Where will truce lead?

Israel has had some bad experiences with ceasefires with the Palestinians in the past, particularly those announced unilaterally. Even during Yasser Arafat's time some of the ceasefires only held up for a few hours and others for a few days.

Often recalcitrant Palestinian factions used the violation of a truce to exact concessions and benefits from the Palestinian Authority, and more rarely it was an IDF operation that went wrong and brought about the renewal of fire.

As of now, we should wait a day or two to establish as to what extent the current ceasefire is viable and stable. It would also be a test of Mahmoud Abbas' credibility as well as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Popular Resistance Committees' ability to rule over their military wings and militiamen.

In any case, it can already be ascertained that the primary motive for calling a ceasefire can be attributed to the pressure emanating from the Palestinian street in the Gaza Strip and which is directed at the organizations and the armed factions.

Apparently, it's not just the Palestinian political leadership, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, who are attentive to the calls and murmurings emanating from the refugee camps and the streets of the cities, but also the leaders of the more radical organizations who are not partners to the regime.

To be honest, they have no choice. They and their families have been living for almost a year amongst a population suffering from an economic and military siege. It's not only the residents of Sderot who are suffering - the Palestinian population is also paying a heavy death toll for the "Qassam Intifada."

Almost half the fatalities and injuries incurred by the exchange of fire in recent months are boys, women, children and elderly Palestinians. Not to mention the insufferable living conditions prevalent in the Strip and the sense of humiliation of hundreds of thousands of men who are unable to provide for their families.

Détente for gaining strength

Mahmoud Abbas can be given the credit for knowing how to take advantage of the mood on the Palestinian street. The ceasefire didn't emanate from his personal influence and power of persuasion, but he knew how to be insistent and to offer the armed factions a way out at the moment of truth.

He also made sure that the Israeli government - currently under heavy public pressure to put an end to the suffering of the residents of Sderot and the western Negev and also having an interest in complying with the relatively modest requests made by Abbas – would offer it an honorable way out.

The leaderships of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other factions had even more important reasons for holding the fire: The losses incurred by the IDF's operations (some 400 fatalities since July of this year), plus the fear of a broad military offensive by Israel in the near future filled a crucial role in agreeing to Abbas' pleas.

Hamas is in need of a truce in order to reorganize itself without a broad military offensive that would ruin its process of empowerment. The other organizations are also in need of a ceasefire in order to replenish their stockpiles of Qassam rockets and other munitions; to give their people a break and to reorganize their ranks. Just as in standing armies, even guerilla and terror groups reach a breaking point following which they call for a ceasefire.

However, the main reason for the truce initiated by the Palestinians is pressure exerted by the silent population majority – it is quiet yet highly effective pressure. Therefore, the first thing Israel should do the moment it becomes apparent that the ceasefire is holding is to reward the non-combatant Palestinian population. A situation should be created whereby the Palestinian civilian population would be motivated to keep it going, and to pressure the rebellious factions to honor it.

Israel would do well to launch a humanitarian campaign that would significantly ease the plight of residents of the Gaza Strip – immediately open the crossings and grant Palestinians an initial aid package and economic benefits. Palestinian residents must be able to sense that the ceasefire is beneficial and its violation would exact a heavy toll.

From Israel's point of view, the primary danger of a ceasefire is the continued smuggling of arms and explosives via the Philadelphi Route and the strengthening of Hamas. It should also be noted that Mahmoud Abbas made a commitment on behalf of the Palestinian factions to cease "digging tunnels" but not to end smuggling.

A ceasefire binds the hands of the IDF and prevents it from taking military action to stop the strengthening of the factions; therefore, the emphasis should be on a political effort to get the Egyptians to handle the matter.

Positive signs on horizon?

The Egyptians have recently stepped up their activities in the Philadelphi Route and have even chalked up a few achievements. Two weeks ago, for example, they uncovered five smuggling tunnels in the Rafah area within one week. Even Israeli-Egyptian cooperation is currently better and more effective than in the past. However, in order to halt the smuggling, the Egyptian security forces must also take action in areas inside sovereign Egypt.

The munitions, explosives and funds funneled by Hamas, Iran and Hizbullah, pass through two main routes: From Sudan, via Egypt to Sinai and from there to the Strip through the tunnels at the Phildelphi Route and the Rafah Crossing.

The second route passes through the Mediterranean – the munitions land on the Sinai coast and even in the Delta and Nile regions, and from there they reach the Gaza Strip through the Sinai. The Egyptians are only operating along the Philadelphi Route.

Even the coordination between the intelligence forces, the Egyptian army and the Egyptian Foreign Office, involved in foiling the smuggling, is limited and is in need of improvement. Israel has already exhausted its means of pressuring the Egyptians. To obtain real results it should enlist American pressure, which may prove to be more effective in Cairo than Israel's diplomatic efforts thus far.

If the ceasefire holds up, it is likely not only to serve as a temporary relief for the residents of Sderot and the Gaza Strip, but also as leverage and  incentive for further positive developments.

It is likely to accelerate negotiations for the release of abducted soldier Gilad Shalit that is apparently at the last straight. It is also likely to allow negotiations for a ceasefire and temporary settlement in the West Bank. In the future – who knows – it may also help launch a political dialogue on a phased final settlement on the Israeli-Arab conflict.

Putting optimism aside, we currently need to focus our efforts on stabilizing the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and to ensure that it won't turn into a boomerang that would strike back at Israel within a few months or years from now, as it did in Lebanon.