to examine how and why the extent of the threat posed by the tunnels was unknown and was not addressed before hand.
Their comments seem to indicate that the IDF fears that it has dealt only a limited blow to the tunnels, or at least one not as dramatic as was promised by political leadership, possibly unrealistically.