Netanyahu was right when he decided to hold discreet talks with Hamas and not inform the cabinet
Photo: Avi Roccah
Netanyahu handled Mengisto affair correctly
Op-ed: The prime minister realized that public exposure would drag Israel into extreme negotiations accompanied by criticism from the opposition and social groups and pressure to give in to Hamas' insolent demands.
The first prisoner release deal I covered was the one which marked the turning point in terms of the Israeli decision makers' surrender to extortive demands made by Palestinian terror organizations: In May 1985, Israel released 1,150 murderers in exchange for the return of three Nahal soldiers who had been taken captive in Lebanon by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).
Every week, on a small hill opposite the Prime Minister's Office, Miriam Grof, the mother of Yosef Grof, one of the captive soldiers, faced a herd of journalists who allowed her to relay the message that the government must "bring back the sons at all costs."
PM's Envoy
Yoaz Hendel
Op-ed: The Mangisto affair must not be turned into an ethnic or strategic issue; it's the story of a weak family with a lost son who crossed the fence into Gaza out of his own free will.
Then-Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who led the negotiations, said later on that he would never forgive himself for giving in to terrorists, and mainly for not having the courage to face Grof and tell her that despite all the sorrow, there was a price Israel would not pay.
In any event, there are a few characteristics which repeat themselves in all the deals for the return of captives, abductees and bodies:
- Israel will not accept the kidnappers' demands: That's not true. The Israeli side always accepted the demands or, if you will, surrendered.
- The government, the captives' relatives argue, failed to do enough for their release and did not take the required measures to obtain information on their fate: That's not true. Israel's government have taken every measure, invested huge sums of money and risked agents' lives in an effort to solve the painful issue.
- There is usually no factual basis to the government's working premise that the missing people are alive: That's not true. The diplomatic-security echelon knows that the talks are being held over bodies or several items left behind, and yet the negotiations continue as if they were live captives.
- The Knesset enacted a law aimed at restricting leaders' discretion on the "price" that will be paid as part of the deal: True, but this law does not and will never actually exist. Prime minister will not give up their discretion the moment they are required to make decisions.
- The families are tightly escorted by a PR campaign in order to increase the pressure on the government.
Prime Minister Netanyahu and the Mangisto family. He did not hide the affair from the public, but tried to handle it sensitively (Photos: AP, Herzl Yosef)
Now that the curtain has been lifted over the absence of Abera Mengistu and the Bedouin citizen who crossed the border and reached Gaza, the campaign has begun according to the patterns of conduct we have become accustomed to.
It's important to note that the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu handled the current affair correctly. Netanyahu was right when he decided to hold discreet talks with Hamas and when he decided not to inform the cabinet and the subcommittee of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee about the talks for the two citizens' release.
Why? Because we should memorize the basic facts rather than pin demagogic arguments on them. Two Israelis crossed the border voluntarily. They were not kidnapped, they not taken captive, and with all the required caution, it should be stated that they are responsible for their fate and there is no reason to rock an entire country in negotiations which will end with the release of dozens of murderers who will kill more Israelis. There is no arrogance or disregard here towards Israelis of Ethiopian descent or members of the Bedouin community.
Netanyahu did not hide the recent affair from the public. He tried to handle it sensitively, out of an understanding that public exposure would drag Israel into extreme negotiations, which would be accompanied by criticism from the opposition and social organizations that will try to turn the affair into another aspect of discrimination.
We can only hope that the PR campaign, which will accompany the government's effort to release the two men from now on, will not end – as always – in surrendering to Hamas' insolent demands. Unfortunately, past experience suggests otherwise.
